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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
ENERGY, STRUCTURE, SOIL, AND SELF-REGULATION IN PLANT/SOIL SYSTEMS: 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
A new concept is presented which suggests that in stable plant/soil 
systems, plants control the soil environmental factors that affect plant 
growth and the interactions among those factors by controlling system 
structure. The concept is based on the plant-control hypothesis and 
rhizocentric model of soil structural development. The plant-control 
hypothesis declares that in plant/soil systems energy is the primary 
resource, and structure an essential regulator of energy flows. The 
rhizocentric model of soil structural development in grass-dominated 
plant/soil systems describes the process which results in plant-control 
of soil structure, and, consequently, of energy and nutrient flows for 
such systems. In conjunction, the plant-control hypothesis and 
rhizocentric model form a conceptual model of control in plant/soil 
systems. The conceptual model may help explain the self-regulatory 
capabilities of stable plant/soil systems, and the causes of instability 
in some agricultural plant/soil systems. Examination of published data 
from various sources has revealed no case in which application of the 
conceptual control model did not result in logically consistent, 
reliable prediction of experimental outcomes, plausible interpretation 
of previously uninterpretable results, and often, formulation of 
testable new hypotheses. It is concluded that the control model -- and 
the plant-control hypothesis and rhizocentric model which it implies --
iii 
has enough credibility to merit further critical examination as a 
potentially useful conceptual tool for soil and agricultural science, 
biology, and ecology. 
Bryce F. Payne Jr. 
Agronomy Department 
Colorado State University 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
There are two sensorally obvious fundamental agricultural 
resources: plants and soils. The emergence within agronomy of crop 
science and soil science as distinct subdisciplines has developed along 
lines defined by the obvious separability of plants and soils. Within 
soil science this apparent separability has been the basis of even 
further specialization. 
If a soil scientist is involved in production agriculture, then his 
orientation is toward study of the short-term physicochemical behavior 
of soils as it affects plant growth. The soil is regarded as a source 
of, or means for delivering, chemical and physical support to growing 
plants; functionally the soil is regarded as a bed of randomly arranged 
mineral, organic, and biological soil materials, which may be 
manipulated as necessary to meet production objectives. In the words of 
Buo1 et al. (1980), "Agriculturalists and industrialists may describe 
the soil as a machine, whose principal parts are aggregates and roots 
and which manufactures crops and livestock." This perception of 







If, on the other hand, the soil scientist's primary concern is soil 
genesis, then his orientation is toward study of the physicochemical 
characteristics of soil that become apparent in the long term (decades 
to millenia) as the effects of biological and other soil forming 
factors. "Soil is a coincidence of materials and arrangements related 
to the 'factors of soil formation.'" (Buol et al., 1980). The 
perception of the plant/soil system from this perspective might be 
represented as: 
Though both perceptions are valid and essential to the theoretical 
foundation of soil science, both imply that soils are "random" or 
"coincidental" arrangements of matter. Perhaps this underlying bias 
explains why there has been no concept capable of supporting a realistic 
description of the material function of either natural or agricultural 
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It is the objective of this dissertation to present such a concept. 
3 
The concept to be presented is an attempt to enable agricultural 
science to address plant/soil systems as wholistic entities, that is, as 
entities the functional parts of which are so physically numerous or 
functionally variable, and the relationships among the parts of which 
are so flexible and complex, that even apparently exhaustive enumeration 
of the parts and description of the relationships among them will not 
enable scientists to reliably predict plant/soil system behavior. 
The concept is based on five fundamental p~emises and an 
assumption. (1) Plant/soil systems appear to be adaptive, i.e., 
plant/soil systems seem to be able to respond internally to external 
events in such a manner as to assure the continued existence of 
plant/soil systems. (2) Adaptiveness is an organismic property, i.e., a 
property of life. (3) Life requires matter which can be organized into 
living material, energy which can be used to accomplish such 
organization, and knowledge of at least some organizations of matter 
which, when accomplished, will have the attribute called life. (4) 
Among the life forms in plant/soil systems only plants are capable of 
accessing solar energy to support the biological transformation 
(organization) of matter -- essentially all other life forms in 
plant/soil systems are dependent upon the energy provided by plants. 
(S) For plant/soil systems, soil (the earth in a longer-term sense) can 
be considered the source of matter, the sun the source of energy, but 
the source of life-enabling knowledge is not so readily apparent. And 
the assumption: plant behavior is the best source of reliable knowledge 
about which organizations of matter, that is, which plant and plant/soil 
structures, are most effective at assuring their own continued 
existence, and, consequently, the existence of all forms of 
4 
life energetically dependent on the sun and materially dependent on the 
soil. The development of ideas which comprises this dissertation is an 
effort to identify the logical consequences of these premises and 
assumption, that is, of this perception of plant/soil systems: 
SUN.Ap ddU' energy , ",PLANT ~ - b' un p u •• 
~OBES/ANlMALS/MAN • 
~/ 
EAR. THI-matter .... S I6 d d Ad ... 
and to determine whether or not those consequences are in accord with 
observations of the structure and function of real plant/soil systems; 
that is, whether or not the ideas presented merit further consideration 
as potentially useful conceptual tools for scientific study of 
plant/soil systems and whether the perception supporting them might 
serve as a unified conceptual foundation for soil and agricultural 
science. 
IThis dissertation is an attempt to present a (set of) concept(s) 
which has interpretable implications for all the factors suggested by 
this diagrammatic representation, but the reader should not expect to 
find in the following brief presentation attempts to discuss all such 
implications. For example, in the earth environment the atmosphere 
serves as an avenue for the transfer of matter to plants, and its 
presence and role should not be ignored. However, the atmosphere is not 
included in this diagram and not specifically discussed in the following 
text for two reasons. First, the concepts to be presented below 
consider a plant/soil system as a localized, biological phenomenon 
existing with a biologically sensible structure and on a biologically 
sensible scale, while the atmosphere is considered a global phenomenon 
neither the structure nor scale of which need be biologically sensible. 
Any given plant/soil system is considered as adapted to, or in the 
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process of adapting to, a relatively fixed range of recurring 
atmospheric phenomena, i.e. a certain climate. That is, given the 
existence of a stable plant/soil system, it is implicit that an 
atmosphere exists within which a certain climate occurs (on the site of 
the given plant/soil system). Second, the atmosphere is a much more 
fluid medium than soil; its physical structure is altered by non-
biological phenomena on far shorter time scales and over a much wider 
range of spatial scales than is the physical structure of a soil or 
plant/soil system. Whether or not the structure of the atmosphere is 
biologically modifiable or controllable cannot be directly considered 
from the level of the concepts presented in this dissertation, the level 
of the individual plant/soil system. On the other hand, the composition 
of the atmosphere is biologically modifiable, perhaps controllable. 
Although biological modification of the composition of the atmosphere is 
not discussed in this dissertation, plant-control of soil structure 
could, according to the concepts presented, enable plants to control, 
for extended periods and over extended areas, the exposure of a major 
portion of the soil microbiota to air and energy-providing substrates, 
hence, to control the activity of the soil as a source and sink for many 
gases and, consequently, the composition of the atmosphere. Similarly, 
geological events of pedological interest, those defining parent 
material and topography for instance, occur on spatiotemporal scales 
beyond sensible consideration from the level of the individual 
plant/soil system. Consequently, although the concepts presented have 
implications for the within-system transformations of parent material 
and topography, the implications are not explicitly discussed in the 
following presentation. 
Chapter 2. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE 
The objective of this dissertation is to present a mode1 2 which 
might serve as a unified conceptual foundation for soil science. The 
objective of the model (as presented in this dissertation) is to replace 
a dichotomy of concepts of the plant/soil relationship, with a single, 
wholistic concept. The concept is based upon a systematic and, in so 
far as humanly possible, objective consideration of observations of the 
material behavior of soils and plant/soil systems. The generality 
required of the model, by precluding development of sufficient "new", 
"hard", experimental data to validate the model within the time frame of 
even an extended post-graduate study, made it necessary and appropriate 
to develop and test the model through analysis of the observations of 
other researchers. 
Initially it was felt that the procedure used was a type of systems 
analysis. In practice the procedure was more generative than 
analytical. An investigation of system-analytical methods and general 
system theory revealed this disparity between the procedure used and 
systems-analytical approaches, as well as some inherent theoretical 
2More precisely, a hierarchy of three mutually dependent models, 
where, as throughout this dissertation, the term "model" should be 
understood to mean a descriptive conceptual framework, "a tentative 
ideational structure used as a testing device". It should also be 
stated that each such conceptual model, when valid, enables prediction 
of certain, specific behaviors of the modeled system, but not simulation 
of the behavior of the modeled system as a whole. 
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inadequacies in "systems" approaches. Further investigation into the 
principles of and relationships among language, logic, cognition, and 
science led to the conclusion that the procedure used was more clearly 
conceptually associated with Lesniewski's mereology, the logic of wholes 
and parts. (Some of the results of the investigation into the 
philosophical and logical principles mentioned in this paragraph and 
used throughout this chapter are considered in the Appendix. A critical 
overview of general system theory.) The principles encountered during 
that investigation reveal that any communicable model that is to be 
fully general with respect to a specific field of inquiry can be only 
qualitatively descriptive with respect to that field, and that 
qualitative models have certain characteristics. Some of the 
characteristics of qualitative models contrast sharply with those of the 
more traditionally scientifically acceptable quantitative models. 
Qualitative models may be considered analog representations and 
quantitative models digital or numerical representations. Quantitative, 
numerical, or digital models are reducible, and consequently can be 
partially valid. Such models are called reducible because they contain 
compatible submodels; alteration, replacement, or removal of which may 
change the numerical value of predictions (output) the model produces, 
but will not cause a functional or logical collapse of the model as a 
whole. For example f one version of a given model might accurately 
(quantitatively) predict the behavior of some real system in 90% of the 
studied cases, while a reduced version, say, miSSing a submodel, in 60%, 
and both versions will be considered representations of the same real 
system. 
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Qualitative models, in contrast, are wholistic, not reducible, 
conceptual black boxes if you will, either wholly valid or wholly 
invalid. To clarify, valid qualitative models are not reducible 
because, even though they may contain submodels, no submodel can be 
removed or altered without causing a logical, hence functional, collapse 
of the model as a whole. This is so because qualitative predictions can 
be assigned only the logical values of "true" or "false"; that is, a 
qualitative model makes predictions that are either 100% accurate 
(qualitatively) or are simply wrong. There can be no partially accurate 
qualitative predictions, and consequently no partially valid qualitative 
models. In practice, whenever a qualitative model fails to accurately 
predict the qualitative behavior of a real system to which it is 
applicable, that qualitative model must be rejected as a whole, though 
valid submodels may be used to formulate other new testable models. 
Valid qualitative models are essential to science, though their 
place is not generally recognized. A qualitative model developmentally 
precedes and functionally encompasses every quantitative model (again, 
the reader is referred to the Appendix for a consideration of the 
linguistic, logical, and cognitive principles supporting this 
statement). The development of valid qualitative models is difficult 
and slow (relative to the development of quantitative models in which 
partial validity can be tolerated). They generally appear suddenly, 
and remain forever likely to disappear just as suddenly as a consequence 
of a single predictive failure. The procedure used to develop the model 




The procedure used was in principle identical with a traditional 
scientific method: observe, attempt to explain what was observed, test 
the explanation, if the explanation fails the test reformulate it, or if 
it passes, formulate an explanation for other observations. However, 
the objective of the effort behind this dissertation was to develop a 
general, qualitative representation of soil structure and later, by 
implication, control in plant/soil systems. 
Because of its qualitative objective the procedural application of 
the scientific method was subject to two constraints not encountered, or 
at least not dealt with, in quantitative scientific studies. First, 
generality was a required characteristic of the model under study. That 
generality precluded experimental generation of sufficient data to 
clearly support or refute the model. Consequently, it was necessary to 
turn to the literature for sufficient data from sufficiently different 
situations so that testing of the model could be considered to 
demonstrate a general validity. Second, a qualitative model can be 
refuted by a single, unexplainable, valid observation of a real system 
to which the model is applicable. Therefore, in order to assure valid 
testing of the model, it was necessary to select from the literature 
only data or observations from or about studies to which the model was 
retrospectively applicable. 
A three-step selection process was used in order to safeguard 
against selecting for consideration only those studies the results of 
which would support the model, and at the same time to assure that the 
model would not be improperly refuted by an attempt to explain 
observations of a study to which the model was not applicable. The first 
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step was to (i) determine whether the model had any general 
applicability to the study under consideration as a potential data 
source. For example, the model would not be considered applicable to a 
study of the differences in inter-varietal effects of a foliar 
application of a pesticide on corn yields, while it might or might not 
be considered applicable to a study of the relationship of soil type to 
the effects of pesticide residues on corn yields. Next. when general 
applicability was apparent, as for example, to a study of long-term 
effects of different tillage practices on crop yields, 
(ii) applicability to a specific study was determined on the basis of 
whether the report of the study allowed an adequate evaluation of the 
variables required by the model. If the model was considered applicable 
to a particular study on the basis of the general and specific subjects 
of that study, then (iii) the procedure and data reported were examined 
to assure their technical validity. No study which was found to meet 
these selection criteria could be eliminated from consideration because 
its data did not support the model. 
The procedure used may be summarized, then, as follows: 
1. A conceptual model is proposed. 
2. Each study to be used for testing the model is selected on the 
basis of: 
(i) General relevance of the model to the subject of study_ 
(ii) Compatibility of the study with the data requirements 
of the model. 
(iii) Technical reliability of the data reported. 
3. The model is given the experimental conditions and any other 
relevant, reliable information available. 
4. The predictions of the model are compared to the results 
reported for the study. 
No procedure is offered for the original formulation of the models 
presented, since the means by which they became apparent to the author 
are unknown except to the extent that they are described in the 
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discussion of philosophic and logical principles presented in the 
Appendix. Those principles suggest that the orderliness (and beauty) of 
the natural universe, and the phenomena that occur within it, is not a 
measurable object, but a perceivable quality; that perception of this 
quality is a primitive, biological, adaptively advantageous, cognitive 
function; and that there is no substitute for patient and humble 
cogitation in the pursuit of an understanding of the laws of nature and 
how they might be wisely applied to the benefit of humankind. 
A word regarding the organization and content of the following 
chapters. Self-regulatory control in plant/soil systems is modeled 
(chapter 5) as the result of the simultaneous application of the model 
of biological control of energy use in plant/soil systems (chapter 3, 
the plant-control hypothesis) and a model of soil structural development 
(chapter 4, the rhizocentric model). The order of presentation is not 
intended as a representation of the chronological or developmental order 
of the models, but only as a communicatively effective organiZation of 
the concepts. There is a hierarchical functional relationship among the 
models, the soil structure model within the biological control model 
which is within the composite control (self-regulation) model. Adequate 
input to a lower level model(s) produces specific qualitative 
predictions about higher level(s)t while input to a higher level can 
produce only general predictions with respect to a lower level. Each 
model can be used to produce quantitative predictions within the same 
level, given appropriate quantitative input. 
Chapter 3. ENERGY, STABILITY, AND CONTROL IN PlANT/SOIL SYSTEMS: 
THE PLANT-CONTROL HYPOTHESIS 
INTRODUCTION 
G. V. Jacks (1963) wrote, "It is commonly agreed that the so-
called climax plant association with its associated fauna, in 
equilibrium with the climate. is the social organism which makes the 
fullest use of the environment; the plants and animals have made the 
best possible living conditions for themselves; and the productivity of 
the soil is then the highest possible under the prevailing conditions." 
Jacks used the terms fertility and productivity interchangeably, 
concluding n ••• soil fertility is a biophysical rather than a 
physicochemical phenomenon." Following Jacks' lead, Cooke (1967, p. xi) 
wrote, "The fertility of soil undisturbed by man is its capacity to 
support the climax population of plants and animals above ground and the 
associated flora and fauna below ground. When taken over for 
agriculture, the fertility of the soil becomes its capacity to produce 
the crops desired ... The inevitable result of farming is always to 
diminish natural fertility, because portions of the total supply of 
plant nutrients, and of the organic compounds made with the aid of the 
energy of sunshine, are removed. In undisturbed communities these would 
be returned to the soil, to be used again as food for plants and 
animals, so maintaining or increasing fertility. If 
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Production agriculture has had little or no concern with an 
ecological definition of soil fertility/productivity until recently_ As 
long as arable land or fertilizer and fuel were plentiful and cheap, a 
loss in "natural fertility" had no immediate practical importance. Now 
the situation has changed: More than 10% of the earth's land surface is 
presently under cultivation, and most of the remaining potentially 
arable land is marginal (Cox and Atkins, 1979, p. 12-18; Larson, 1986). 
Fuel and fertilizer supplies are unreliable in many areas of the world. 
The need to develop and adopt farming practices that do not inevitably 
diminish soil productivity -- the need to develop a "sustainable 
agriculture" -- is now widely recognized (USDA-ARS, 1983). Efforts to 
develop a "sustainable agriculture" will likely be benefited by every 
insight into how stable ecosystems maintain fertility/productivity. 
This chapter presents the "plant-control" hypothesis which suggests that 
plants induce biological maintenance of fertility/productivity by 
biophysically controlling production and decomposition processes. 
SOIL FERTILITY/PRODUCTIVITY: ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Several writers remark about a lack of the knowledge necessary to 
develop a practical ecological definition of soil fertility/produc-
tivity. One predicted that the secret of soil fertility will be 
revealed only when the ways of life of many kinds of bacteria and other 
microscopic organisms of the soil are known. "Crops, soil, and soil 
microorganisms must need be investigated simultaneously: a great task 
fraught with great issues for the welfare of mankind" (Keeble, 1932, p. 
145-146). Cox and Atkins (1979, p. 219) stated that soil is a ... portion 
of a terrestrial ecosystem ... an ecosystem in its own right ... the 
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complexity and variability of which are extraordinary. Since many of 
its important functions take place among microscopic organisms within a 
dense, opaque matrix, it is one of the most difficult of ecosystems to 
study, and as yet we have but meager knowledge of its structure and 
dynamics. Both writers mention "microscopic organisms", reflecting the 
essential role of soil microbes in soil fertility/ productivity. 
ENERGY AND CONTROL OF NUTRIENTS IN STABLE ECOSYSTEMS 
I begin this ecologically oriented discussion of soils and 
plant/soil ecosystem fertility by considering certain differences and 
similarities, and the nature of a possible biological "common thread" 
between two ecosystems that often appear, especially for agricultural 
purposes, to present two environmental extremes: the tropical rain 
forest and the temperate semiarid grassland. 
The Rain Forest: An Ecosystem in One Environment 
In the rain forest most biological activity occurs outside the 
mineral soil. This limited role of the mineral soil facilitates 
discussion of three ideas: (i) Biomass and detritus are the most 
biologically effective means of retaining nutrients in an ecosystem. 
(ii) The ability of the soil to support the plant community, i.e., its 
fertility, is its ability to retain, not just contain, effectively 
plant-available nutrients. This ability increases proportionally as the 
detrital food web extends into the soil. (iii) Successful retention of 
nutrients by an ecosystem depends on the coordination of production and 
decomposition processes. The plant community controls energy and, 
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consequently, decomposition in and nutrient release from the detrital 
food web. 
Nutrient Retention in Biomass and Detritus 
Although recent studies have shown nutrients may be lost by 
volatilization (Morgan et al., 1985; O'Deen and Porter, 1986) and 
leaching from living plants, these losses are. especially in stable 
natural systems, much smaller than might be expected if the nutrients 
were in the soil (Vervelde, 1978). Tropical rain forest ecosystems 
depend on plant/microbial symbioses that intercept nutrients prior to 
release from detritus. These relations assure that the nutrient supply 
is essentially all in plant biomass, detritus, or in the microbial 
biomass of microorganisms under energetic control of the plants. 
Productivity and Soil Fertility 
Just how much the fertility of the soil ecosystem affects the 
productivity of the entire host terrestrial ecosystem is variable, 
particularly when there is a question of what constitutes the soil. 
Generally, soil is defined as the uppermost portion of the crust of the 
earth on and within which resides the terrestrial plant and animal 
populations of an ecosystem. Often, especially in an agricultural 
context, surface layers of accumulated organic litter and detrital 
materials are not considered a functional part of the soil. This can be 
a troublesome exclusion (van Wambeke, 1978). 
For example, try to reconcile ecological descriptions of soil 
fertility/productivity with the above soil definition. Cox and Atkins 
(1979, p. 247) say that the fertility of the soil ecosystem is 
determined by how well it retains water and nutrients in forms readily 
available to plants. Cooke (1967, p. xi) holds that the fertility of 
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soil undisturbed by man is its capacity to support the climax population 
of plants with the associated fauna and microflora. In tropical rain 
forests the underlying mineral soils do, indeed, support the climax 
population. Many studies have shown, however, that when the litter 
layer is removed, these soils fail to retain nutrients and/or water to 
support a climax plant population (Herrera et al., 1978; van Wambeke, 
1978). Rather, the plant-available nutrients are stored within the 
standing plant biomass and the detritus and decomposer biomass which 
occur outside the mineral soil. Plant-fungal symbioses (mycorrhizae) are 
very common and the host plant exploits directly, via the decomposing 
activities of the symbiont fungus, the nutrients in recently fallen 
litter. Such relationships protect the nutrient resources essential to 
the long-term survival of the tropical rain forest ecosystem by 
preventing release of nutrients to the mineral soil (Herrera et al .• 
1978; Stark, 1971; van Wambeke, 1978). 
The Detrital Food Web and Soil Fertility 
Retention and recycling of nutrients within an ecosystem are 
essential to its survival. That the detrital food web is effective for 
nutrient retention and recycling is well-established (Thompson, 1952, p. 
42-49; Vervelde, 1978). Though the rain forest ecosystem is productive, 
the soil is not fertile, because the detrital food web is outside the 
mineral soil. The latter, consequently, has minimal retentive capacity 
for plant-available forms of nutrients and moisture (van Wambeke, 1978). 
In the rain forest ecosystem, the most important role of the mineral 
soil is not to store nutrients or shelter sensitive organisms, but 
provide a physical foundation that can accept and drain away large 
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amounts of rainfall without incurring destabilizing soil losses (de 
Mooy, 1981, personal communication; Unger and McCalla, 1980). 
Coordination of Production and Decomposition 
All biological activity in stable terrestrial ecosystems depends on 
the energy provided by plant production (Cox and Atkins, 1979, p. 40; 
Jacks, 1963; Thompson, 1952, p. 42). On the other hand, the nutrients 
that permit production depend on decomposition by microbes. 
Coordination of these complementary processes, production and 
decomposition, is inherent in the rain forest ecosystem for two reasons. 
First, but perhaps less importantly, producers and decomposers share a 
common environment, outside the soil. When environmental conditions 
limit production they likely limit decomposition as well. Second, the 
primary decomposers and producers are directly physiologically linked in 
mycorrhizal and other symbiotic associations which dominate p1ant-
microbe relations in the rain forest. Because of the symbiotic 
connections, plant activity throttles microbial activity; hence, 
production and decomposition are coordinated. 
The biota of tropical rain forest ecosystems meet the constraints 
imposed by a constantly warm, high rainfall environment. Analogously, 
the biotas of other ecosystems must meet the constraints of their 
particular environments, some where moisture and temperature vary widely 
with weather and season. 
The Temperate Grassland: An Ecosystem in Two Environments 
The temperate grasslands are among the most agriculturally 
important ecosystems (Jackson, 1984). Temperate grassland soils, unlike 
those of tropical rain forests, support a biota adapted to an 
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environment where both cold and lack of moisture constrain plant 
activity for extended periods. The ecosystem's need for a stable 
foundation is coupled with a need for shelter. As in the rain forest, 
stability requires coordination of production and decomposition. 
However, the factors permitting passive coordination in the rain forest 
are not effective in the grassland ecosystem. 
Soil and the Need for Shelter ---- --- --- ---- ---
In grasslands many decomposer microorganisms depend on the soil for 
protection, their activity above-ground being severely limited 
(Woodmansee, 1984). In fact, most microorganisms survive in grassland 
ecosystems within the dense, opaque matrix of the mineral soil, 
partially protected from lethal effects of the wet/dry, freeze/thaw 
cycles characteristic of the above-ground environment. Perennial plants 
survive similarly protected within the soil body. Such plants invest 
relatively large amounts of energy to develop and maintain extensive, 
durable root systems that can survive winter cold or extended drought. 
Also, such root systems conserve nitrogen (N) by retaining and recycling 
N within the living plant biomass, and they permit rapid, effective 
response to major or minor rainfall events (Clark, 1977; Woodmansee, 
1984). Even many of the consumers of the grassland ecosystems, various 
rodents and insects, seek refuge from the "elements" by residing within 
the soil. The detrital food web, then, is mostly limited to operate 
within the confines of the protective soil environment. 
Coordination of Production and Decomposition 
Not a result of environmental coincidences -- The producers provide 
inputs of new available energy when environmental conditions both above 
and within the soil are favorable for plant growth. However, microbial 
19 
activities in most of the detrital food web are determined only by the 
environmental conditions within the soil. Further. soil microbes are 
not so fastidious in their environmental requirements as plant roots. 
Microbial decomposition of plant residues has been found to occur at 
moisture levels well below those at which root activity ceases 
(Bartholomew and Norman, 1946). Frequently, then, below-ground 
conditions permit microbial activity when environmental conditions 
prevent plant activity. Decomposition at such times releases nutrients 
that may accumulate and become subject to leaching or volatilization. 
When such losses exceed nutrient inputs, productivity is reduced, 
eventually threatening the survival of the biota and the ecosystem. 
In laboratory studies microbial communities decompose and release 
the nutrients from most of the organic materials found in grassland 
soils rather rapidly. However, field studies show that volatilization 
and leaching losses are minimal for grassland ecosystems (Clark, 1977; 
Woodmansee, 1978). Organic matter of intact soil, then, must release 
nutrients at much slower rates than predicted from results of laboratory 
studies. Such information and the decrease of organic matter in soils 
under cultivation, have led to the generalization that decomposition is 
relatively slow in intact grassland soils. 
It has been suggested that slowed but prolonged decomposition, 
induced by relatively cool soil temperatures and higher moisture levels 
caused by vegetative and litter cover, reduce losses of released 
nutrients (Woodmansee, 1984). Transpiration, however, always reduces 
soil moisture, and at least one study has shown that decomposition in 
grasslands is more closely related to moisture availability than 
temperature (de Jong, 1981). The results of a carbon-14 (14C) 
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laboratory study of soil respiration under blue grama (Bouteloua 
gracilis (H.B.K.) Lag.) also indicated temperature was not as 
restrictive of microbial activity as might be expected (Dormaar and 
Sauerbeck, 1983) (Table 3.1). Evolution of 14C-labelled carbon dioxide 
(14C02) was measurable throughout a simulated winter even though the 
soil eventually froze. 
Table 3.1. Redistribution over three simulated seasons of l4C activity 
photosynthetically fixed during the first simulated summer 
and translocated to roots by blue grama [Bouteloua gracilis 









FIRST SUMMER1 FALL/WINTER SECOND SUMMER2 
-------------------(% of l4C activity)-----------------
41 16 16 
27 48 44 to <48 
31 4 0 to <4 
lAll l4C labelling occurred during the first summer through 
photosynthetic fixation of 14C from 14C02 in the above-ground 
atmosphere. 
2Ranges are reported for soil and C02 because of the unknown 
distribution of 14C activity retained in shoots over winter and 
translocated below-ground during the second summer. 
Further, mass balances on carbon (C) suggest decomposition in 
grasslands is not slow. One such mass balance was prepared for a 
Canadian grassland soil (data from van Veen and Paul, 1981) by assuming 
grassland soils are in a steady state with respect to organic C and 
using an estimate of the rate of loss of organic carbon from cultivated 
Canadian grassland soils (de Jong, 1981). Decomposition of root 
residues in native prairie (1300 kg-C ha- 1 yr-l) was only 64 kg-C ha- l 
yr- l less than total decomposition apparent for a parallel cultivated 
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soil (calculated as 1104 kg-C ha- 1 yr-1 crop residues plus 260 kg-C ha- 1 
yr- 1 in organic matter losses -- 260 kg-C ha- 1 yr- 1 is likely an 
overestimate of losses due to decomposition since some of this is 
probably erosion loss). If only 6.41 of the grassland above-ground 
residue (1000 kg-C ha- 1 yr-1) were considered as input to the soil, then 
the decomposition rate would equal that of the cultivated soil. In 
fact, it was estimated that 50X of the grassland above-ground residue 
was input to the soil. Clearly in this case, decomposition in grassland 
soil was not less than in cultivated soil. 
Additionally, a crop-fallow management system causes higher soil 
temperatures in periods of adequate moisture (no transpiration losses 
during fallow) than occur in grassland soil. The decomposition rate 
during the less frequent periods of activity in the grassland must have 
exceeded the rates in the presumably more-favored cultivated soil. 
Otherwise, annual decomposition in the grassland could not equal or 
exceed that of the cultivated soil. Again, it follows that microbial 
activity (decomposition) is higher in the presence of active plants than 
when conditions appear to favor microbial activity but plants are 
inactive or absent. Thus, examination of the environmental conditions 
required by plants and microbes and the two environments in grassland 
ecosystems reveals, but does not explain, the coordination of production 
and decomposition. 
Not a Result of Symbiotic Dependencies -- Most plant and microbial 
activities are symbiotically linked in rain forest ecosystems. 
Mycorrhizae, essential in the rain forest detrital food web, apparently 
are less important in grassland soils. Mycorrhizal infection may be an 
adaptation to environmental constraints, but once the fungal symbiont is 
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established, supporting it apparently is obligate for the host plant. 
The symbiosis is an energy expense that is not always compensated by 
greater nutrient availability for the host plant (Alexander, 1977). 
In a tropical rain forest, where photosynthetic energy supplies to 
roots are less constrained, spending energy to improve nutrient 
availability would be advantageous. But, mycorrhizae apparently do not 
improve nutrient availability to plants in relatively fertile soils, and 
plant activity in temperate grasslands suffers lengthy interruptions. 
During such interruptions, supporting the fungus would reduce energy 
reserves for root maintenance and initiation of new shoots when 
environmental conditions improve. These factors may explain the 
questionable importance of mycorrhizae in productive grasslands and 
other fertile soils (Alexander, 1977, p. 71; Focht and Martin, 1979). 
Legumes and the rhizobial symbiosis are often of minor importance in 
grassland ecosystems (Jackson, 1984). Thus, symbiotic plant/microbe 
relationships cannot adequately explain the coordination of plant and 
microbial activity in stable, productive grasslands. 
Energy and Plant-Control of Microbial Activity -- The tight 
coupling of plant and microbial activity in the detrital food web of 
grassland ecosystems appears an enigma. Often, conditions favor 
microbial rather than plant activity yet decomposition rates indicated 
by nutrient losses seem low during these periods. Decomposition rates, 
however, must be quite high when plants are active to achieve the 
required high annual turnover. There is no direct phYSiological link 
between the microbial decomposers and plants, nor a sharing by these two 
groups of the above-ground environment in grasslands -- the linking 
factors apparently important in rain forests. 
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The inadequacy of the "competitionn hypothesis that explains the 
coupling of plant and microbial activity in grasslands as due to the 
simultaneous occurrence of plant-favorable and microbe·favorable 
environmental conditions, has already been discussed. (The reasons for so 
naming this hypothesis will become clear.) The problem with this 
hypothesis is not obvious theoretical inadequacies, but an assumption that 
experimental results obtained from agriculturally or experimentally 
disturbed soils can be reasonably extrapolated to undisturbed soils. Plants 
are left out of most studies of soil microbial activities, and when plants 
have been present, it has almost always been in disturbed soils: plowed, or 
sieved for greenhouse or laboratory studies. Interpretation of results from 
such experiments gave rise to the adage, "Microbes are first to the table" 
with respect to uptake of nutrients. That is, soil organisms usually 
extract their nutrient quota first and higher plants must subsist on what 
remains available (Brady, 1974, p. 132). Competition for limited nutrients 
is the central concept a correct interpretation when adequate available 
energy substrate makes soil microbes much better competitors for nutrients 
than plants. Competition, however, requires that the competitors be 
functionally independent. The functional independence of plants and soil 
microbes, correct for disturbed soils, should not be presumed correct for 
undisturbed soils, especially those of climax ecosystems. 
Consider again the tropical rain forest where plants exercise much 
control over microbial activities through a direct microbial dependence 
on them for energy_ The key to the remarkably-effective nutrient 
conservation of this ecosystem is the dependence of microbial 
decomposers, the only organisms capable of increasing the supply of 
plant-available nurtrients, on the plant producers. The nature of the 
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cooperative plant and microbial commmunities (mycorrhizae being one 
example) that have developed in rain forests is the result of adaptation 
to an environment where light, temperature, and moisture rarely limit 
plant activity. 
Grassland ecosystems also efficiently conserve nutrients. If soil 
microbes and plants independently competed for nutrients, then intense 
microbial and plant activity would not coincide nor would low microbial 
activity occur during microbe-favorable/plant-unfavorable periods. 
Neither grassland nor rain forest ecosystems seem to have the 
independence of microbial and plant activities necessary for 
competition. However, in the grassland, the detrital food web is mostly 
underground and plant-microbe symbioses are less common. Further, 
microbially available nutrients are plentiful as is organic C. Despite 
plentiful nutrients and substrate for microbes, their activity is 
disproportionately low during periods of reduced plant activity. Plant 
activity releases energy as organic C into the soil, stimulating 
microbial activity (Alexander, 1977, p. 427-429; Foster et al., 1983; 
Merckx et a1., 1985). Thus, a "plant-control hypothesis" is proposed. 
THE PLANT-CONTROL HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis is that in stable grasslands, as well as in stable 
forest ecosystems, plants control microbial decomposition of organic 
matter and the associated transformations of nutrients by controlling 
the supply of energy_ The "plant-control" hypothesis can be valid only 
if three conditions exist in grassland soils. First, microbial activity 
must be energy-limited when plants are inactive. Second, since organic C 
(energy substrate) is plentiful in grassland soils, even when plants are 
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inactive, energy limitation must depend on some abiotic soil factor(s). 
Third, plant activity must effectively control the soil factor(s) 
limiting energy. 
Soil Microbes Are Starved 
The lack of microbially available energy in soils is well 
recognized (Alexander, 1977). Generally, there are adequate inorganic 
nutrients but little readily utilizable organic nutrients. Evolution of 
C02 from soil will increase upon addition of a simple organic compound, 
but not when inorganic nutrients are added. Soil fractions produced 
more striking results in the same manner when supplemented with soluble 
C substrate vs. inorganic nutrients (Payne, 1985). Also, the 
"rhizosphere effect" or microbe population increase adjacent to active 
plant roots is thought a response to root-derived, readily utilizable 
energy substrate (Alexander, 1977, p. 427-429; Merckx et al., 1985). No 
such response occurs beyond the rhizosphere though concentrations of 
inorganic nutrients likely are higher there. Thus, soil microbes lack 
available energy substrate when or where plants are inactive. 
Factors Limiting the Microbial Availability of Energy 
Three factors are thought to limit microbial access to the energy 
in soil organics: humification of organics, adsorption on soil 
particles, and occlusion within soil aggregates (Anderson, 1979; Black, 
1968, p. 414-416; Payne, 1985). Additionally, the factors are 
interdependent. Under the same climate and vegetation, the nature and 
amount of humic substances are related to the quality of soil particles, 
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and the quality and extent of soil structure is related to the soil 
organic matter, soil mineralogy, and particle size distribution. 
Humification 
More humified soil organics, those with higher molecular weight and 
aromaticity, are thought to resist microbial attack (Anderson, 1979). It 
is logical that the soil microbes must be able to decompose nearly any 
natural organic substance (Alexander, 1977, p. 130; Payne, 1985). And 
research results have been equivocal for a strong humification role in 
protecting soil organics (Skjemstad et al., 1986; Payne, 1985). 
Aromatic substrates that might be expected to occur naturally in 
soils do not seem to resist soil microbial attack. Several monomeric 
aromatic compounds when added to soil were decomposed to C02 as 
effectively as glucose (Huntjens et al., 1981). They and others suggest 
the apparent resistance of some phenolics is due to polymerization side 
reactions that occur during oxidative degradation (Haider and Martin, 
1975). Several genera of soil bacteria cleave polymers, chosen as 
models of lignin and humics, if supplied with an available energy 
substrate (Rast et al., 1980). Some authors mention a likely 
cooperative or mutualistic attack on soil organics by microbes (Payne, 
1985; Rast et a1., 1980; Sato, 1981). 
Highly humified organic matter in a silt fraction free of clay, and 
less humified organic matter in a clay fraction, decomposed at similar 
high rates so long as soluble energy substrate was supplied (Payne, 
1985) (Fig. 3.1). Dormaar and Pittman (1980) noted that the lignin 
content increased in crop residues decomposing underground in fallow and 
in root residues decomposing over winter in grassland soil, but 
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Fig. 3.1. Effect of added soluble carbon substrate (cellobiose) on the 
extent of microbial utilization of the carbon in soil organic 
matter associated with different fine soil particle size 
fractions (i.e., chemically different soil organic matter 
fractions). Data of Payne (1985). 
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planting. It is suggested that stabilization by adsorption and 
humification arises primarily from the insolubility of adsorbed or 
humified substrates (Payne, 1985). 
Adsorption 
Adsorption of organics, especially by clays, is thought to thwart 
enzymatic microbial attack by hindering geometry or substrate 
accessibility. Adsorption reduces the solubility of the adsorbed 
organics. If substrate solubility is important, then soil microbes 
should require readily available energy to excrete and maintain in the 
soil solution the enzymes necessary to attack less soluble substrates. 
Addition of soluble substrate promoted decomposition of clay-adsorbed 
organic matter (Payne, 1985). Addition of plant residues promoted loss 
of soil organic matter under both laboratory (Table 3.2) and field 
conditions (Broadbent, 1947; Broadbent and Norman, 1946; Rouse, 1947). 
It appears that soil microbes do attack humified, lignified, or adsorbed 
materials when provided adequately available energy. 
Table 3.2. Effect of decomposition of added (13C-labelled) sudan grass 
(Sorghum vulgare L.) residues on mineralization of soil 
organic matter in soil incubated for 11 days. Data from 
Broadbent and Norman (1946). 
Sudan grass residue added 













633.1 417.8 215.3 
980.7 651.5 329.2 
Occlusion 
Research demonstrating stabilization of soil organic matter by 
occlusion in specific structural units is rare. But research showing 
increased microbial attack when soils are physically disturbed is common 
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(Black, 1968, p.4l6-4l8). Grinding a previously sieved sod soil caused 
a 140% increase in C02 evolution (Powlson, 1980). Reaggregation of 
dispersed clays decreased loss of occluded organic matter, despite added 
soluble substrate (Payne, 1985). Artificial aggregates protected l4C_ 
labeled starch until they were disrupted by mechanical or wet-dry 
treatments (Adu and Oades, 1978). For this discussion it does not 
matter whether disturbance promotes microbial attack by increasing 
physical exposure or improving aeration. It is only important that 
microbial attack increases with physical disturbance and with added 
energy substrate. 
Plant-Control of Microbial Activity 
Whether plant activity controls the soil factor(s) limiting 
microbial activity has not been directly examined. However, plant roots 
are known to release significant amounts of organic compounds into the 
soil, probably causing the "rhizosphere effect". Further, plant root 
growth physically disturbs the soil. Plant root activity, then, both 
physically disturbs the structure of soil and increases readily 
available energy supplies. It seems reasonable, in view of the previous 
discussion, to expect that plant activity would increase microbial 
activity and consequently, decomposition of soil organics. 
Plants Stimulate Mineralization of Soil Organic Matter 
Analysis of the data of Beale et al. (1955) and Johnston et al. 
(1942), as examples among several, indicates an increase in annual 
decomposition of soil organic matter in agricultural soils as the time 
under actively growing plant cover increases. Using isotopic nitrogen 
(15N) , Bartholomew and Clark (1950) concluded that total mineralization 
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in cropped soil was four times that in the same soil in fallow. Haider 
et al. (1987) reporting a 15N study of the effects of plant roots on 
denitrification observed, "The mineralization of organic N seems to be 
greatly enhanced by the presence of plants." In other work the 
microbial biomass in fallow plots changed little in a year, while in 
plots planted to wheat and pasture the microbial biomass increased from 
the time of seeding (Ladd et al., 1981). Large biomass increases 
occurred in the planted soils shortly after fall rains. Biomass 
responses to the rains were slower and much smaller in the unplanted 
soil. Note that these observations contradict the "competition" 
hypothesis. Despite an absence of plant competition for nutrients in 
the unplanted soil, the microbial biomass did not respond to moisture 
inputs as it did in the planted soil where plants were competing for 
both moisture and nutrients. These results indicate that plant activity 
controls microbially-restrictive soil factor(s) to permit higher levels 
of microbial activity. 
Plants Suppress Decomposition of Their Own Residues 
If plant root activity only removed the effects of the restrictive 
soil factor(s) to permit unrestricted microbial activity, there would be 
nothing to stop the microbes until all C substrate had been exhausted. 
Such control would not conserve ecosystem integrity. Effective plant 
control must assure not only adequate mineralization i.e., adequate 
levels of appropriate microbial activity--to meet plant nutrient 
requirements during growth, but also must assure that when plant 
activity ceases, microbial activity is restricted such that net 
mineralization is minimized. Mineralizable N in grassland soils has 
been found to decrease through the growing season, being restored during 
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the winter (Fig.3.2). The results of Eagle (1961) and Richardson (1938) 
suggest microbial activity leading to net N mineralization predominates 
during active plant growth despite high levels of available C (from 
plant inputs) and low levels of available N (due to plant uptake). That 
is, plant activity induces net mineralization in the presence of an 
apparently high C:N ratio -- the condition traditionally considered to 
promote immobilization. The increase in mineralizable N during the 
winter suggests that microbial activity leading to net mineralization of 
N is reduced, despite less available C and presumably more available N 
due to an absence of plant "competition" for N. Summarizing these 
results, mineralizable N increased over winter when plants were inactive 
and decreased during spring and summer when plants were active. the 
latter condition apparently inducing microbial activity leading to net N 
mineralization. 
Merckx et al. (1985) presented data suggesting that plant activity 
may control soil factor(s) to stabilize root-derived organic substrate. 
Wheat (Triticum aestivum L. var. Sicco) plants grew in a phytotron for 
32 days with the shoots in an atmosphere enriched with labeled 14C02 and 
the roots in pots with a separately controlled atmosphere with no label. 
The arrangement enabled measurement of l4C-labeled photosynthate 
translocated from shoots to roots, lost from roots to soil (including 
microbial biomass and root-derived materials), and respired by roots and 
microbes to gaseous 14C02' 
The study examined the dynamics of root-derived 14C in two soils of 
different texture, a sandy soil (960 g kg- l sand, 20 g kg- l silt, and 20 
g kg- l clay) and a silty clay loam (130 g kg- l sand, 500 g kg- 1 silt, 





Fig. 3.2. Seasonal patterns of potentially mineralizable nitrogen under 
grasses and above-ground production of pasture grasses in 
England. Adapted from Richardson (1938), and Anslow and 
Green (1967). 
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loam soil accumulated more labeled microbial biomass and retained more 
of the fixed l4C in root-derived materials, despite more root biomass 
and soil respiration in the sandy soil (Fig.3.3). 
The data from the sand show that after 18 days of shoot exposure 
to l4C02 root biomass and soil contained 63% of the l4C translocated 
from the shoots to the roots, decreasing to just over 61% after 32 days 
exposure (Fig. 3.4). In contrast, in the more clayey soil the 
translocated 14C remaining in the roots and soil increased from 61% 
after 18 days shoot exposure to 14C02 to 71% after 32 days exposure. 
In the sandy soil, decompostion of translocated l4C-organics to 
14C02 increased with increasing root l4C, indicating decomposition of 
root-derived materials was related to release of labelled substrate from 
the roots (Figures 3.3, 3.4). In the more clayey soil, the portion of 
translocated l4C-organics respired/decomposed (to 14C02) decreased as 
the quantity of roots and root-derived materials increased (Figures 3.3, 
3.4). That is. plant activity affected the more clayey soil in a manner 
that resulted in stabilization of recently released organic substrates. 
Results from another phytotron l4C study carried out by Dormaar and 
Sauerbeck (1983), using blue grama, also indicated a distinct 
stabilization of recently deposited root-derived carbon (Table 3.1)'. 
During the first simulated summer, when all photosynthetic labelling 
occurred, 27% of the 14C activity translocated below-ground was 
recovered in the soil while 31% was respired/decomposed to 14C02' 
Despite release of more than half the 14C activity from recoverable 
roots during the simulated fall/winter, bringing that recovered in the 
soil to 48%, only 4% of the 14C was respired/decomposed to 14C02_ The 
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Fig. 3.3. Effects of soil texture on the l4C activity (kBq) in the 
roots in, and C02 (root+microbial respiration) evolved from, 
two soils (a sandy soil and a silty clay loam) planted to 
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3.4. Effects of soil texture on the stability of recently wheat-
root-derived, 14C·labelled organics. 
(A) The portion of 14C activity translocated to roots that 
remained in the soil and roots, i.e., that was not 
respired/decomposed to 14C02, on each sampling date. 
(B) The effects of the amount of 14C (activity) in roots and 
soil on the portion of 14C (activity) translocated to roots 
and respired/decomposed to 14C02. Data of Merckx et a1. 
(1985). 
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the recoverable roots (35% having been evolved as l4C02 over the 
preceeding two seasons), but less, probably considerably less, than 4% 
of the l4C was respired/decomposed to l4C02. This is all the more 
striking when one considers that the second summer was the period of the 
greatest total (12C02 + l4C02) soil respiration. The results indicate 
the 14C deposited by the roots during the preceeding seasons was 
remarkably stable during the second summer. 
An important role for clays in plant-induced stabilization of root-
derived materials is shown, also, by the results of Craswell and Waring 
(1972 a, b). Those authors examined the effect of grinding on N 
mineralization in soils of different clay contents. Grinding grassland 
soils increased the mineralization of N only in soils with more than 10% 
clay. Further, the effect was more pronounced for soils containing 
montmorillonitic clays than for those with kaolinitic clays. Their 
findings suggest that grinding disrupts soil structural units in which 
clay is an essential component and which stabilize labile soil organics 
as long as the units remain undisturbed. 
The findings of Craswell and Waring (1972 a, b), Dormaar and 
Sauerbeck (1983), Merckx et al. (1985), and Richardson (1938) taken 
together, suggest that plant activity stabilizes labile organics in root 
and microbial residues by inclusion within structural units formed as a 
consequence of the effects of root activity on soil particles, 
especially clays. Further, the character and extent of microbial 




The information presented indicates that the "plant control" 
hypothesis is reasonable. Plants may control microbial activity by at 
least two root effects on the soil environment. Growing plant roots 
physically disturb the soil structure while releasing readily available 
energy into the surrounding soil. Stabilization of energy substrates by 
occlusion within plant-induced structural units, the formation and 
efficacy of which seems to depend on clay particles, assures that energy 
availability will limit microbial activities when plant roots are 
inactive. Under these conditions plants control the supply of 
microbially available energy; microbial activity is dependent on plant 
activity and competition cannot occur. Thus, the "plant-control" 
hypothesis rejects the idea that plant-microbial competition dominates 
plant-microbe relationships. 
Plants depend on microbial activity to release adequate supplies of 
plant-available nutrients just as the microbes depend on the plants for 
energy, but unrestrained microbial activity would result in harmful 
losses of nutrient resources from the ecosystem. Plants acquire energy 
and release it into the soil in accordance with the supply of plant 
available nutrients and the plant-favorability of soil conditions, and, 
as the most important "movers" of soil particles, induce the development 
of soil structure, promoting and restricting microbial activity and 
release of plant-available nutrients according to the level and type of 
plant activity. 
The substrate-stabilizing effect of soil structure is well 
supported. Also, it is historically established that grasses are 
particularly beneficial to soil structure, but no mechanistic or 
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conceptual model has been able to adequately explain the soil 
structuring effects of plant root activity. A model capable of 
integrating the interdependent structurally related functions of plant, 
soil, and microbe is needed. Lack of such a model probably has hindered 
fertility/productivity research. The need for such a model may be met 
by a recent conceptualization of the functional dynamics of 
soil/plant/microbe systems (Payne, 1985; Payne and Norstadt, 1984, 
1985). That conceptualization is compatible with the "plant control" 
hypothesis, based on relatively simple fundamental principles, and 
flexible enough that assimilation of new information improves its 
applicability, yet sufficiently defined to generate experimentally 
testable hypotheses. It is a potentially useful new tool which may lead 
to a better understanding of soil fertility/productivity. It may, 
since it models soil/plant/microbe interactions in plant/soil systems, 
lead to development of an agriculturally useful definition of soil 
fertility/productivity as a biophysical quality of an ecosystem rather 
than a physicochemical property of soil. 
Chapter 4. THE RHIZOCENTRIC MODEL OF SOIL STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
With few exceptions, productive soils are well-structured. Produc-
tion problems and increased erosion, often associated with deteriorated 
soil structure, have interested many researchers (Beale et al., 1955; 
Johnston et a1., 1942; van Bavel and Schaller, 1950; Wilson and 
Browning, 1945). Research on soil aggregation has been favored, over 
that on intact soil structure, perhaps because the former is easier to 
observe and measure. A voluminous literature on soil aggregation 
(Harris et 81., 1966; Tisdall and Oades, 1982) has accumulated from the 
continuous efforts to understand soil structure as a major factor 
affecting soil productivity even though aggregation and structure are 
not the same (Allison, 1913, p. 316). 
The term "soil productivity." as commonly used, is misleading. 
Soils do not produce -- plants do. On the other hand, plants do not 
produce efficiently on unsuited soils. In other words, as Jacks (1963) 
suggested, productivity is not a physicochemical quality of a soil (or a 
biological property of plants), but a biophysical quality of a 
plant/soil system. This statement has several consequences. If 
productivity is a quality of a plant/soil system, then it follows that 
in any stable plant/soil system a mutual dependence between the plant 
community and soil will have evolved. Further, the apparently obligate 
association of soil structure with productivity suggests structure may 
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be the biophysical quality inherent in and essential to stable, 
productive plant/soil systems (see Chapter 3). It also follows that 
stable plant/soil ecosystems are highly integrated, made up of 
intimately and extensively interrelated plant and soil components; and 
that an understanding of how those essential interrelationships are 
controlled in stable, productive plant/soil systems might provide more 
than temporary, "band-aid" answers for production problems which until 
now have been considered structure-, fertility-, or erosion-related. 
The test of this thesis, of course, will be whether it eventually 
contributes something to development of a "sustainable" agriculture. 
The present author is not aware of any conceptual model that 
considers soil aggregates to directly affect soil fertility/productivity 
and simultaneously attributes to them unique structural/developmental 
functions in the soil body. This chapter presents the rhizocentric 
model of soil structural development, a model that credits a wide 
spectrum of the biophysicochemical qualities of plant/soil systems to 
soil structures and structural processes. At times, the presentation 
may seem circuitous and repetitive, but that is because of emphasis on 
interactions. The model emphasizes interrelationships and their 
consequences rather than single factors. 
PREVIOUS MODELS OF SOIL AGGREGATION 
Several conceptual models attempt to explain how soils aggregate. 
Harris et al.'s (1966) thorough review of soil aggregation literature 
discussed, among others, Emerson's (1959) early model of soil crumb 
structure. That review reported an almost bewildering number of often 
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contradictory results. Not surprisingly, no conceptual or general model 
could handle the information, let alone reconcile disagreements. 
A more recent, thorough but concise review of the literature on 
soil aggregation may be found in Tisdall and Oades's (1982) presentation 
of their hierarchical model for soil aggregate structure. They expanded 
their model to explain soil aggregate development and discussed 
implications for management practices. Their model, probably the most 
well-developed model presented in the literature, is based on extensive 
studies of Australian red-brown earths, and postulates two types of 
aggregates: macroaggregates, those of diameters >250 micrometers, and 
microaggregates, diameters <250 micrometers. They regarded 
macroaggregates to be ephemeral assemblies of microaggregates stabilized 
by "transient" (polysaccharides) and "temporary" (roots and hyphae) 
binding agents. In contrast, they suggested that "persistent" binding 
agents (degraded, aromatic humic material associated with inorganic soil 
components) stabilize microaggregates. Only the development of "stable 
particles 2-20 fD" and "aggregates <2 fD diameter" were specifically 
discussed by them. 
Later, Oades (1984) clarified their model and the genesis of the 
two principal aggregate size classes. He considered macroaggregates to 
form as growing roots and hyphae "enmesh" sets of microaggregates. 
Annual replacement of roots and hyphae catch portions of old roots and 
hyphae within newly-bound macroaggregates. Decomposition of 
internalized root and hyphal fragments and microbial residues eventually 
forms persistent binding agents and stable microaggregates. Elliott 
(1986) interpreted the results of his study of aggregates from a Pachic 
Haplustoll in Nebraska as corroborating the Tisdall and Oades model. 
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Tisdall and Oades (1982) based their model on assumptions about the 
principal roles of soil structure. One assumption was that favorable 
soil aggregation assures soil physical conditions favorable for plant 
growth. Another was that in order to enhance the plant-favorability of 
soil physical conditions water-stable aggregates must be able to remain 
aerobic internally while retaining plant-available water. Those authors 
emphasized three points as implications of their model: 
(i) microaggregates are essentially permanent structures, relatively 
insensitive to management practices, while macroaggregates are temporary 
and sensitive to management, and (ii) plant roots improve soil 
structure by assuring " ... the best distribution of muCilage and energy 
source for microorganisms ... " and (iii) " ... additions of organic matter 
will serve the same effect" (Oades,l984). They did not discuss the 
possibility that these points might not be implications of their 
description of soil structure and structural processes, but of the 
assumptions upon which their description was based. 
Results of new research and reinterpretation of old data indicate 
that it should be possible to advance beyond the Tisdall and Oades 
model. This chapter presents a new model which suggests that soil 
aggregates are intrinsic in soil formation/structure/function and that 
soil structure is a primary cause of the stable fertility/productivity 
of undisturbed plant/soil systems. The new model synthesizes many 
aspects of previous models and new information into a plant-oriented 
conceptualization of soil structure/function reminiscent of Bradfield's 
(1937). A few implications of the new model follow: (i) Ultimately 
tillage operations worsen soil structure (Bradfield, 1937). (ii) 
Aggregates <250 micrometers in diameter are dynamic and sensitive to 
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management. (iii) Organic matter amendments are not substitutable for 
plant roots as "structural improvers". (iv) Soil structure affects not 
only the physical but also the biological and chemical processes and 
conditions of the soil. (v) These effects are due to a plant-
controllable biophysical organization of soil particles, especially 
clays, which results in diffusion limitations, hence, stabilization of 
organic matter and nutrients in relatively anaerobic microsites within 
water-stable aggregates. 
UNEXPLAINED OBSERVATIONS AND DATA 
The ideas behind the model came from considering observations made 
during work for the thesis entitled "Studies of the Mechanisms of 
Stabilization of Organic Matter in Semiarid Soils" (Payne, 1985). 
Observations and corroborative data indicated that the physical, 
chemical, and biological processes occurring in certain water-stable 
aggregates (WSA) differed from those occurring in the rest of the soil. 
For example, the clay content (<2 micrometer, weight basis) of these WSA 
was considerably higher than the rest of the soil. Also, when water-
floatable plant residues retained by 0.2S0-mm sieves were excluded, the 
WSA passing through that sieve contained more nitrogen (N), phophorous 
(P), and organic carbon (C) than the nonaggregated soil (that passed the 
sieve). WSA with diameters >O.OS mm had higher C:N ratios than the rest 
of the soil. 
These same WSA (diameter >O.OS mm), when ultrasonically dispersed, 
unexpectedly released the dark colors and strong odors typical of 
anaerobic decomposition processes! Similar dispersion of remaining 
soil, that not in >O.05-mm WSA, or of bulk soils did not produce unusual 
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odors or colors. The fine silt dispersed from these WSA had ammonium 
bicarbonate-diethylenetriamine-penta-acetic acid (NH4HC03DTPA)-
extractable levels of iron, manganese, and nickel (Fe, Mn, and Ni) that 
were 4, 53, and 35 times higher, respectively, than the fine silt not in 
WSA. 
These results indicated the soil in WSA perhaps as small as 0.05 mm 
in diameter contained more organic matter, and that this organic matter 
was qualitatively different from, possibly less decomposed than, that 
associated with unaggregated soil. Further, the odors, colors, 
extractabilities of Fe, Mn, and Ni, and redox potential changes which 
occurred upon dispersion of WSA indicated the occurrence of localized 
anaerobiosis within larger WSA (Norstadt and Payne, 1984; Payne, 1985). 
Sexstone et al. (1985) have directly measured low redox potentials 
inside aggregates, using microelectrodes. 
What in soil theory could account for the apparent anaerobic micro-
sites in such small WSA? Initially it seemed reasonable to believe that 
it might be particles of relatively undecomposed organic matter in the 
cores of water-stable aggregates, as suggested by Tisdall and Oades 
(1982) and Oades (1984). Anaerobiosis, then, might be due to high 
oxygen demand associated with the decomposition of occluded organic 
matter in the aggregate cores. However, other observations made it 
illogical to suppose that there were sufficient anaerobic residues to 
cause the marked odors and colors observed on dispersion of WSA. 
Consider, for example, the following: The strongest indications of 
anaerobiosis effused from a sample of the Harney series Typic Argiustoll 
which had been air-dried, ground to pass a 2-mm sieve, and stored air-
dry in paper containers for six months prior to study. Most, if not 
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all, anaerobic microsites within transient macroaggregates or in organic 
fragments that had developed clay-mucilage coatings (per Oades, 1984) 
should have been aerated during sample preparation. 
And what is to account for the high clay content of WSA? Payne's 
data (1985) showed that the clay content of the WSA (stable to immersion 
from an air-dry condition) from two uncultivated soils (a Typic and an 
Aridic Argiustoll) must have been at least twice that of the bulk soil. 
Analysis of the data of Dormaar (1983) show that WSA (stable to immer-
sion following capillary wetting) from cultivated and uncultivated sites 
on a Haploboroll had a clay content ranging from 1.3 to 2.2 times that 
of the bulk soil. Other researchers have reported similar results 
(Harris et al., 1966, p. 140). Clay enrichments like these imply that 
each aggregate contains essentially all the clay from a volume of non-
aggregated soil nearly equal to the volume of the aggregate itself. How 
is this clay segregation accomplished? Previous models, with the 
possible exception of Oades (1984), have implied that aggregates develop 
as roots and hyphae "enmesh" randomly distributed particles, or as such 
random distributions are glued together near fragments of organic 
matter. 
Is it not possible, even necessary, in view of the high clay 
contents, that some factor or factors other than chance encounter 
concentrate the clay and organic carbon in WSA? Reference is to WSA 
capable of protecting anaerobic microsites, maintaining them intact 
during extended dry, aerated storage, even during air-dry processing and 
grinding, and immersion in water from an air-dry state. Surely, these 
are not characteristics of randomly assembled soil aggregates. 
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REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEXT MODEL 
A new model was needed to explain the observed qualities of WSA: 
(i) high organic carbon content; (ii) high clay content (in undisturbed 
soils, at least 1.5 times the clay content of the bulk soil); (iii) 
relatively small size (from <0.05 to 2.00 mm in diameter); (iv) high 
structural stability (resistant to dry grinding and immersion); and (v) 
apparent anaerobic microsites and, by inference, unique microfloral, 
chemical and physical properties. 
Toward a General Concept of Soil Aggregation 
The soil aggregation phenomenon is bewilderingly complex. Previous 
efforts to explain the aggregation phenomenon and the qualities of WSA 
have concentrated on various suggested mechanisms including, among 
others: clay involvement with water dipoles, cation bridges, and 
precipitated and irreversibly dehydrated colloids; cementation of clays 
and larger soil particles by organic substances; microbial production 
and degradation of the cementing organic substances; entanglement of 
soil particles by roots and hyphae; and the effects of wet-dry/freeze-
thaw cycles. This list is not complete. The number of suspected 
mechanisms is large and the number of possible interactions even larger. 
(And the number of physicochemicaly-oriented models may be expected to 
increase each time a likely new mechanism is discovered.) The number of 
possible combinations of physicochemical aggregation mechanisms, each 
combination potentially resulting in a different aggregation condition~ 
is legion. Yet there are surprisingly few soil aggregation conditions 
that are biologically favorable over the long-term, and these conditions 
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are not known to arise spontaneously or to be self-sustaining in soils 
uninhabited by plants. 
Allison (1973, p. 315-345) offered a different perspective on 
aggregation. He emphasized spatial and temporal requirements, and 
suggested that desirable aggregation results from the simultaneous 
operation of mechanisms effective in the distinct processes of aggregate 
formation and stabilization. Formation is primarily a spatial effect, 
becoming apparent when finer particles are moved into close proximity 
and oriented so that physicochemical forces can hold them together on 
drying (ibid, p. 317). Time is a distinctly more important factor in 
stabilization -- recently-formed aggregates are generally less stable 
than older ones (ibid, p.3l5-317). Allison pointed out that forces 
responsible for aggregate formation usually do not provide long-term 
stablility, and some of the best stabilizing agents have no effect on 
aggregate formation (ibid, p. 317). 
Favorable soil aggregation conditions in stable plant/soil systems 
are the result of the interplay of many different mechanisms. The 
interacting mechanisms and the effects of the interplay vary through 
space and time. It is thus apparent that specific-mechanism-oriented 
models will have only restricted applicability. A general model, based 
on a factor of general and fundamental importance, would be much more 
applicable and valuable in agricultural research and practice. 
The Likelihood of a Single Causative Agent 
Allison's distinction between formation and stabilization and the 
implied effects of space and time provide direction in the search for a 
fundamental cause of favorable soil aggregation. Stabilization, though 
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it may be concurrent, cannot precede formation in time or space. 
Conversely, formation is precluded when and where stabilization is fully 
effective. The complexities of the aggregation process and the 
multitude of possible outcomes, most of which are biologically 
undesirable, suggest that desirable aggregation is the consequence of an 
orchestration of aggregation mechanisms and their interactions through 
space and time. It is unlikely that an orchestration of such complexity 
and extensiveness could be successfully arranged and conducted by more 
than one "conductor". The reasoning is that a general model of 
biologically desirable soil structure and function should concentrate 
not on identifying each instrument in the soil aggregation orchestra 
instruments which humans cannot "play" even if identified -- but, 
instead, on identifying the conductor, the apparently uniquely qualified 
agent of control and coordination, and its method. 
The Plant Root: A Uniquely Qualified Agent 
The single causative agent would have to be present throughout the 
soil and yet, on a very localized scale, able to affect the distribution 
of clay, organic carbon, microbial activity, and perhaps oxygen. 
Further, as pointed out by Allison (1973, p. 326-330), the mere presence 
of organic matter does not consistently result in the development of 
desirable soil aggregation. Whatever it was, it would also have to 
possess the ability to organize the clay such that shrink-swell 
processes would not disrupt aggregates or excessively ventilate their 
interiors. And it would have to exercise its abilities reliably and 
consistently over long periods of time. 
49 
The proverbial association of good soil structure with an undis-
turbed plant cover, especially a grass cover, and the character of plant 
root activities pointed to the plant root as a prime candidate. The 
plant is, in undisturbed soils, essentially the only source of organic 
carbon (Allison, 1973, p. 325; Dommergues et al., 1978; Foster et al., 
1983; Thompson, 1952, p. 42), Water flow to an absorbing root probably 
affects the distribution of clay particles in its vicinity (Clarkson and 
Robards, 1975; Oades, 1984). Root-induced pressure differences and 
water flow might explain the tangential orientation of clays about roots 
and nearby particles (Foster et aI, 1983). Active plant roots are, 
along with microorganisms, the soil's principal consumers of oxygen 
(Breymeyer et al., 1978; Foster et al., 1983). Active plant roots 
preferentially stimulate anaerobes and other members of the soil 
microflora -- the well-established "rhizosphere effect" (Alexander, 
1977, p. 423-429; Allison, 1973, p. 85-86). Roots are the principal 
"movers" in undisturbed soils, rearranging the soil matrix as the 
growing root extends and expands through the soil. Plants must 
integrate essentially all the biologically-important environmental 
factors during their growth (Grable, 1966). And stable plant 
communities can be expected to integrate environmental factors and 
respond through growth and production, influencing the soil consistently 
through diurnal, seasonal, and climatic cycles for centuries. The 
rhizocentric model is based on the apparently unique ability of roots to 
induce all the physical, biological, chemical, and temporal conditions 
essential to form and stabilize the aggregates necessary to the 
maintenance of soil "productivity" (Allison, 1973, p. 316-343). 
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THE RHIZOCENTRIC MODEL 
Soil structure is a dynamic, biophysical quality of plant/soil 
systems. The living plant root simultaneously affects both the 
organization of soil particles and microbial activities--these are key 
points! The root-induced organization of the soil becomes the soil 
structure and controls soil processes from shortly after the appearance 
of the young root to long after its death, or until destructive altera-
tion of the root-induced organization. The discussion that follows 
describes the present author's conceptualization of how the plant root 
induces development of an essential component of desirable soil 
structure: the water-stable aggregate. 
The Plant Root and Aggregate Initiation 
Aggregate initiation begins when a new plant root appears. Pene-
trating the soil, the young root pushes soil particles aside or into 
adjacent voids, and reduces nearby pore space (Barber, 1971; Drew, 1979; 
Foster et al., 1983; Huck, 1979). At the same time the root tip con-
sumes water, nutrients, and oxygen at a high rate, exudes various 
organic substances, and sloughs cell debris (Foster, 1983; Merckx et 
al .• 1985; Trofymow, 1984). Some of these organic materials, in 
conjunction with the physical disturbance of the soil matrix, disperse 
clay particles which are moved in the water flowing to the root 
(Clarkson and Robards, 1975; Oades, 1984). At the root the water is 
taken up, while the clays are layered-down on the root surface, on or 
within the mucigel, if present, or in voids among nearby particles (see 




Microorganisms are ubiquitous in the soil, and the extending root 
is thereby continuously inoculated. Nutrient uptake by and extension of 
the root tip are exceedingly rapid relative to the time microbes need to 
adjust to nutritional and environmental changes (Trofymow, 1984). 
Consequently, microbial reproduction and activity at or near the root 
tip are comparable to non-rhizosphere soil, despite high levels of 
available substrate (Foster et al., 1983). 
Microbial Responses 
When the microbes, most importantly the bacteria, finally respond 
to the more-than-adequate supply of readily-available carbon substrate, 
the preceding nutrient uptake by the root has imposed a microbial need 
for nutrients other than carbon (Trofymow, 1984). They respond to the 
new constraints with enzyme systems that act on organic matter to 
increase solution levels of N, P, etc., (McGill and Cole, 1981; Payne, 
1985). However, the large, active root surface behind the root tip 
enables the plant to obtain a significant portion of the released 
nutrients. The microbial effort converts the most available, root-
derived materials, as well as significant amounts of soil organic 
matter, to microbial biomass and residues. All of these are 
interspersed within the accumulating clay matrix (Foster et al., 1983; 
Kilbertus, 1980). 
Building the Aggregate Matrix 
The continued uptake of water and nutrients causes further 
accumulation of organized clay around the root, embedding rhizosphere 
microbes and soil particles in a thickening clay/organic matter matrix. 
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Uptake of water, accumulation of clay, and release of readily-available 
carbon substrate slow as the root matures. The live mature root is now 
shrouded in a well-formed, but unstable organization of soil materials: 
a newly-developing soil aggregate. 
The internal particle arrangement, clay, and microbial activity of 
the new soil aggregate already exert a retarding effect on diffusion of 
gases, water, and ions. Some fungal intrusions into this localized 
organization may occur, but restricted diffusion within the clay/organic 
matrix markedly limits microbial utilization of embedded substrates. 
Oxygen supplies probably are not limiting when water movement to the 
root is rapid, i.e., near the root tip, despite high rates of root 
respiration. On the other hand, the mature root is "shielded" from the 
influence of the soil environment external to it by the embedding matrix 
and the root's own mature morphology and physiology (Clarkson and 
Robards, 1975). Further, the mature root's respiration rate is slower 
than that of the root tip (Lemon and Wiegand, 1962). Oxygen supplies 
may not become crucial (determining whether local microbial activity is 
more aerobic or anaerobic) inside the aggregate until after root death. 
Aggregate Activity after Root Death 
Root death, here considered a relatively continuous process 
beginning with decortication, causes another major input of carbon 
substrate to the soil. Now, however, the input is different from that 
produced by new root growth (Foster et al., 1983). Whereas, exudates 
and debris from the young root elicited a marked microbial response, 
that is not the case with the mature/dying root. Carbon substrates are 
mostly structural or structurally-associated plant tissues embedded 
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within the clay/organic matrix. Certain restrictions, peculiar to the 
immature new aggregate, moderate microbial activity near the dead root. 
For example, restrictions on diffusion, especially of gases and 
anions, are an effect of the clay. The relatively fixed spatial 
arrangement of nutrients, microbes, and carbon substrates within the 
matrix of clay and other soil particles effectively places microbes and 
substrates in microscopic compartments, isolated from one another 
(Foster et al., 1983; Griffin, 1981; Kilbertus, 1980). This isolation 
stifles microbial activity, even though considerable quantities of 
microbially available energy and nutrients may have accumulated in the 
clay/organic matrix by the time of root death. 
Microbial activity inside the new aggregate cannot be ignored 
though. Due to the diffusion constraints, degradation of carbon 
substrates inside the aggregate is slower and qualitatively different 
from degradation occurring outside the aggregate. Because the 
clay/organic matrix assures that the interior always holds some moisture 
and freezes at temperatures below DoC, low rates of microbial activity 
are possible as long as some carbon is available, even through extended 
periods of relatively extreme dryness or cold (Dormaar and Sauerbeck, 
1983; Dommergues et al., 1978). Inclusion within clay/organic matrices 
protects soil microbes sensitive to dessication (Kilbertus et al., 
1979). 
Moderated decomposition inside the aggregate, characterized by some 
degree of C excess in a partially to fully anaerobic environment, 
results from diffusion restrictions. The aggregate has a low 02 
diffusion rate. If dry, shrinkage reduces or eliminates pore continuity 
through the clay/organic matrix; and if moist, water occupies or blocks 
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the pores (Lawrence et al., 1979; Newman and Thomasson, 1979). Any 
microbial activity in the moist aggregate further burdens the internal 
02 supply. An internal supply of available substrate, augmented by the 
capacity of the clay/organic matrix and organic core to shrink or swell 
in response to moisture changes and yet retain physical integrity, 
allows the immature aggregate to act as a nutrient sink (Emerson and 
Dettman, 1959; Newman and Thomasson, 1919; Norstadt and Payne, 
unpublished data). Dissolved nutrients, carried in or diffusing through 
water absorbed into the moist aggregate, may internally be incorporated 
into microbial biomass, metabolites, or adsorbed substances. Also, at 
these times there is potential for denitrification, if N03- levels 
outside the aggregate are high enough, or for N-fixation, if solution 
levels of available N are low. 
Stabilizing the Aggregate 
Over time the root residue "core" is converted to organics of 
primarily anaerobic, microbial origin, integrated as part of the con-
solidated clay/organic matrix. Reduced forms of some elements may 
accumulate. Shrink-swell cycles and the effects of external compressive 
forces, like plant root activity and freeze-thaw processes, adjust the 
aggregate's size and shape to offset any volume reductions resulting 
from degradation of root residue. 
Abiotic factors affect the clay and the microbially-produced 
organic components to stabilize the aggregate, also. Drying events 
shrink the clay/organic matrix, reducing distances between the oriented 
clay particles in the matrix. Less water and shorter distances between 
clay particles increase the concentration of and inter-particle bridging 
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by adsorbed organics. More effective organic cementing of the closely 
packed, oriented clay particles results. 
The reduced inter-particle distances, more effective organic cemen-
tation, and perhaps irreversible dehydration of some of the organics, 
fix particle arrangements, possibly inhibiting re-entry of water into 
some of the inter-particle spaces. Once the particle arrangements are 
fixed, age-hardening of the clay matrix enhances the structural 
stability of the aggregate, also (Kolope et al., 1985). 
It is suggested that the mature, non-slaking, water-stable 
aggregate, the aggregate always present in naturally fertile upland 
soils, is produced by a dynamic, biophysical process. Its formation 
and stabilization are totally dependent on an organization and sequence 
of soil biological and physical components and events induced during, 
and only during, the life cycle of active plant roots. Limited 
diffusion within the aggregate results in accumulation of nutrient-rich, 
labile, partially-decomposed root and microbial residues, microbial 
products, and reduced, inorganic forms of some nutrients. Root residues 
predominate in the immature aggregate, but are unrecognizable in the 
mature aggregate (Norstadt and Payne, unpublished data). 
Aggregate De-Stabilization and Dispersion 
If undisturbed, a mature aggregate might be expected to "fall 
apart," as organics slowly degrade, and act as a "slow-release" nutrient 
source or "stable organic matter pool". However, succeeding plant roots 
likely exploit the newly-formed aggregate before enough time passes for 
it to achieve maximum functional strength. One can visualize that the 
plant roots and soil in an undisturbed, stable system continually 
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interact in a dynamic, yet harmonious, tearing-down and building-up of 
soil aggregates/structure. 
Moist, plastic aggregates accomodate root growth better than rigid, 
primary mineral particles. Further, as a root pushes by a plastic 
aggregate, the root molds and disturbs the structural organization of 
the aggregate. Whenever aggregate organization is modified, some of the 
diffusional constraints are relieved and internally-retained nutrient 
forms are exposed. Needed soluble nutrients are absorbed by the growing 
root, and that uptake may prepare exposed sorptive surfaces for further 
activity. The rapid, root-stimulated microbial activity mineralizes 
labile organic nutrient forms previously stabilized inside the 
aggregate. Some of the mineralized nutrients are used by the plant, 
some by the microbes. Succeeding events create yet another new 
aggregate structure, assuring that the cyclical coupling of plant and 
microbial activity is not broken. 
Clays in the root-disturbed aggregate are dispersed by the physical 
forces of the root, root-induced microbial attack on clay-associated 
organics, and possibly certain root exudates. Formation of a new 
aggregate begins immediately as the dispersed clays are drawn to and 
reorganized about the new root. Root-initiated aggregate deformation 
then, assures a timely release of nutrients that minimizes losses 
through leaching and volatilization. And fully as important, root~ 
initiated aggregate dispersion provides timely and appropriate release 
of clays, in amounts and locations (relative to active roots) that 
minimize clay loss through eluviation. 
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THE SOIL STRUCTURE EQUILIBRIUM 
Marshall (1962) defined soil structure as "the arrangement of the 
soil particles and the pore space between them." It would seem that, 
without any plant activity, this arrangement is a physical quality, 
changing with each effective input of mechanical energy. The abiotic 
chemical and physical environment will determine the quality and effec~ 
tive size of soil particles. As an instance, the mechanical energy of 
water and wind move particles of clay, sand, or even gravel, according 
to their effective particle size, in surface erosion. 
Fine particles in most soils are distributed within a matrix of 
coarser particles~ and percolation of water through the soil will cause 
selective downward movement of the smallest particles. Here is vertical 
"erosion" of clays, leading to the formation of argillic horizons, pans, 
or, under extreme conditions, possibly even loss of clay from the soil 
profile. The structure of uninhabited soils (i.e., soil systems as 
contrasted to plant/soil systems), then, is principally a product of 
erosional and depositional rearrangements of soil particles. A stable 
structure is achieved when the soil reaches an abiotic physical and 
chemical equilibrium with its environment. Whether the resulting 
structure is or is not favorable to plant growth is purely coincidental. 
Structural Dynamics in Undisturbed Systems 
In soils inhabited by plants a major portion of the effective 
energy inputs are of biological origin. The arrangement and 
rearrangement of soil particles, as well as the degree of aggregation 
which determines their effective size and functions, result from 
complex biophysical processes. Principally, these transformations 
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involve plant roots, soil microbes and mineral particles. From the 
vantage point of the rhizocentric model, plants are seen as the first 
cause or sole biological source of energy inputs, both mechanical and 
chemical, in beneficial soil structural formation and function. 
It follows that the outcome of the processes is controlled by the 
quality of plant energy inputs and their fractional-part of the total 
energy inputs to the soil in a given environment. Soil structure 
becomes more favorable to plant growth as the relative importance of 
plant inputs of structurally-effective energy increases. 
Plant inputs occur through root action that rearranges soil 
particles and controls microbial activity. Subsequent microbial 
activity enhances the effectiveness of soil rearrangement by providing 
necessary materials to stabilize the root-induced structure. Later on, 
soil particles, especially clays and organics, respond to environmental 
events, such as drying, to transform the root-induced organization of 
plant/soil components into a stable aggregate. To recast the concept, 
the plant root rearranges soil particles, creating a microenvironment 
that regulates microbial activity; all three components, root, soil 
particles, and microbes, act in concert within the microenvironment. An 
aggregate develops that has a structurally-secured, but plant-
accessible, nutrient store. 
Aggregates form and stabilize, but not simultaneously_ Favorable 
arrangements of soil microbes and particles can only occur during 
periods of plant root activity while most stabilization occurs some time 
later -- depending mostly on environmental conditions -- from some time 
before to some time after root death. Further, exploring plant roots 
disperse existing aggregates and initiate formation of new ones. This 
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conceptualization requires that soil structure in an undisturbed plant-
inhabited soil is dynamic. The undisturbed soil is structurally steady-
state, i.e., as a matter of course, structural disturbance does not 
occur independently of structural restoration. 
The number of aggregates, for example, is essentially constant, not 
because inherent aggregate stability prevents dispersion, but because 
aggregates are being dispersed and reformed at the same rate. Under 
these conditions structurally bound nutrients are not subject to loss 
from the soil profile except by plant uptake. Clay particles, essential 
to effective plant-induced structural stabilization of organic matter 
and nutrients, are retained in the root-affected zone. The stability of 
the undisturbed plant-soil system is apparent not only as a balanced 
composition of the plant and microbial communities, but also by the 
ecologically sound structural and nutrient status of the soil. Thus, 
one can appreciate that the productivity of the undisturbed plant-soil 
system is dependent upon a continuous, sensitive, plant-oriented, 
perhaps even plant-dominated. dynamic process. This complex process 
governs the distribution of nutrients among its biotic and abiotic 
components, stabilizes the nutrients in periods of plant inactivity, and 
releases them at times appropriate for plant use. 
Structural Dynamics in Agricultural Systems 
Given the previous arguments, one can reason that deleterious 
changes in soil structure result from any inappropriate inputs of 
structurally effective energy. Soil-based culture of agricultural crops 
has developed around inputs which are inherently, though not 
intentionally. inappropriate. 
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In most cropping systems tillage is perhaps the dominant structure-
affecting energy input. Too often, tillage interrupts or terminates the 
root-induced sequence of soil structural events. A plant-favorable soil 
organization is initiated when crop roots begin to establish control of 
the "arrangement of the soil particles and the pore space between them." 
Crucial arrangements of biotic and abiotic components arise from gradual 
and sequenced applications of mechanical, chemical, and biological 
energies throughout the root-affected soil body. Suppose those 
innumerable, small-scale, but structurally essential, plant-controlled 
events are superseded by management control that invokes large, episodic 
applications of mechanical energy on a macroscopic scale. What has 
tillage done beyond randomizing some portion, if not most, of the root-
induced arrangement of soil particles and pores that the crop may have 
had time to accomplish? 
Aggregate formation, initiated by crop root organization of the 
soil, is disrupted by tillage before aggregate stabilization can become 
effective. One of the principal effects of such disruption is relief of 
the root-induced structural constraints on microbial activity that would 
otherwise control the extent and quality of microbial soil processes and 
help to stabilize plant and microbial residues. This interruption causes 
the soil environment to become more oxidized and uniform (Linn and Doran, 
1984). 
Consequently, there is loss of organic matter and an increase in 
the relative importance of more highly aromatic organic matter, such as 
humic acids and high-lignin residues (Dormaar, 1983). Concurrently, the 
complexity and stability of the soil microflora declines (Linn and 
Doran, 1984; Stotsky, 1972). Such changes translate to losses in the 
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quality that might be termed "effective fertility" or "plant/soil system 
resiliency", i.e., the ability of the soil-plant system to withstand 
environmental, pest, or disease stresses and temporary nutrient 
shortages. Such losses are difficult to define and measure and go 
beyond that ascribed to losses of nutrients to harvest and physical 
deterioration of the soil. 
Possibly a more subtle change in the structurally-effective energy 
inputs ~n cropped soils arises from differences between the root 
behavior of crop plants and their non-domesticated counterparts. The 
effects of these differences in energy inputs will probably become more 
apparent as the extent or intensity of tillage decreases with the 
adoption of reduced-tillage practices. Plant species and even cultivar 
varieties differ in mature root morphology and growth habit (Raper and 
Barber, 1970). The quality, quantity and nutrient content of root 
exudates and debris, and the timing of their release into the soil 
likely differ as well. Breeding efforts have developed high-yield 
varieties with higher shoot:root ratios and improved abilities to divert 
photosynthate to the seed head (Mitchell, 1984, p. 30-31). It is likely 
that in cultivars, compared to progenitors, root residues and their 
nutrient content have declined. Reduced plant investments of root-
derived energy and nutrients in the soil hinder the ability of the 
plant/soil system to maintain its productivity. One might suspect that 
the quality of mechanical and chemical energy inputs from the roots in 
cultivated soils, continuously planted with the same crop, is more 
restricted than for soils in a rotation which includes extended periods 
under perennial vegetative cover. Hore extensive and/or more rapid 
reductions in the size and diversity of the microflora and loss of 
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system productivity are expected if a natively fertile, well-structured 
soil is brought under cultivation in a monocultural cropping system than 
if put into an appropriate rotation system. 
SUMMARY 
The material and energy flows and control relationships suggested 
by prior models of soil structure and by the new rhizocentric model of 
soil st~ctural development are summarized in the following series of 
diagrams (Figures 4.1 through 4.9). Fig. 4.1 depicts the flows and 
relationships, implied by prior models, for plant/soil systems in which 
soil structure is not plant-controlled. 
The rhizocentric model suggests two levels of soil structural 
development, that of rhizocentric soil aggregation and that of plant-
controlled soil (super-aggregate) structure. The rhizocentric model 
suggests that soil structural development is a root-induced biological 
process during which resource flows and control relationships change. 
Stages in the soil aggregation process, each with different resource 
flows and control relationships, can be designated in terms of the life 
cycle of plant roots. The resource flows and control relationships for 
a series of such stages are depicted in Figures 4.2 through 4.8. 
The rhizocentric model suggests that the soil aggregation process 
is cyclical, being reinitiated seasonally as root activity resumes. 
Once a sufficient number of rhizocentric aggregation cycles have been 
completed, most of the soil particles, particularly the clay particles, 
are involved in or with rhizocentrically structured aggregates. The 
cumulative effect of cyclical repetition of the rhizocentric aggregation 
process is, then, organization of the soil at a super-aggregate level. 
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The resultant organization of aggregates, non-aggregatable (larger) soil 
particles, and inter-aggregate/particle macropores is a historically 
developed, root-induced, phytocentric (directed by and to plants and 
plant activity), plant-controlled soil structure. The resource flows 
and control relationships for the soil in plant/soil system with a 
rhizocentrically developed, structurally plant-controlled, 
phytocentrically organized soil structure are depicted in Fig. 4.9. 
Resourc~ flows into, out of, and through the soil are continuously 
regulated by the present or accumulated structural effects of plant 
activity. The rhizocentric model also suggests that cultivation 
interrupts, or eliminates the phytocentricity of the organization of 
soil particles, and, consequently, plant-root-control of soil processes, 
allowing untimely and inappropriate microbial activity and resource 
flows. Ultimately, net losses of plant nutrients occur and soil 
structure degrades, leading to decreased productivity. Returning 
structural control of the soil to plants by adopting reduced tillage 
practies may not cause short-term production gains, compared to tilled 
soils, if damage to the soil's biophysical condition has been too severe 
or if rhizocentric soil aggregating activity of crop plants is 
appreciably less than or different from that in locally well-adapted 
plant/soil systems. 
AUTHOR'S NOTES: It should be mentioned that there is no intention to 
imply in this presentation of the rhizocentric model that soil 
structural units which may also be procedurally definable, hence, 
usefully describable, as "water-stable soil aggregates" cannot form 
through other processes. It is intended, however, to portray 
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rhizocentrically formed and organized aggregates as having unique, 
plant-control enabling, biophysical properties which are determined by 
their organization and composition and that this organization and 
composition obtains only as the consequence of root activity of certain 
plants, particularly certain grasses. It is further proposed that 
rhizocentric aggregate formation is the principal process of structural 
development in the surface soil of stable and productive grassland 
plant/soil systems. 
Also, as the author, I wish to emphasize that the rhizocentric soil 
aggregate formation/structural development process is a continuous, 
biologically induced and controlled process, not an incrementalized, 
mechanistic process as might be suggested by the following series of 
sequential diagrams purporting to depict different stages in the 
process. The diagrams are naively simple and the depicted stages 
arbitrarily defined to facilitate presentation of the rhizocentric 
concept of soil structural development. In real plant/soil systems, the 
onset, duration, intensity, and spatiotemporal extent of the lower-
level processes suggested as occurring in the different stages could 
vary considerably among and within plant/soil systems in which plant-
control is achieved through rhizocentric control of soil structure. 
Further, it is my opinion that rhizocentric soil structural development 
is an evolutionary, irreversible process not likely subject to reliable 
mathematical description or numerical simulation. I recommend against 
any attempt, which the following diagrams might seem to invite, at 
numerical simulation modeling of the rhizocentric soil structure 
concept. I believe such efforts would violate the premises and purposes 
upon which the rhizocentric model is based. Indeed, I am concerned that 
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these diagrams do not meet the linguistic requirement that scientific 
descriptions be rendered only in languages capable of describing the 
subject of study unequivocally, that the presentation of these digrams 
violates the principles of wholistic reasoning (see the Appendix), and 
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Fig. 4.1. Material (~ and energy ( ~) flow diagram for a soil 
the structure of which is not plant-controlled. (Relatively 
larger flows or more effective control connections are 
depicted as solid lines. smaller or less effective by broken 
lines.) Plants are principally consumers of water, air, and 
plant nutrients. The behavior of the plant/soil system is 
controlled by the character (mineralogy, size distribution, 
organic matter content, etc.) of the soil and the 
organization of soil particles (soil structure) which is 
determined by the energy inputs from the environment 
(principally through the actions of water), animals, humans, 
and microorganisms. This diagram represents the situation in 
sparsely plant-inhabited, highly tilled, or recently exposed 
soils and summarizes the more important material and energy 
flows and control relationships assumed, expressed, or 
implied by conceptual models of soil structure prior to the 
rhizocentric model. Water is the primary transport medium. 
The movement of water and the resources it carries is 
governed largely by the soil structure, which is not directly 
influenced by plant activity. 
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Fig. 4.2. Material (-a..) and energy ( .. ) flow and control ( .... 111 ... ) 
diagram for the first stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. (Relatively 
larger flows or more effective control connections are 
depicted as solid lines, smaller or less effective by broken 
lines.) A root has just penetrated a volume of soil that 
will become a rhizocentric aggregate. Uptake of plant-
available nutrients by the passing root tip is intense. The 
root displaced particles from its path during its penetration 
of the soil, resulting in compaction of the surrounding soil 
matrix, but not a sufficient alteration of the organization 
of soil particles to measurably affect (relative to the soil 
outside the rhizocentrically affected volume) the mass flow 
and diffusion of water, air, and nutrients through the soil 
to the root, or the movement of microbial substrates from the 
root into the soil. The microorganisms present in the soil 
volume have not yet had time to respond to the substrates 
being released by the root. 
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Fig. 4.3. 
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Material (--+-) and energy ~ .) flow and control (-e><:J-o) 
diagram for the second stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. The root has 
extended through the volume of soil. The effects of the root 
activity have altered the organization of soil particles to 
affect the diffusion and mass flow of material within the 
soil volume under the root's influence. The accumulation of 
clays carried by water mass flowing to the root, and root-
released organics within the root-compacted matrix of larger 
soil particles near the root surface results in the partial 
inhibition of the movement of water, air, and nutrients to 
the root. The microorganisms have begun to respond to the 
substrates released by the root, competing weakly with the 
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Fig. 4.4. Material (~) and energy ( ... ) flow and control (--t><:J--c) 
diagram for the third stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. The portion of 
the root within the volume of soil bas now matured. Enough 
clays have accumulated in the soil matrix near the root 
surface to begin inhibiting the flow of nutrients, air, and 
water to the root, and microbial substrates from the root. 
The microorganisms respond to the high energy availability 
and low nutrient availability by releasing enzymes which 
cause release of plant·available nutrients from soil organic 
matter (considered part of the microbial substrates pool). 
The root is still an able competitor for some of the 
nutrients released by the microbial activity. 
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Material ~ ~ and energy ( 4 ~ flow and control <--l><l-) 
diagram for the fourth stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. Clays have 
accumulated in the soil matrix near the root surface to the 
point that transfer of materials to and from the root is 
strongly inhibited. Little, if any, more clay accumulation 
will occur. The zone of rhizocentric organization of soil 
particles has now extended far enough that the microorganisms 
utilizing the root-released substrates are no longer able to 
access air that is freely exchanging with that in the 80il 
outside the rhizocentrially affected volume. Anaerobic 
microbial activity, which may have begun much earlier, 
becomes more important. Some of the microbial biomass 
produced earlier dies, its content of plant·available 
nutrients and microbial substrates being retained within the 
structurally diffusion-constrained interior of the forming 
aggregate. 
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Fig. 4.6. Material (~) and energy ~ ,..) flow and control (-l:><)ooo) 
diagram for the fifth stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. The root is now 
dead, its remains now microbial substrates. The interior of 
the forming aggregate is now so well isolated from the 
external soil environment that microbial decompositon of the 
root residues and other microbial substrates proceeds mostly 
through anaerobiosis. The products of the anaerobic 
decomposition processes accumulate within the aggregate as 
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Fig. 4.7. Material <--+-) and energy ~ .~ flow and control (-t><]-) 
diagram for the sixth stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. In the fully 
matured rhizocentric aggregate almost all the root residue 
have been converted into anaerobic microbial biomass, 
metabolites, or product compounds. The diffusion limiting 
organization of soil particles in the rhizocentric aggregate 
protect the accumulated anaerobic organic products and 
residues from exposure to the air and the aerobic degradation 
processes which would ensue upon such exposure. The 
anaerobic residues act as cementing agents to maintain the 
stability of the aggregate, which may remain intact in the 
soil matrix for years if the rhizocentric organization of 
soil particles is not disturbed. 
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Fig. 4.8. Material <--+) and energy (f ~ flow and control (-t><J--) 
diagram for the seventh stage in the development of a 
rhizocentrically structured soil aggregate. The rhizocentric 
aggregate is stable within the soil matrix, but plastic when 
moist, allowing a passing root to disrupt the diffusion 
limiting structure of the aggregate. Disruption exposes the 
accumulated anaerobic residues to an aerobic environment in 
which they are rapidly decomposed, releasing plant-available 
nutrients, much of which will be taken up by the passing new 
root. Decompositon of the organics enhances the release of 
the already disturbed clays to be rhizocentrically 
reorganized by the new root, continuing the cyclical 
structural process. As the rhizocentric structural cycle is 
repeated, more and more of the clay in the soil becomes 
involved in rhizocentric aggregates and the range of 
interaggregate structural arrangements becomes limited. At 
the structural limit, a maximally plant-controlled, 
phytocentrically organized soil structure obtains. 
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SOIL BELOW lOOTING ZONE 
Fig. 4.9. Material ~ ~ and energy ( lit) flow and control (--t><J--) 
diagram for a rhizocentrically developed, structurally plant-
controlled, phytocentrically organized soil. Plants are the 
principal suppliers of energy and consumers of energy and 
material resources in the plant/soil system. The energy 
inputs associated with root activity induce rhizocentric 
organization of soil particles, which enables formation of 
rhizocentrically structured aggregates and a phytocentrically 
structured soil, in which the plant-related effects of soil 
phenomena are optimized. For example, the moisture-sensitive 
microporous structure of rhizocentrically structured 
aggregates allows storage of of plant-available water, but 
inhibits diffusional exchange of biophysically plant-
accessible nutrients in their interiors with the water and 
air in the interaggregate macropores. The interaggregate 
macropore system endows the soil with desirably high 
permeability to air and water, but nutrients not stabilized 
against events in the macropore system would be subject to 
loss from the plant/soil system in any mass flow of macropore 
water out of the rooting zone. Hence, rhizocentric aggregate 
structure and phytocentric soil (super-aggregate) structure, 
in conjunction, allow nutrient losses to be minimized while 
moisture use efficiency is maximized. 
Chapter 5. STRUCTURALLY ENABLED SELF-REGULATION IN PLANT/SOIL SYSTEMS: 
TESTING THE PLANT-CONTROL HYPOTHESIS AND RHIZOCENTRIC MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
The life system on earth depends on the unique photosynthetic and 
chemosynthetic capabilities of plants, and human survival is dependent 
on the continued productive success of a certain few of those plants. 
Agriculture began about 100 centuries ago when humankind discovered that 
by modifying the environment it could increase production of those most 
desirable or directly useful plants. Several specific environmental 
factors that influence plant growth have been identified over the last 
100 years. Specific soil environmental factors include moisture supply, 
soil structure and aeration, soil reaction (pH), and the supply of 
mineral nutrient elements. Agricultural practices modify the 
environment by manipulating the factors, but the interplay among them 
ultimately controls production, and such interactions remain poorly 
understood (Tisdale and Nelson, 1975, p. 22-51). 
The "plant-control" hypothesis (PCH) and associated "rhizocentric 
model" (RM) of soil structural development provide new conceptual 
vantage points from which to observe and consider the behavior of 
plant/soil systems. The PCH is that stable plant/soil systems must 
control the interactive environmental factors that affect plant growth 
--otherwise they could not be stable -- and that such control can be 
accomplished by physically organizing the system in such a way as to 
control the biological utilization of energy. The RM suggests how plants 
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induce the formation of a phytocentric soil structure which allows plants 
to control the biological utilization of energy substrates even after they 
have been released from the biomass which they constituted or in which they 
were produced. The PCH and RM might lead to a practical understanding of 
the interplay among the factors that influence plant growth and to 
development of a more stable and productive agriculture. 
The PCH/RM are new, however, and the extent of their credibility is 
yet to be established. Examination of the naive representation of the RM 
in Figures 4.2-4.8 reveals that the variables and parameters which would 
have to be measured to test the validity of the RH independent of the PCH 
are only very difficultly measured (for example, the movement of gases 
within an unstable soil structural unit), or not quantifiable (e.g., 
"organization of soil particles"). Indeed, during the early stages of 
formation not even the boundaries of the "rhizocentrically affected unit of 
soil" can be materially identified in any practical sense. Similar 
problems affect testing the PCH independent of the RM. The PCH and RM in 
conjunction (PCH/RM), however, imply certain consequences (predictions) 
which are testable. Testing of PCH/RM predictions can be based on a single 
assumption about the conditions which must be met if a plant/soil system is 
to be stable and productive "into perpetuity" (USDA-ARS, 1983). That 
assumption is: resource outputs from the system cannot exceed inputs to 
the system. Fig. 4.9 suggests some of the parameters which might be 
examined in order to test some the PCHjRM concept. Essentially these 
involve any material which may be transported into or out of the soil by 
plants or mass or diffusive flow of gases, liquids, or solids, and 
relationships among plant activity, soil structure, and the variables that 
the RM concept suggests may be affected by structure (among others, soil 
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permeability and erodibility, mobility and structural distribution of soil 
colloids, chemical character of soil organic matter, availability of plant 
nutrients encountered natively in the soil). 
This chapter presents preliminary and indirect examinations of 
the credibility of the PCH and RM through examination of the ability of 
the higher level PCHjRM concept to deal with existing data, presents 
some of our own experiences using these new ideas (Norstadt and Payne, 
1984, 1985; Payne and Norstadt, 1984, 1985), and illustrates their 
logical consistency. The examinations also serve to demonstrate the 
predictive and interpretive usefulness of the PCHjRM in the analysis and 
interpretation of data from published studies concerned with the 
environmental factors affecting plant growth. The discussion is 
oriented toward temperate grassland and agricultural soils, under 
traditional agronomic crops or vegetation dominated by grasses. 
Although details of the RM, and necessarily then the PCHjRH, will differ 
for plant/soil systems dominated by other types of vegetation, it is 
suggested that plant-control and the role of structure in enabling 
plant-control (i.e., the PCH) are generally applicable. 
It should be noted that the RM is the more specialized (lower 
level) concept, and that predictions made using the PCH/RM are 
restricted to the range of the RM (narrower than the range of the PCH). 
Consequently, demonstrations that PCHjRM predictions are incorrect 
should be regarded as refutations of the RH, but not necessarily of the 
PCH. On the other hand, demonstration of the validity of PCH/RH 




According to the RM, plants determine soil structure because their 
roots control, through space and time, the physical and biological 
conditions affecting soil structure. It is especially important that 
root activity affects fine soil particles, most notably clays. The RM 
holds that the sum total of root activity continuously disperses clays, 
moves the clays to and re-arranges them about the active root, and 
stabilizes the rhizocentric arrangement. When soil structure is root-
controlled, none of the sequence of clay-affecting steps occurs 
independently, and clay dispersal (as a consequence of root activity) is 
the rate limiting step. Consequently, there are no dispersed clays 
during periods of root inactivity. Thus, the location and arrangement 
of clay particles is closely controlled, optimizing expression of the 
beneficial qualities of clays while minimizing their potentially harmful 
effects. 
One may predict, based on the RM, that any interruption of the 
continuous, cyclical, rhizocentric soil-structuring process will 
increase the quantity of readily-dispersible clays in the soil. Oades 
(1984) cited results indicating an increase in dispersible clay due to 
cultivation. Dormaar's (1983) study of the effects of cropping to 
spring wheat on the water-stable aggregates in a Typic Haploboroll also 
agree with this prediction. Mass balances for the particle size 
fraction data reported by Dormaar (Table 5.1) show that interruption of 
the rhizocentric structural cycle (by tillage and cropping) immediately 
increases the amount of water-dispersible clays, and that despite 
important increases in soil aggregate stability over winter, the effect 
is cumulative -- water-dispersibility of clay was greater in wheat-
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Table 5.1. Water-dispersibility of clays in a Typic Haploboroll soil 






















lWater-dispersible clay equals the total soil clay minus the clay 
in water-stable aggregates. 
2Sampl ed in April 1980. 
3Sampled in August 1976. 
fallow soils, where plant-control was interrupted for longer intervals 
than in continuous wheat. In contrast, all clay in the native prairie 
soil was stabilized the year round. 
Colloid Movement 
The RM postulates that water flowing to the an absorbing root 
carries colloids that accumulate and become organized about it (see the 
electron micrographs of Campbell and Porter, 1982). Eventually, the 
accumulated colloids block further water movement to the root. One 
would predict, then, for a given soil, a limited range of clay contents 
in rhizocentrically formed water-stable aggregates. Referring again to 
Dormaar's (1983) data (Table 5.2), water-stable aggregates in soils 
cropped to wheat averaged 27.6% clay (range 22-35%), those under native 
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prairie averaged 28.3% (range 26-30%), while whole soil contained only 
16-18%. Dormaar's data indicates an elevated clay content may be an 
intrinsic property of water-stable aggregates, unrelated to soil or 
aggregate organic carbon (C) content, extent of soil aggregation, 
apparent aggregate age (before vs. after fallow), or sand or silt 
content of the aggregate. 
Table 5.'2. Characteristics of soil and water-stable aggregates after 68 
years of wheat rotations on a Typic Haploboroll. Data from 
Dormaar (1983). 
Cropping patterns 
Crop-fallow rotation Continuous cropping Native prairie 







































Using the RM one can anticipate that infiltration problems can 
develop due to loss of control of clay-sized particles when the 
rhizocentric structural cycle is interrupted. Tillage operations, for 
example, interrupt the structural cycle, randomize the arrangement of 
soil particles, and temporarily increase the macropore volume. Flowing 
water moves dispersed clays through the network of tillage-induced 
macropores until the character of the pore system (and thus water flow) 
changes. Such change occurs at the interface between the plow layer and 
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the underlying unplowed soil. At the interface, the tillage-induced, 
mechanically organized macropore system of the plow layer meets the 
root-induced, biologically organized pore system of the undisturbed soil 
beneath. Decreased flow rates and a filtering effect at this interface 
of mechanically and biologically organized soil bodies cause deposition 
of the dispersed clays. Continued deposition eventually forms an 
essentially impermeable layer. The RM indicates that these massive 
structures, known as plow pans or ·compaction layers·, will develop in 
plowed soils having adequate clay regardless of tillage implement 
compressive loads on the soil. 
Structure Affects Shoot:Root Ratios 
Another effect of increased clay dispersibility is suggested by the 
RH. The postulated rhizocentric clay accumulation is self-limiting, 
ending when the accumulated clays block water flow to the root. The 
faster the active root surface accumulates clay, the sooner water and 
nutrient diffusion to the root will end. Therefore, given adequate 
supplies of nutrients, moisture, and air (or other factors which can 
affect rate and extent of root growth), a plant growing in a coarse-
textured or well-structured soil -- soils with less readily-dispersible 
clay -- will not require as large a root system as the same plant 
growing equally vigorously in a heavier textured or poorly-structured 
soil. 
Norstadt and McCalla (1971) grew Lee variety spring wheat (Triticum 
aestivum L.) to maturity in pots containing quartz sand or Holdrege silt 
loam soil from a cultivated field. The soil was fertilized initially at 
levels indicated by soil tests and the sand was flushed weekly with a 
82 
nutrient solution. Pots were watered three times per week. Because 
different methods were used to add nutrients in the two treatments, it is 
possible that differences in plant growth between the two treatments might 
have been due to differences in nutrient supplies. Indeed, at harvest the 
plants (grain + straw + roots) grown in sand contained 38% more nitrogen 
than those grown in soil. However, most of the increased nitrogen in the 
sand treatment was due to an increase in the nitrogen content of the straw. 
The nitrogen contents of the roots and grain were not significantly 
different between the two treatments, and the mass of grain produced was 
not different (Table 5.3). Further, in the soil treatment the total 
Table 5.3. Yields and shoot:root ratio of spring wheat grown in 
texturally different rooting media. Data from Norstadt and 
McCalla (1971). 
Rooting medium 
grain straw roots 
-------------g plant- l -------------
Sand 0.71 1.21 0.13 
Silt loam 0.74 0.91 0.17 





nitrogen recovered in the plants accounted for 54% of the nitrogen added 
as fertilizer, without considering that taken up from native soil (non-
fertilizer) nitrogen, likely a significant source. So, although it is 
not certain that the plants in the two treatments were exposed to the 
same concentrations of nutrients, it appears that in both treatments the 
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plants were exposed to nutrient levels which permitted at least maximum 
grain production (for the experimental culture conditions), and perhaps 
some luxury consumption. Despite the apparently likely adequacy of 
nutrient supplies in both treatments, the plants grown in soil had 25% 
more root mass and 33% less shoot mass than those grown in sand. Plants 
grown in soil had a shoot:root ratio of 5.3 while the ratio for those 
grown in sand was 9.4. 
The. data of Merckx et al. (1985) show a similar effect of texture 
in the shoot:root ratio of wheat (~ aestivum L. var. Sicco) grown in 
pots containing a sandy or a silty clay loam soil. The plants were not 
grown to maturity, the experiment being terminated when the plants were 
42 days old. At the end of the experiment wheat plants grown in the 
sandy soil had a shoot:root ratio of 1.1, while those grown in the silty 
clay loam had a ratio of 0.73. 
There are field data suggesting the predicted effect of more 
(dispersible) clay on root mass, also. Reduced tillage practices 
generally improve soil structure and presumably reduce the 
dispersibility of soil clay. (No-till cropping systems are of 
particular interest, because their soils are structurally controlled by 
plants yet lack the potentially confounding effects of the continuous 
presence of live, perennial roots.) Meisinger et al. (1985) noted that 
conventional-tillage corn produced 10% less dry matter than reduced-
tillage corn. Those authors proposed that fertilizer application rates 
should be higher for reduced tillage because more plant biomass requires 
more nitrogen. Hargrove (1985) reported that no-till corn plants were 
larger and that their roots were more active (as indicated by rubidium 
tracer technique) than corn plants grown in conventionally tilled soil. 
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Organic Matter and Soil Structure 
Different effects of above- and below-ground plant residues on 
organic matter (OM) and soil structure are foreseeable from the RH. It 
is obvious that above-ground residues are only indirectly related to 
desirable soil structure. There is (to this author's knowledge) no 
proposed mechanism which would enable leaf and stem residues, even when 
plowed into the soil, to relocate and reorganize enough clays to form 
stable soil aggregates with the unique biophysical properties of 
rhizocentric aggregates, properties proposed here as essential to the 
soil structure of many stable and productive plant/soil systems. Only 
the biophysical effects of root activity and root residues are necessary 
to, and capable of, inducing the development and maintenance of such a 
favorable soil structure. 
Skidmore et al. (1986) studied the effects of winter wheat (!. 
aestivum L.) and sorghum (Sorghum bicolor <L.> Moench) cropping and 
residue management on soil physical properties. Leaf and stem residues 
were hauled or burned off, or were incorporated in the amount produced 
by the crop or at twice that amount. Except for differences in the time 
of planting, harvest (and a post-harvest discing operation associated 
with residue treatments) and fertilizer application -- necessitated by 
the different seasonality of the two crops -- the treatments were 
identically (conventionally) tilled. After 13 years, there were no 
significant differences among the residue management treatments in 
content of aggregates >0.84 mm in diameter, wet or dry aggregate 
stability, bulk density, aggregate density, or aggregate size 
distribution. However, all measured properties differed between soils 
cropped to sorghum and those cropped to wheat (Table 5.4). Soil 
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structure was essentially unaffected by the presence (or absence) of 
incorporated above-ground residues, as anticipated from the RH. 
Table 5.4. Structure-related properties of a relatively uniform silty 
clay loam (Aridic Argiustoll) after 13 years of cropping to 
wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) or sorghum [Sorghum bicolor 
(L.) Moench]. Data from Skidmore et ale (1986). 
Crop 
Structure-related soil property ---------------------------------
Wheat Sorghum LSD (0.01) 
------- ----------
Aggregates >0.84 mm (%) 
Wind erodibility index (Mg/(ha/yr)] 
Dry aggregate stability (%) 
Wet aggregate stability (X) 
Bulk density (Mg/m3) 
Rupture stress (kPa) 
Aggregate size distribution 
(geometric mean diameter, mm) 
Saturated hydraulic conductivity 
(micrometers per second) 



















Also, one can predict from the model that tillage does not, in 
practice, eliminate rhizocentric plant-control of soil structure, but 
limits the extent and effect of that control. If tillage eliminated 
rhizocentric control of soil structure, then there should have been no 
difference between Skidmore et al.'s wheat-cropped and sorghum-cropped 
soils, since all soils were similarly tilled (Hooker et a1., 1982). The 
soils, however, did differ in all measured physical properties --
differences that result, the RH explains, from differences in the two 
crops' root activities. Further, the wet stabilities were typical of 
tilled soils (Feng and Browning, 1946; Kemper, 1966; Malik et al., 
1965), undisturbed soils characteristically having higher stabilities. 
Thus, plowing does not eliminate plant-control of soil structure but 
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diminishes the extent through space and time, and consequently the 
effectiveness of that control. 
Roots, Aeration, and Structure 
Adequate root aeration is essential to the health of upland plants. 
The RM postulates that the clay/organic matrix, which envelops mature 
roots, functions as an effective diffusion barrier, limiting root access 
to soil air. Therefore the mature roots of upland plants should be 
tolerant of low oxygen (02) levels. Such tolerance is graphically 
apparent in Huck's (1979) time-lapse study of cotton (Gossypium sp.) 
root growth. Oxygen deprivation was fatal to an immature root, but 
mature roots behind dead tips apparently resumed normal activity after 
02 supplies were restored -- even after several hours of 02 deprivation. 
The sensitivity of the immature root is accomodated by the RM that 
indicates the tip and immature root do not accumulate sufficient clay in 
well-structured soils to reduce gas diffusion rates to injurious levels. 
Luxmoore et al. (1970) also found upland plants have a good 
tolerance of low 02 levels. They estimated from their study of root 
respiration that the 02 concentration at which respiration was half-
maximum to be 16% 02 for rice roots, but only 8% for corn roots. Their 
data further suggests that corn root respiration was not as well adapted 
to high 02 concentrations as rice root respiration. Roots were 
sectioned at uniform intervals beginning at the root tip. When 02 
levels were increased from 20.8% to 80%, respiration increased in all 
rice root sections. Among the corn root sections, only the tip showed a 
markedly increased respiration rate while 4 of the 9 other corn root 
sections showed decreased respiration rates when 02 levels were changed 
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from 20.8% to 80%. The results clearly imply a greater tolerance, if 
not respiratory adaptation, of corn to lower 02 levels than rice -- an 
apparent paradox, resolved if, as suggested by the RH, the formation of 
a diffusion-limiting clay/organic envelope about the roots of upland 
monocots is a normal occurrence. 
MINERAL NUTRIENTS 
Soil aeration has marked effects on the plant-availability of 
nutrients. Anaerobic conditions can enhance processes, like 
denitrification, which reduce nutrient supplies. On the other hand, 
availability of certain nutrients, iron and phosphorus for example, may 
be increased under anaerobic conditions (Bohn et al., 1979, p. 250-270). 
Organic matter is less extensively decomposed and thus stabilized under 
anaerobic conditions. The PCH suggests that plants have evolved 
mechanisms for structuring plant/soil systems to optimize the 
availability and stability of nutrient supplies. The RH suugests that 
the optimization in grasslands is accomplished by root adjustment of the 
biophysical environment near the root, inducing diffusional constraints 
that determine the quality and extent of microbial activity. Relatively 
anaerobic conditions and compartmentation which develop in structural 
units about the mature root stabilize labile OM. The following sections 
present data indicating the possible validity of such implications of 
the RH. 
Root Morphology and Function 
One may predict from the RM that diffusion limitations about the 
surfaces of a mature root restrict nutrient uptake to only a small 
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portion of the entire root under field conditions. Burns (1980) 
concluded, from a review of the literature, that most crops can grow 
normally with less than 15% of their roots exposed to nitrate nitrogen 
(N03·-N). The results of Haider et al. (1985, 1987) and Power et al. 
(1986) suggest that nitrogen uptake (N) does not increase geometrically 
with increased size of the root system. 
The RM explains that plants (in undisturbed soils) avoid microbial 
competi1?ion for available nutrients, because plant-available forms are 
taken up by the advancing root before microbes can respond to root-
derived substrates (Trofymow, 1984). The microbes active in the energy-
rich, nutrient-poor soil environment dominated by the maturing root 
obtain nutrients by decomposing nutrient-rich soil OM. The large 
portion of the plant root surface unoccupied by microbes (Foster et al., 
1983, p. 8), assures that the plant reaps considerable benefit from the 
enhanced mineralization. Thus, mineralization of soil OM is a necessary 
consequence of plant root activity, and much of the nutrients taken up 
by plants in a given season are supplied from root-induced, microbial 
mineralization of soil OM. 
Power et al. (1986) used isotopic N (15N) to study the effects of 
residue levels on N uptake from soil, fertilizer, and residue by no-till 
corn (Zea mays L.) and soybeans [Glycine ~ (L.) Kerr.]. They found 
that most of the N utilized came from mineralization of native soil N. 
Nitrogen fixation was likely in the soybeans and fixed N could not be 
differentiated from native soil N. In corn, though, it was estimated 
that 88%-90% of the N taken up was native soil N despite a spring 
fertilizer application that could have provided 16%-28% (assuming half 
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of the fertilizer N was unavailable in the soil or volatilized) of the 
corn's N requirements, but actually only provided 5%-8%. 
Utilization of native soil N by corn increased as crop residue 
levels increased (moisture conditions improved and plant size 
increased), but its relative importance as a N source did not. Each 
year the fertilizer was surface broadcast before planting. Its 
distribution within the soil body presumably depended on soil moisture 
content ~nd the quality of moisture inputs, known to differ among the 
surface residue treatments. The native soil N, on the other hand, was 
much more uniformly distributed throughout the soil body. If, as 
predicted from the RM, the mineralization (and utilization) of native 
soil (organic) nutrients is a direct consequence of root activity, then, 
in Power et al.'s study use of native soil N should be proportional to 
root mass. Use of fertilizer N, however, would depend on its effective 
entry into the soil body_ 
Assuming shoot:root ratios were reasonably consistent across 
residue treatments, then the mass of above-ground plant residue (stover) 
may be used an indicator of corn root mass. The ratio of [fertilizer N 
taken up]: [stover mass] was not consistent across residue levels 
(different moisture conditions) but, the relationship among levels over 
time was consistent (Table 5.5). This finding suggests that utilization 
of fertilizer N was not as closely related to root mass as it was to the 
effects of residue levels -- presumably on the entry of fertilizer N 
into the active rooting zone. In contrast, the ratio of [native soil N 
taken upJ:[stover mass] was consistent across residue levels (Table 5.5) 
suggesting that the utilization of native soil N is directly related to 
plant size (root mass). This result agrees with the RM condition that 
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each root, as it grows, induces mineralization of native organic 
nutrients within its effective rhizocentric range. 
Table 5.5. Effects of crop residue levels and time on ratio of 
fertilizer or soil nitrogen (N) taken up to stover 













Ratios of N uptake2 to stover mass 
July 1980 Oct 1980 Oct 1981 
Grams fertilizer ~ E!! kilogram stover 
1.9 1.1 1.2 
2.9 2.1 1.7 
1.9 1.6 1.3 
















1100% - Amount of crop residue at the end of preceding crop year. 
Residues were removed to achieve lower (0 and 50%) levels. Residues 
removed from lower level treatments were added to plots as necessary to 
achieve the 150% residue treatment. 
2N uptake - stover (straw) N + grain N. Root masses and N contents 
were not determined. 
3Uptake of soil N was consistently ten-fold greater than uptake of 
fertilizer N. To facilitate comparisons of the ratios for the two N 
sources, soil N uptake was divided by 10, that is, the units used for 
soil N are ten-fold larger than the units used for fertilizer N. 
These field results (Power et al., 1986) are supplemented by the 
results of Haider et ale (1987). The latter work is particularly 
interesting because, in contrast to the former, it was done under 
laboratory conditions using a loamy soil low in OM (7 g kg- I organic C). 
Roots were severely spatially constrained compared to field conditions -
- corn (Zea mays L. cv. Brillant, Harms-Bielefeld) was grown, 2 plants 
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per lS-liter pot. The soil contained 0.62 g kg-l total N and was 
amended with lSN-labelled fertilizer, at experiment initiation each pot 
containing approximately 1000 mg of N03--N. More labelled N03--N was 
added in subsequent irrigations such that, by the end of the experiment 
(85 days), a total of 2950 mg had been added to each planted pot, 1220 
mg to each unplanted pot. These additions maintained N03--N 
concentrations between 11 and 63 mg N kg- l soil in the planted pots and 
between 30 and 61 mg N kg-l soil in the unplanted pots, i.e., the soils 
were never allowed to become even marginally deficient in available 
inorganic N. 
Despite the spatial constraint on root extension, relatively low 
levels of native soil N, and the continuously high levels of available 
inorganic N, 20% to 25% of the N taken up by the corn came from 
mineralization of native soil organic N. Haider et al. concluded from 
their results that plant roots increase mineralization of N from soil 
organic matter. 
A Rhizocentric View of Roots and Organic Matter 
Note that these results (Haider et al., 1987; Power et al., 1986), 
agree with the RM and indicate that mature ~ do not induce 
mineralization of organic nutrients. If mature roots enhanced 
degradation of soil OM until senescence, then utilization of native soil 
N would be geometrically related to plant size (root mass). On the 
contrary, plant utilization of native soil organic nutrients is linearly 
related to root length (Table 5.5). Each unit length of root 
corresponds to a roughly cylindrical, rhizocentrically-affected volume 
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of soil, i.e., each length of root has an associated rhizocentrically 
affected "length" of soil. 
From its associated "length" of soil the advancing root extracts 
nutrients by several means. It mechanically and chemically disturbs 
soil structure, exposing the more available nutrients and labile, 
nutrient-rich organic matter. Available inorganic forms are taken up 
directly. Access to the organic forms is obtained through (cooperative) 
stimulation of soil microbes by release of readily available (energy) 
substrates. Substrate release diminishes as clays and organic debris 
accumulate about the maturing root. The potential for immobilization is 
high about the mature root, but diffusional constraints prevent high 
levels of microbial activity. The diffusional constraints and microbial 
activity cause partially anaerobic conditions, permitting slow nutrient 
transformations, and assuring the presence of labile OM for long periods 
after root death. 
Plants Control Nitrogen Through Soil Structure 
Haider et al.'s (1987) results support other PCH/RM predictions. 
For example, plants induce microbial mineralization of labile or 
nutrient-rich OM only in the rhizocentric range of the root. The 
intensive diffusion gradient toward the root assures rapid absorption of 
any plant-available nutrient forms. Mineralization of soil OM releases 
ammonium nitrogen (NH4+·N), i.e., N obtained from the root-induced 
mineralization will be taken up in that form. Haider et ala (1987) 
noted that N mineralized from soil OM did not show up in the nitrate 
pool, and suggested that this it was taken up as NH4+·N. 
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The PCH/RM explains the inherent stability of natural plant/soil 
systems (as compared to agricultural plant/soil systems) as a 
consequence of plant/soil system structure. The RM, as presented, deals 
specifically with structure in grassland soils. Obviously, reliable 
nutrient supplies are essential to a stable plant/soil system. If the 
PCHjRM concept is correct, then it should explain how natural plant/soil 
systems stabilize, or otherwise assure adequate supplies of, for 
example, plant-available N. 
Direct uptake of NH4+-N from root-induced mineralization of soil 
OM, and the sheer power of the immature root as a nutrient sink, assures 
minimum accumulation of N03-·N in the soil that, along with root-control 
of readily available energy, minimizes N losses to leaching and 
denitrification while plants are active. However, to be stable the N 
supply must be protected when plants are inactive. It follows from the 
PCHjRM that NH4+-N and relatively labile organic N will be more 
prevalent in mature, structurally plant-controlled soils than in, for 
example, tilled soils. This prevalence is consequent to the 
stabilization of organic matter and NH4+·N within certain parts of 
rhizocentrically-formed soil structural units, portions of which are 
observed as water-stable aggregates (WSA). The stabilization is 
intrinsic to the uniquely dynamic, biophysical organization of 
rhizocentrically-formed structures that limits 02 access to, while 
permitting some diffusional exchanges and microbial activity in, the 
aggregate interior. The high organic C contents and lower 02 
concentrations expected in structurally-plant-controlled soils do not 
favor nitrification. The well-known low N03-·N contents, greater 
importance of NH4+·N, and greater lability of organic N in undisturbed 
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grassland soils are thus explained by plant-control of soil structure, 
with no need to invoke continuous high rates of root consumption of 
N03--N or allelochemical effects. The PCH/RM explains the converse 
situation in cultivated soils as a result of structural disturbance. 
PLANT CONTROL: AN EVOLUTIONARY NECESSITY 
Early Nutrient Supplies: Available but Unstable 
If the PCH/RM is correct, then soil OM is overwhelmingly important 
to stable plant/soil systems. Plants, particularly grasses, apparently 
are obligated to preferential use of the nutrients in soil OM. Hopkins 
(1948) speculated on the origin of this dedication and the changes in 
nutrient forms that occur during development of "skeleton soils" into 
mature soils 
We can reasonably assume a steady fall in the favorable proportion 
of active to inactive nutrients ... Plants, finding their soluble 
n·-~rients less abundant in the soil, began to evolve with an eye to 
the next best thing, the nutrients loosely attached to the humus. 
An increasing dependence upon humus, and increasing association of 
plant roots with humus, developed." (p. 78-79). 
The PCH/RM is in accord with the view that the plant-humus (and thus 
plant/soil) relationship is an evolutionary development of resounding 
importance to agriculture -- indeed to life on earth as we know it. 
As supplies of nutrients in the soil diminished, supplies of 
organic nutrients may be presumed to have increased. Plants "with an 
eye to" (a functional ability to use) the organic forms would clearly 
have an adaptive advantage under these circumstances. We can assume 
that primitive plants were no more capable of direct utilization of 
organic nutrients than modern plants. Indeed, it can be reasoned that 
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plants capable of direct utilization of organics would be functionally 
independent of microbes and consequently evolutionarily doomed. Those 
plants successful in accessing organic nutrients were likely those 
tolerant of microbial activity on or near the roots. Evolution selected 
for this tolerance trait. Note that development of the ability to 
obtain nutrients (via microbial activity) from organic sources did not 
and does not require a plant to give up its ability to use inorganic 
nutrients, since it is, in fact. a complementary rather than a 
replacement capability. A further adaptive advantage belonged to those 
plants in which an ability developed, not to just tolerate, but to 
selectively stimulate those microorganisms or microbial activities most 
important to mineralization of organic nutrients. The converse 
reasoning may be used with respect to microbial evolution. As plants 
became more successful and important as a source of energy substrates, 
microbes more capable of meeting plant needs would have an adaptive 
advantage over those not so endowed. However, such evolutionary 
developments lead to a dilemma. 
The Dilemma: Available or Stable Nutrients 
Hopkins (1948, p.18-19) pointed out the ability of "humus" to 
retain nutrients against leaching and fixation on or in minerals, i.e., 
the ability of OM to preserve an ecosystem's nutrient supplies and 
assure long-term survival. He also felt that plants evolved "with an 
eye to ... the nutrients loosely attached to humus," that iS t labile 
organic nutrients. The ability of soil OM to stabilize nutrients 
against losses to leaching, fixation, etc., depends on resistance to 
microbial attack. its "recalcitrance". On the other hand, the ability 
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of OM to supply plant nutrients depends on its susceptibility to 
microbial attack, its "lability". Therein resides the dilemma: If 
nutrients, organic or inorganic, in the soil were to be useful for plant 
growth, then they must have been sufficiently labile. If the nutrients 
were labile, then they were subject to losses and eventual exhaustion; 
and consequently, the plants using them, indeed the entire ecosystem, 
were doomed. Probably many more plants, and the ecosystems dependent 
upon them, failed (in the evolutionary sense) than succeeded. Plants 
that did not evolve beyond this dilemma, those that did'not encounter an 
effective means of controlling or avoiding the lability/recalcitrance 
dilemma, survived as opportunistic and "pioneer" species, but could not 
serve as the dominant producers in stable plant/soil systems. The PCH-
RM can be used to address the lability/recalcitrance (of soil OM) 
dilemma. The PCHjRH accomodates evidence that no soil OM is truly 
recalcitrant (Payne, 1985). 
The Solution: Stabilize Availability 
There are two apparent successful adaptations. One, common among 
modern dicots, involved direct symbiotic relationships exemplified by 
the legume-rhizobial and mycorrhizal symbioses. These are a refinement 
of the selective stimulation of microbial activities beneficial to 
plants, giving plants access to otherwise inaccessible nutrients. This 
adaptation, seen at an extreme in modern tropical rain forests, 
minimizes contact of nutrients with the soil and by-passes the 
lability/recalcitrance dilemma associated with dependence on soil-borne 
nutrients. It follows that stable plant/soil systems which rely heavily 
on this adaptive approach will not have fertile soils. 
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The second successful adaptation, apparently restricted to certain 
monocots, is most fully developed in modern perennial prairie grasses. 
Energy is expended, not to access new or alternative nutrient sources, 
but to physically alter the soil itself, to change "the rules of the 
game". Again the effect is to control microbial activity, selectively 
stimulating beneficial activity, but with a different method of control. 
Root-induced rearrangements of soil particles in zones of plant-
stimulated activity impose diffusion constraints, slowing and altering 
microbial activity. Relatively large, root-defined structures can not 
be rapidly disrupted by the much smaller soil microbes, but the 
mechanical forces applied by the growing root can disrupt an aggregate 
in a few hours, perhaps even minutes. Thus, root-controllable physical 
isolation of OM permits stabilization of labile nutrient forms against 
microbial activity without sacrificing plant access. Plant-accessible 
labile nutrients, mostly organic, can accumulate until the soil 
structural capacity is reached. Beyond this structural capacity, 
unstabilized plant residues with high C:N ratios assure immobilization 
of free nutrients appearing during periods of plant inactivity. Such 
immobilized nutrients would not be of immediate use to plants, but help 
assure the adequacy of future nutrient resources. (No doubt there are 
many ecosystems transitional between the tropical rain forest and the 
temperate grassland. In those, and the plants important in them, there 
are probably gradations and peculiar refinements of the two successful 
adaptations just outlined.) 
The preceeding discussion from the PCHjRM perspective is 
speculative, but any discussion of ancient plant evolution must be. 
However, the discussion introduces two important PCHjRM hypotheses: 
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(i) any given soil has its own, limited structural capacity, and 
(ii) the dedication of plants to organic nutrients is an evolved 
(inherited) trait. 
ORGANIC MATTER AND SOIL CHEMISTRY 
The RM says that a soil's structural capacity depends on the 
quantity and quality of root-rearrangeable clays in that soil. The 
structural capacity is reached when all these clays are involved in 
rhizocentrically formed aggregates. (Recall Dormaar's (1983) results 
(Table 5.1) showing no readily dipsersible clays in undisturbed prairie 
soil.) Rhizocentrica1ly-aggregated clays are highly organized and 
intimately associated with OM. Therefore in structurally plant-
controlled soils most, if not all, mineral colloidal surfaces are 
physically occluded or occupied with adsorbed organic molecules. 
Rhizocentric control of soil structure consequently brings soil 
chemistry under plant control. 
Ion Exchange Properties 
Evangelou and Blevins (1985) studied the soil phase ion-
exchange/solution phase interactions of basic cations (Ca++, Mg++, ~, 
NH4+) in long-term tillage systems on a Typic Paleudalf in Kentucky. At 
sampling, three treatments (no-till + 336 kg N ha- l yr-l, no-till + no 
Nt and conventional tillage + no N) had been applied annually for 13 
years to the silt loam soil previously in bluegrass pasture for S5 
years. No-till resulted in a "drastic decrease," compared to 
conventional tillage, in the ion exchange selectivity for ~ vs. (Ca++ + 
Hg++) , but an increase in the selectivity for ~ vs. NH4+. Those 
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authors suggested these effects were related to "organic matter content 
as well as possible colloidal surface modification of the soil inorganic 
phase due to specific adsorption of organic molecules." 
The PCHjRM suggests that structural disturbances (by tillage) of 
rhizocentric soil structure (undisturbed in no-till systems) will result 
in qualitative, as well as quantitative, changes in the soil OM. Ion 
selectivity was more clearly related to lack of tillage than to OM. 
From the conventional tillage (structurally disturbed) to the no-till + 
no N treatment, OK increased by 23.3 g kg- l and the ~ vs. (Ca++ + Mg++) 
and ~ vs. NH4+ selectivities changed significantly (Table 5.6). From 
the "no-till + no N" to the "no-till + N" treatment, the OM again 
increased significantly (by 15.4 g kg-I) but, there were no significant 
differences in the ~ exchange selectivities between the two no-till 
treatments. These results clearly indicate that the ion-exchange 
properties of the no-till soils were governed by a different quality, 
and not quantity, of effective soil ion exchanger than were the exchange 
properties of the tilled soil. 
In order to pursue this point further, one may consider that there 
was a substantial amount of OM (21.3 g kg-I) in the conventionally 
tilled soil. Therefore, if the quality (chemical character) of OM was 
consistent across tillage treatments, then changes in ion exchange 
properties should be proportional to changes in OM content -- regardless 
of whether the exchange sites in OM accumulate additively or by 
occluding and replacing mineral exchange sites. But, the "drastic 
decrease" in ~ selectivity from tilled to untilled treatments shows the 
changes in exchange properties were not proportional to changes in OK 
content. Further, since considerable OM was present even in the 
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Table 5.6 Chemical and physical soil properties after 13 years of no-
till and conventional corn (Zea mays L.) cropping on a Typic 
Paleudalf. Data from Evangelou and Blevins (1985). 
Quantitative data 
Organic matter (OK) g kg-1 
Cation exchange cap.(CEC) cmol(+)kg- l 
Saturation paste point (Spp)2 kg kg- l 
Qualitative indices 
Selectivity coefficients3 
1(+ vs. (Ca++ + Kg++) 
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1Fertilizer applications were the same for all three tillage 
treatments, except no N was applied to the conventional tillage and one 
no-till treatment while the other no-till treatment received 336 kg ha- l 
yr-l NH4N03' 
2Mass of water required (oven-dry soil weight basis) to form a 
saturated paste as described by the U.S. Salinity Lab. Staff (1954). 
3Sel ectivity coefficients are those described in Evangelou and 
Blevins (1985) and reflect the ability of ~ to displace the compared 
ions from soil ion exchange sites. 
4Tbese ratios are presented as dimensionless because they index 
collective properties of a soil as a whole, just as a carbon:nitrogen 
ratio (C:N) indexes a collective property of, say, a kind of plant 
tissue. In order for such ratios to be meaningful, all that is 
necessary is that both the property indicated in the numerator and that 
in the denominator be properties of the whole which the ratio is used 
to describe. No functional connection between the two properties within 
the whole is necessary or implied, although such connection may exist. 
Such ratios should not be misinterpreted: a plant's C:N does not imply 
that all or any of the plant's carbon is in nitrogen-containing 
compounds. Neither should a soil's CEC:OK, for example, be interpreted 
as suggesting that all or any of that soil's CEC is attributable to its 
OM. 
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conventionally tilled soil, such a "drastic decrease" in ion exchange 
selectivity suggests that the greater plant-control of structure in the 
no-till soils resulted in "effective elimination" of a considerable 
portion of the inorganic exchange sites probably due to either physical 
(structural) occlusion or adsorption of OM onto the inorganic exchange 
sites. 
Structure and the Chemical Character of Organic Matter 
The RM postulates less oxidized conditions within rhizocentric 
structural units and consequent stabilization of more reduced organic 
forms. Interference with the root-control of structure would be 
expected, therefore, to cause greater losses of reduced than oxidized 
forms of OM. Also, elimination of the diffusional constraints would 
result in the decomposition of organic residues under more oxidized 
conditions and consequent replacement of lost, relatively reduced OM 
with OM synthesized under more oxidized conditions. Dormaar (1979) 
specifically examined the characteristics of the OM from cultivated and 
undisturbed sites for each of six different Canadian prairie soils. He 
found cultivation generally resulted in decreased importance of 
aliphatic -C-H and -NH2 groups in side chain components, and increased 
-COOH content. 
If the formation of highly condensed, relatively highly aromatic 
humic molecules is a side-effect of oxidative microbial degradation of 
organic substrates (Haider and Martin, 1971), then it follows that the 
OM characteristic of more oxidized environments would have higher humic 
acid:fulvic acid ratios (HA:FA). Under similar conditions tilled soils 
are predicted to be relatively more oxidized, and consequently have 
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higher HA:FA. than undisturbed soils. Dormaar (1979) found, contrary to 
this RM prediction. that the HA:FA of whole soils decreased as a result 
of cultivation. However, tillage reduces the effectiveness of 
rhizocentric structural control and therefore this RM prediction should 
only apply to the organic matter in the rhizocentrica11y-induced soil 
structural units which survive the effects of tillage. In a later study 
of the water-stable aggregates in one of those six prairie soils (a 
Haploboroll), the HA:FA ratio of the OM in all aggregate size classes 
studied had increased under cultivation, in harmony with the PCHjRM and 
oxidative polymerization hypothesis. 
Dormaar (1979) reported effects of cultivation on the distribution 
of OM among the sand, silt, and clay fractions, also. The soils were 
ultrasonically dispersed before fractionation. Cultivation resulted in 
a shift of C from the sand to the clay size fraction, increased 
extractability of the C in all size fractions, and decreased C content 
(thus, increased 0 content) in the extractable OM. The infra-red 
absorption (IR) spectra also showed that cultivation resulted in a 
decrease in the importance of C-H and phenolic -OH groups, especially in 
the sand size fraction, and -NH2 groups, especially in the clay size 
fraction. These results indicate that the lower (whole soil) HA:FA 
ratios for cultivated soils result from an accumulation of less 
structurally-affected, relatively nitrogen-poor, more highly oxidized OM 
formed during decomposition of plowed-in, rhizocentrically-unaffected 
crop residues. Linn and Doran's (1984) study of differences in the 
composition of the microbial populations between tilled and no-till 
soils likewise reflect a less oxidized soil environment in structura11y-
undisturbed soils. 
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Also, Dormaar (1979) presented the IR spectra of (whole soil) 
resin-extracted OM for three of the six soils he studied. The three 
soils were from climatic zones with different moisture regimes. The IR 
spectra of OM extracted from undisturbed soils showed consistent 
differences across the climatic zones. The drier the climate the more 
important aliphatic -C-H and -NH2 groups. Phenolic -OH groups were 
important across all three zones. In contrast, the OM of the cultivated 
soils (all in wheat-fallow rotations) did not vary across the climatic 
zones. That is, when the structurally effective inputs (wheat root 
activity and tillage) are consistent, the quality of the soil OM will be 
consistent despite pedogenetically important differences in climate. 
The PCHjRM predicts that soil structure is the dominant environmental 
factor determining the character of soil OM, and that the stability of a 
plant/soil system depends on the ability of (the system's) plants to 
control soil structure. 
Soil Organic Matter and pH 
If the PCHjRM is generally applicable, then soil pH should also be 
subject to plant-control through structural control of soil OM. 
Referring again to Dormaar's (1979) results, the total acidity of OM 
from undisturbed prairie soils was always lower than that of OM from 
cultivated soils. Further, earlier studies by Dormaar (1974, 1975) 
indicate a close association between exchangeable calcium and OM. A 
greater ion-exchange preference of OM for calcium, especially OM in 
structurally undisturbed (no-till) soils, is also suggested by the 
results of Evangelou and Blevins (1985) (discussed above). The lower 
total acidity of, and increased retention of calcium by, the OM of 
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structurally plant-controlled soils clearly suggests that soil pH can be 
controlled through control of the character and quantity of soil OM. 
Pratt (1961) showed the probable importance of pH-dependent cation 
exchange capacity (CEC) in soil pH buffering. Bohn et al. (1979) 
pointed out that, while some of the charge of layer silicates is pH-
dependent, all charge on OM is pH-dependent. It follows that if pH-
buffering is related to pH-dependent CEC (charge), then, in most 
agronomically useful soils, OM should be very important to pH buffering. 
Magdoff and Bartlett's (1985) study of the pH buffering capacities of 51 
Vermont soils also supports that role. The latter authors concluded 
that OM apparently has an important role in buffering soil pH. In fact, 
for the Vermont soils studied, pH titration curves were mainly OM 
titration curves. 
Increases in the concentration of soluble salts in the soil 
solution lowers pH (Tisdale and Nelson, 1975, p. 404-405). Those 
authors cite three major sources of soluble salts in the soil solution: 
mineral weathering, organic matter decomposition, and addition of 
fertilizer. The PCHjRM suggests that the ability of plant/soil systems 
to deal with inputs is related to the evolutionary experience of the 
plants controlling the plant/soil system. Generally, plants have 
evolved in environments in which weathering minerals and decomposing OM 
were the major sources of soluble salts. These two sources provide 
long-term, low-intensity inputs, that are subject to evolved plant 
control mechanisms. Fertilizer inputs are evolutionarily new challenges 
to plant/soil systems. The inputs are intense, short-term, and 
generally not subject to plant control except through plant uptake and 
subsequent influence on soil properties, especially CEe. 
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Ion-Exchange and pH Interdependence 
It is worthwhile to again consider in this regard the work of 
Evangelou and Blevins (1985) on the ion exchange properties of a 
Paleudalf cropped to corn under three tillage/fertilizer treatments. 
There were two no-till treatments, one receiving 0 kg ha- l yr-l (NT) and 
the other 336 kg ha- l yr-l (NTN), and one unfertilized conventional 
tillage (CT) treatment. Soil samples were mixed into saturation pastes. 
To simulate fertilizer applications, all samples were amended with"S.S5 
mmol kg- l NH4Cl and 0.97, 1.94, 4.46, or 8.92 mmol kg- l KCl, both added 
in solution during preparation of saturated pastes. After 24 hours 
equilibration, the pH, solution phase cation (Ca2+, Mg2+, NH4+, ~) 
concentrations, and soil phase exchangeable (1 mol L-l NaCl) cations 
were measured. 
Fig. 5.1 was developed to examdne the solution phase ~ 
concentration ([~]), instead of pH, and the sum of the concentations of 
all measured cations ([~]) as related to the soil phase exchangeable ~ 
(soil-~x)' In all three soils [~] increased as soil-K+x increased. 
However, a marked increase in [~] occurred at 
soil-~x 0.8 cmol (+) kg- l for the conventionally tilled soil but, not 
until soil-~x reached 1.2 cmol (+) kg- l in both the no-till soils. The 
pH in the no-till soils was apparently well buffered as long as soil-~x 
was below 1.2 cmol (+) kg-I. Above this soil-~x level, pH buffering 
(apparent in the slope of the [~J vs. soil-~x line) differed between 
the two no-till soils, the difference probably due to a history of lower 
base saturation in the fertilized soil (Blevins et al., 1983). In the 
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Fig. 5.1. The relationship between soil-phase exchangeable potassium 
and the solution-phase concentration of (A) major cations 
(Ca2+, Mg2+, NH4+, ~), and (B) of hydrogen ions for 
saturated pastes of a Typic Paleudalf in corn (Zea mays L.) 
under continuous tillage and fertilizer treatments for 13 
years. Data of Evangelou and Blevins (1985). 
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the data, except for the marked change at a soi1-~x level of 
0.8 cmol (+) kg-I. 
Since the two no-till soils had different OM contents (44.6 vs. 
60.0 g kg-I), the strong similarities in the CEC behavior and the 
consequent pH buffering qualities (change at soi1-~x - 1.2 cmol(+) kg-l 
and strong pH buffering at soi1-k+x < 1.2 cmo1(+) kg-I) were likely 
related to similarities in the character, rather than the quantity, of 
the OM present. Analogously, the differences between the tilled soil 
and the no-till soils are more likely related to differences in the 
character of the respective soils' OM, rather than differences in OM 
content among the soils. These similarities and differences in OM 
character are predicted from the PCHjRM as the consequences of plant 
control (or lack of plant control) of soil structure and function. 
Differences between the tilled and no-till soils in soil organic 
matter/structure/cation exchange relationships are also indicated by the 
data from Evangelou and Blevins (1985) given in Table 5.6. The 
quantitative measurements increase consistently from CT to NT to NTN. 
The qualitative indices, however, show the no-till soils were similar to 
each other, but different from the tilled soil, in every case. Among 
the qualitative indices the three treatments were most similar in their 
cation exchange capacity:saturation paste point (CEC:SPP) ratios3 . The 
two no-till soils had essentially identical CEC:SPP. Since all three 
treatments were applied to the same soil, textural differences probably 
were minimal and the SPP may be considered an index of moisture holding 
capacity (U.S. Salinity Lab, 1954) and structure. The CEC:SPP ratios, 
3See Table 5.6 footnote 4 
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then, indicate that CEC is closely related to structure, that CEC has 
the same relationship to structure under no-till corn regardless of OM 
level, and that this relationship is not the same as existed under 
conventionally cultivated corn. 
These results show, as the PCH/RM anticipates, that the character 
of a soil's OM, and, hence, its chemical properties (here, pH buffering 
and ion exchange behavior) depend on soil structure, which is controlled 
by the plant (or plant-and-plow) activity that affect the soil. 
MOISTURE SUPPLY 
Historically, agricultural experience suggests a link between plant 
control of soil structure and a more plant-favorable moisture supply_ 
During the last century Dokuchaev and Kostychev showed that continuous 
cultivation of chernozems for cereal production increased susceptibilty 
to drought (Kononova, 1961, p. 23). Kostychev showed soil physical 
properties which favored retention of moisture were associated with the 
accumulation of humus under perennial grasses (ibid.). 
Soil Organic Matter and Structure: The Moisture Connection 
The data of Evangelou and Blevins (1985) (Table 5.6) furnish recent 
evidence of the effectiveness of plant control of soil structure in 
improving moisture supply_ The SPP is directly related to water 
holding capacity for most soils of moderate texture -- the available 
water holding capacity (WHC) is approximately one-quarter of the amount 
held at SPP (Bower and Wilcox, 1965, p. 934). Differences in the OM 
content of the CT, NT, and NTN soils appear to be directly related to 
differences in the estimated SPP for the three soils, suggesting that 
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increases in water holding capacity in the NT and NTN compared to the CT 
soil were a consequence of the parallel increases in OM content (Table 
5.6). However, as was the case with the CEC, direct examination of the 
data is deceptive. In order to obtain an index of the contribution of 
OM to the WHC of each soil as a functional whole (i.e., not each soil as 
a simple composite, the WHC of which is a property defined by summation 
of the WHC effects of the mineralogy. texture, and OM content of the 
soil)4 the SPP:OM ratios of the three soils can be calculated. The 
values of the SPP:OM turn out to be 24.5. 15.9, and 14.3 for the CT t NT, 
and NTN soils, respectively. Again, as with the CEC:SPP and CEC:OM 
ratios, both the no-till soils had similar SPP:OM values which were 
distinctly different from the SPP:OM of the CT soil. Further, as can be 
anticipated through use of the PCH/RM (but not through any other 
conceptual model with which the author is familiar) the SPP:OM values 
for the no-till soils were lower than that of the conventionally tilled 
soil. The relationships among the SPP:OM values of the three soils 
suggest that the OM content was more strongly related to the ability to 
retain moisture in the CT than in the no-till soils. That is, in the 
no-till soils where plant-control of structure was less disturbed (more 
effective), the OM content was less strongly related to the SPP (water 
holding capacity) than in the CT soil where structure was to a large 
extent mechanically determined. 
The PCH/RM suggests that this effect results from the ability of 
the plant roots to organize the soil particles so that hydraulic 
conductivity and moisture retention are simultaneously optimized. 
4See Table 5.6 footnote 4 
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Rhizocentric organization of soil clays into water-stable aggregates 
increases water-stable porosity. Thus, plant-control of soil structure 
enables soil to consistently accept water at higher input rates than the 
same soil with tillage-induced structure (except, in some soils, for a 
brief period following a tillage operation). This is vividly shown in 
the infiltration rates of sad and parallel cultivated soils (Mazurak and 
Ramig, 1962, 1963). 
Moisture Dynamics of Rhizocentric Structural Units 
Rhizocentrically-organized, water-stable aggregates are expected to 
have unique properties that increase available soil water holding 
capacity. These aggregate's high clay content would increase their 
moisture holding capacity, but not necessarily their available moisture 
holding capacity since the water of hydration of clays is not plant-
available. In order to improve retention of available moisture, clay 
particles must be arranged such that the aggregate has more pore volume 
when moist than when dry. 
Rhizocentric structures have such an arrangement. Layer silicate 
clay particles are "puddled" around the root, laid down with the a-b 
plane parallel (c axis perpendicular) to the longitudinal axis of the 
root and drawn into close packing by the matric suction of the active 
root and later by environmental events. The geometry of the aggregate 
is thus dominated by the organic (root) core and proximate concentric 
laminations of clay particles about the core. The minimum and maximum 
diameters of the aggregate are defined by this physical arrangement. 
The minimum occurs when the aggregate is dry, all clays and OM are 
shrunk and pore volume is minimal (Fig. 5.2). Upon wetting the 
III 
A. DRY B. MOIST 
Fig. 5.2. A diagrammatic representation of the effect of moisture on 
the porosity of aggregates formed by concentric lamination, 
with face-to-face organic bonding, of swelling layer silicate 
particles around an organic core. 
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aggregate swells (Emerson and Dettman, 1959; Norstadt and Payne, 
unpublished data), but layer silicates swell essentially only along the 
c-axis. If the clay platelets were not cemented together at the areas 
of face-face contact, such swelling would disrupt the aggregate. 
However, the rhizocentric arrangement of the clays and organics is such 
that, most swelling in the clay-dominated "shell" results in radial 
expansion, with only limited tangential expansion. Consequently, sub-
microscopic water-filled "cracks" develop upon wetting (Fig. 5.2). 
(Assuming a cylindrical aggregate, the formation of such cracks would be 
unavoidable if the tangential expansion was not greater than radial 
expansion by a factor of "pi".) As the soil dries, the clays (and 
organic core) shrink, resulting in radial contraction and reduction of 
the moisture-induced microporosity. Thus, the water intake/output 
behavior of such aggregates is not a constant-pore-volume phenomenon, 
because the pores which accept and hold moisture are dynamically 
dependent on the amount of water present. (In reality the clay 
particles may not be so well organized as depicted in Fig. 5.2, and such 
structures would be expected to contain enmeshed silt and sand 
particles. These and other factors complicate the discussion, but do 
not eliminate the effects of the principle just discussed.) 
Newman and Thomasson (1979) presented evidence indicating such 
behavior, and concluded, from studying the effects of drying on soil 
porosity in lS-to-20-mm soil peds, "much plant available water released 
from clay soils at potentials less than -15 bar (-1500 J Kg-I) is 
controlled by shrinkage of the soil rather than by emptying of pores." 
I have observed air-dry, water-stable aggregates from Colorado 
grassland soils as they were wetted with a capillary pipette. The 
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aggregates did not swell equally in all three dimensions, but 
preferentially in two dimensions. When the longitudinal axis of the 
root residue core could be identified prior to wetting, the aggregates 
were observed to swell typically by 0.2 mm mm- l perpendicular to the 
root's longitudinal axis, but by <0.05 mm mm- l along the axis. Also, 
the air-dry aggregates wetted quickly. Swelling appeared to occur after 
wetting. Artificial aggregates, broken from air-dried puddled soil 
clays, wetted slowly, swelling and dispersing while wetting. Mineral 
particles from the same soil and the same size as the aggregates often 
did not wet at all (unless physically forced into a water droplet). 
Determinations showed the water-stable aggregates held water at the rate 
of 0.7 kg kg- l while the mineral particles from the same soil retained 
0.1 kg kg-I, at about -1.5 J kg-I. Undecomposed and aggregate-
uninvolved root residues retained relatively large amounts of water at 
low suctions but, dried rapidly in air compared to moist aggregates. 
These observations and the results of Newman and Thomasson (1979) were 
predictable using the PCH/RM and support the idea that plant-control of 
soil structure might optimize water management in plant/soil systems. 
SUMMARY 
The PCHjRM concept explains that in stable plant/soil systems 
plants control the soil environmental factors that affect plant growth 
and the interactions among those factors by controlling the soil 
structure of the system. In some environments plants achieve this 
control by rhizocentrically structuring the soil. PCH/RM 
interpretations of the findings of several studies of the soil 
environmental factors affecting plant growth have been presented. Data 
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have been presented that supports the RM-postulated movement of colloids 
to plant roots. Other results indicate that the quantity of dispersible 
clays may affect production by altering root:shoot ratios. The PCHjRM-
indicated roles of readily dispersible clays, and their likely 
prevalence in the soil environment over evolutionarily important time 
periods, may help explain the somewhat surprizing tolerance of upland 
plant roots for low 02 levels. Elevated contents of rhizocentrically 
organized clays appear to be intrinsic in rhizocentric water-stable 
aggregates providing them with unique biophysical properties. The 
cumulative effect of seasonal or annual reinitiation of the rhizocentric 
aggregate forming process is development of a plant-controlled, 
phytocentrically organized structure at a super-aggregate (soil) level. 
Phytocentrically organized soil structure regulates such soil macro-
properties as erodibility, bulk density, and permeability to air and 
water, and, consequently, microbial activity outside aggregates, while 
rhizocentrically organized aggregate structures regulate the quality and 
extent of aggregate-affected microbial decomposition processes, bence, 
the quality and quantity of soil OM, and, consequently, the soil 
chemistry. By inducing such structure, plants can control the forms of 
nitrogen and other nutrients which prevail in the soil, induce microbial 
proceSSing of nutrients into structurally stabilized but plant-
accessible (not to be confused with plant-available) forms, and promote 
more efficient utilization of soil moisture. 
This dissertation presents only a small part of an extensive review 
of the literature covering more than 100 years of agricultural research. 
That review revealed no case in which the PCH/RM concept could not lead 
to logically consistent interpretations and/or conclusions, and often 
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new hypotheses. The PCHjRM offers logically consistent explanations for 
previously unexplainable results. The PCH/RM appears a credible concept 
which merits critical examination as a new tool for use in attempts to 
understand plant/soil systems and to develop a stable and productive 
agriculture. 
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Appendix. A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: 
FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PROCEDURE 
PREFACE 
When the manuscripts for chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this dissertation 
were presented to my graduate committee, one of the members asked how it 
was that I developed the concepts (models) presented in those chapters; 
that is, what was the method I had used. My response at the time was 
that I had not consciously employed any specific method to "develop" the 
concepts -- the ideas simply occurred to me after lengthy consideration 
of what had previously appeared, within other conceptual frameworks, to 
be self-contradictory behaviors of soils and agricultural production 
systems. I was in turn told that science without method is not science 
and a dissertation not based on a documentable methodology would not be 
acceptable. One of my committee members then stated his opinion that I 
had used a "systems approach" and that I should, for the purpose of 
finalizing an acceptable dissertation, set about demonstrating that use. 
In order to accomplish such a demonstration I began an examination of 
the "systems analytical" literature only to become convinced that I had 
not used a "systems approach" as it is currently understood, but had 
instead done something common in science: induce an explanation which 
would allow the observable behavior of a certain class of natural 
phenomena to become recognizably consistent and predictable. This 
appendix presents the development of the conclusions just stated, with 
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an initial consideration of "systems theory" as it has been developed 
and invoked by "systems thinkers" and working into a consideration of 
inductive logic, its role in science and the difficulties underlying an 
adequate linguistic description of it. 
INTRODUCTION 
Systems approaches have become quite fashionable in scientific 
research. Systems concepts, however, are not new, dating back at least 
to the time of Aristotle (Checkland, 1981), and the implicit application 
of systems approaches may predate the dawn of recorded history. The 
impressive effectiveness with which systems approaches have been more 
recently applied in the physical sciences, and especially engineering t 
raised the expectations of biological and social scientists that systems 
approaches would similarly lead to the solution of problems in their 
fields. In practice, however, results have been uninspiring, often 
quite disappointing (Berlinski, 1976; Bertalanffy, 1968; Checkland, 
1981). Poor performance has led some to abandon or ignore systems 
approaches as ineffective, others to attack general system theory (GST), 
the presumed conceptual foundation of all systems approaches (Berlinski, 
1976; Lilienfeld, 1975). Much of this disappointment seems, to the 
present author, not to be due to an inherent errancy or impotency of 
systems approaches, but due to unreasonably high expectations _. 
expectations based for the most part on the impressive track record of 
systems engineering in computer and aerospace technology, and not on the 
results of any thorough examination of what GST is or what systems 
approaches can and, more importantly, can not do. I attempt in this 
appendix to present such an examination and to develop from it a 
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framework for the presentation of a conceptual model of soil structure 
and control of resource-use efficiency in plant/soil systems. 
THE G.S.T. DEBATE 
If there is anything particularly striking in an exploration of 
(the literature on) general system theory, it is the ebullient 
enthusiasm of devotees of, and the derisiveness of attacks made by 
critics of GST (Berlinski, 1976; Bertalanffy, 1968; Checkland, 1981; 
Laszlo, 1972; Lilienfeld. 1975; Naughton, 1979; Saridis, 1977). This 
state of affairs is disappointing to scientists outside the exchange, 
since any useful ideas are lost in the rhetoric, and often blatant 
emotionality, of the debate. On the other hand, the debate has been 
raging long enough that at least some of the fundamental issues which 
divide the advocates and critics of GST have begun to emerge from the 
rhetorical haze. It is worthwhile therefore to examine the conflict. 
A Theory or an Ideology 
Initially it is necessary to determine whether or not there is such 
a thing as GST, about which a conflict might arise. Naughton (1979), a 
GST-opponent, has stated that if GST means a coherent body of tested 
knowledge, then there is no such thing as GST. This immediately begs 
the question, "Why then would one bother to oppose something which does 
not exist?" Are GST-opponents tilting at windmills? Clearly they are 
not. Researchers and practitioners in almost all the academic 
disciplines, and governmental and industrial decision-makers have 
accepted a variety of "systems n methods as the practical realization of 
GST. That is, major socio-economic decisions are being justified by 
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invoking a theory which may not even exist. This is clearly a reason for 
concern and is the reason behind Lilienfeld's (1975) view that GST, 
never established as a theory, has already become an ideology, and its 
validity is therefore no longer likely to be subjected to testing . 
Now if GST is not a body of tested knowledge, then it must be, at 
best, a body of untested knowledge, an induction. The social value of 
scientific knowledge may be considered to lie in its reliability, and 
that reliability is established through scientific testing -- deductive 
empirical verification. Since GST is scientifically untested, it should 
be considered unreliable. For most "theories" -- perhaps more properly, 
hypotheses or inductions -- this would not present a problem. All that 
is necessary is to run some experiments to test the induction. However, 
in testing GST a traditional scientific protocol has been violated. 
Full-scale human experiments have been run, before the validity of GST 
had been tested in any scientific sense. Or, as Ludwig von Berta1anffy 
(1968, p.99), considered by many the father of GST, put it, 
"The danger ... is to consider too early the theoretical model as 
being closed and definitive -. a danger particularly important in a 
field like general systems which is still groping to find its 
correct foundations". 
"Systems" devotees have changed GST from Berta1anffy's "theoretical 
model ... still groping to find its correct foundations", to an 
expedient "movement" with such justifications as (Checkland, 1981, p.94) 
GST has little content beyond the level of ana1ogies ... Progress in 
the systems movement seems more likely to come from the use of 
systems ideas within specific problem areas than from the 
development of overarching theory." 
This flies in the face of many GST critics whose concerns were concisely 
summarized by Berlinski (1976) who wrote, " ... in great things great 
ambitions without great theories are insufficient ... " 
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Unfortunately, despite his apparent appreciation of "the danger" 
inherent in too rapid an adoption of inadequately developed theory, 
Berta1anffy (1968) promoted such invocations of GST by referring to it 
as "a working hypothesis'·. One might expect a demotion from "theory" to 
"hypothesis" by the "father" of the theory would have diminished some of 
the enthusiasm for rapid application of GST. It has not. Instead GST; 
or more accurately its presumptuous extension,"the systems approach"; 
has been accepted by systems devotees as capable of explaining the 
behavior of even the most complex systems -- or as a GST-opponent put it 
"systems theory is a claim to total power" (Li1ienfe1d, 1975). It 
follows that if this claim is true, the ultimate test of GST must be to 
determine its ability to explain the most "complex" phenomena which we 
practically encounter for example, human societies. Hence, among the 
experiments necessary to establish the ultimate reliability of GST are 
regional, national, or even global socio-economic experiments. Herein 
lie the fundamental concerns of the opponents of GST -- much systems 
research simply can not be carried out scientifically, especially in the 
analysis and design of human bio-social systems. Each such effort to 
practically apply GST must be classed not as an application of reliable 
scientific knowledge but as an experiment, the results of which may not 
appear for years after its administrative/technical termination, or even 
the biological death of the experimenters. The results therefore can 
not be observed and recorded, hence they can not be analyzed or 
reproduced and consequently experiments can never SCientifically test 
the validity of GST or any other hypothesis that would treat of such 
grand phenomena. 
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Of a more fundamental concern is what will happen to the human 
subjects of such experiments. If the experiment should succeed -- a 
"best case" outcome -- the result would be a smoothly operating, 
centralized, programmed and programmable society -- a dignified ant 
colony. And what if the experiments should fail? The objective of most 
such experiments has been to design and/or establish the minimum 
effecti ve centralized control system nec.essary to set up and maintain a 
socio-economic system with certain functional, usually economic, 
characteristics. Failure of such experiments -- recall the results will 
not likely be apparent by the administrative end of the experiment 
implies a failure of the experimentally imposed control system to 
improve the object functions of the subject socio-economic system. In 
the case of shallow, short-duration, or soon-aborted experiments, the 
effects of failure might be only a temporary diversion of resources into 
the experimenters' pockets. On the other hand, if the experiment is 
protracted or requires major (functionally irreversible) changes in the 
previously existing controls, then failure would likely become apparent 
as prolonged degradation or collapse of the subject system. Therefore 
neither the success nor the failure of such grandiose "systems lt 
experiments can yield anything better than what most rational 
individuals would consider minimally undesirable results. From a 
slightly different perspective, an ethical question is raised: Is man 
(wholesale) to be used to serve "science", i.e. as material upon which 
to test a "working hypothesis"; or is science to serve man, i.e. as a 
source of reliable knowledge, which might eventually include a general 
theory about "systems"? 
134 
Seeking Rigor or Selling Rigmarole 
The extensive human and intellectual damage that may result from 
unqualified invocations of GST seems the primary concern of GST-
opponents. This was, however, also a primary concern of Bertalanffy 
(1968, p. 14, 23, 31, 35, 52-53, 99, 119). Indeed, a "third party" 
examination reveals that the concerns of GST*opponents -- some of which 
Berlinski (1976) has presented with more than a touch of enjoyable 
sarcasm .- had troubled Bertalanffy at least 14 years earlier. 
This awareness of both the advocates and opponents of GST suggests 
that GST, whatever that is, might indeed be a powerful conceptual tool. 
but does little more than to suggest that GST can not be specified by 
examining misapplications. So the conflict leaves the practicing 
scientist with a vague idea of what GST is not, but no idea of what GST 
is. 
This is not altogether surprising when one considers that 
Bertalanffy (1968) himself frequently used statements of negation to 
discuss GST, " ... it will avoid misunderstanding also to state what it 
[GST] is not." (p. 35) and "General system theory therefore is not a 
catalogue of well-known differential equations and their solutions." (p. 
80). Ultimately Bertalanffy's principal contribution may have been his 
recognition of the need for a more general conceptual methodology in 
science and his call for development of a more generally applicable 
schema, 
"It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more 
or less special kind, but of universal principles applying to 
systems in general . . . In this way we postulate a new discipline 
called General System Theory." 
Regarding the often obtuse character of Bertalanffy's work on GST, 
Checkland (1981, p.93), a systems practitioner, stated that 
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Bertalanffy's writings indicated little development from the 1940's 
until his death in 1972. He even agrees with an outspoken GST-opponent, 
Lilienfeld (1975), who described Bertalanffy's work as "rather 
repetitious and even static in character". He goes on to describe 
Bertalanffy's unchanging view as a vision "that there would arise as a 
result of work in different fields a high-level meta-theory of systems, 
mathematically expressed" and continues, "The general theory 
envisaged ... has certainly not emerged" (p. 93). He goes on to cite a 
GST-opponent's (Naughton, 1979) description of GST as "a melange of 
insights, theorems, tautologies, and hunches" and agrees with another 
opponent, Berlinski (1976, p. 10), that GST pays for its generality by 
lack of content, but then he licenses the carte blanche invocation of 
GST. Declarations such as these by Checkland beckon recollection of the 
previously discussed concerns of GST-opponents that acceptance and 
application of untested or inadequate theories is inherently dangerous. 
So it would appear that although "systems" devotees and opponents agree 
on certain undesirable characteristics of GST (and Bertalanffy's 
writing, as well), in practice the disagreement appears ideological and 
is resolved to little more than an agreement to disagree. 
FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS: REFOCUSING THE DISCUSSION 
The points on which the devotees and opponents agree serve to focus 
attention on (what I see as) some fundamental misunderstandings of GST. 
Consider Checkland's and Lilienfeld's concern with what they perceived 
to be the "rather repetitious and even static" character of 
Bertalanffy's work on GST. It is curious that neither GST-devotees nor 
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their critics seem to have been concerned as to why Bertalanffy's work 
appeared repetitious and static. 
In his later years Bertalanffy was held in high regard by "his 
fellow megalomaniacs" (Laszlo, 1972; Naughton, 1979). His notoriety may 
have allowed him to publish repetitiously, but then again repetitious 
publication is not rare in the scientific literature. Further, there 
appears no reason to believe that he achieved recognition as the modern 
father of GST~ through anything other than lonely perseverance during 
his early years as a scientist. Hence, one ought to consider that there 
might be a legitimate purpose behind Bertalanffy's "megalomania", but 
that perhaps his means were inadequate or inappropriate. What was the 
purpose of GST as perceived by Bertalanffy? And why did his efforts to 
achieve the objective appear redundant and ineffective? Where was the 
inadequacy or inappropriateness in his means? 
Bertalanffy was a biologist, and was consequently concerned with 
studying organisms as such. The behavior of living things presents 
something of a practical dilemma for traditional reductionist approaches 
in science, principally because the behavior of living things can not be 
reliably predicted from a knowledge of the parts of which they are 
comprised. Concern with the "whole as more than the sum of its parts" 
dates at least to the time of Aristotle. Bertalanffy, however, was in 
effect concerned with determining what knowledge is necessary before the 
behavior of a whole can be predicted from a knowledge of its parts. 
He got off to an impressive start toward this objective (at least 
as early as 1945) by making two propositions (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55). 
First, when dealing with "complexes" (wholes) of "elements" (parts), 
three kinds of distinction may be made with respect to the elements in a 
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complex: species, number, and inter-element relations. Second, the 
behavior of the whole will not be reliably predictable until one has 
knowledge of the quantities and qualities of the parts and the relations 
among those parts in the whole. 
Since reductionistic approaches permit direct determination of the 
number and identity (species) of parts, but not the functional relations 
among them, Bertalanffy's statements were a challenge to. but not a 
rejection of, reductionistic approaches and the atomistic/mechanistic 
view of the universe. He did not find reductionistic approaches 
necessarily objectionable, just inadequate in many cases -- particularly 
in the study and explanation of the phenomena of most interest to 
biologists. And his propositions explained this inadequacy. While 
reductionistic analyses can resolve a whole into its parts and permit 
the identification of the resolved parts, they can not provide reliable 
information on the relations among those parts in the functional whole -
- for those relations exist only in the functioning whole. A need for 
some non-reductionistic approach was apparent. And so we arrive, 
finally. at a positive statement by Bertalanffy (1968, p. 37) of what 
GST was to be and do, "General systems theory ... is a general science of 
'wholeness'" and its subject is the formulation of principles that are 
valid for wholes (systems) ~ understandable BY investigation of their 
isolated parts. It seems reasonable to conclude that for Bertalanffy 
the purpose of GST was to provide scientists with a (practical and 
investigatively useful) conceptual tool which would enable development 
of a knowledge of holistic properties as reductionistic approaches had 
enabled experimental evaluation of atomistic properties. 
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Having identified Bertalanffy's definition of GST, its subject 
matter and purpose, we may move on to consider the reasons for the 
discussed ineffectiveness of his writings. 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS: ONTOLOGIES 5 , EPISTEMOLOGIES6, 
AND CONCEPTUAL METHODOLOGIES 
It is helpful here to try to identify Bertalanffy's philosophical 
position, his intellectual belief system, at least as far as its effect 
is apparent in his writings. From his definition of GST and its subject 
matter and other statements (p. 55) one may infer he held "holistic" 
beliefs. On the other hand, in so far as his propositions (ibid., p.S5) 
suggest that the behavior of a whole is determined by the quantities and 
qualities of and relations among its parts, he also held "mechanistic" 
beliefs. His philosophy of science differed from that of most modern 
scientists, but not because he denied "mechanism", "realism", or 
"atomism", without which the pursuit of scientific knowledge would be 
pointless, Neither did he deny the possibility that ultimately the 
"atomistic" philosophy, as well as its modern realization in the 
"mechanistic" belief that all natural phenomena will ultimately be 
explainable in terms of the laws of chemistry and physics, might be 
correct. Instead, he argued that a conceptual tool for dealing with 
"wholeness" was simply a practical necessity for scientific 
investigation of phenomena associated with organized complex wholes 
(ibid. p. 18, 48, 247). 
SThe study of or theories about the nature of being, existence, or 
that which exists as it can be experienced. 
6The study of or theories about the nature and grounds of 
knowledge, especially with reference to its limits and validity. 
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Perspectivism and Reductionism 
It is noteworthy that Bertalanffy apparently never explored the 
terms "holism" or "atomism" in his writings. Instead he offered what at 
first appears to be an alternative concept which he called 
"perspectivism". He explored it only very little (ibid., p. 49, 247). 
Yet, perhaps the most enlightening and concise, though indirect, 
description of the intent of GST and the philosophy underlying it, is 
derivable from his first and apparently only useful discussion of 
perspectivism: 
We come, then, to a conception which in contrast to reductionism, 
we may call perspectivism. We cannot reduce the biological, 
behavioral, and social levels to the lowest level, that of the 
constructs and laws of physics. We can, however, find constructs 
and possibly laws within the individual levels. (p. 49). 
Perspectivism is presented as an alternative to reductionism. 
However, the difference between the two is subtle. While reductionism 
might be considered the conceptual tool of atomism, and perspectivism 
potentially the conceptual tool of holism, perspectivism retains some 
"atomistic" character. It implies a hierarchy of cognitively accessible 
(epistemological or "knowable") levels. Phenomena of some empirical 
reference level are the "parts" by which higher (more complex) levels 
are defined, and those the "parts" of even higher ones, and so on, until 
at some sufficiently high level a finite epistemological "universe" is 
defined and the phenomena of the initial reference level become 
effectively "atomic" properties of that "universe". These same 
properties, cognitively "atomic" for the higher levels just discussed, 
are "sub-atomic" for still higher levels, but "universal" for relevant 
levels much lower than the initial reference level. In this the 
fundamental difference between reductionism and perspectivism becomes 
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apparent. Reductionism is derived from an ontological belief in the 
empirical verifiability of an absolute level -- for conventional modern 
mechanicists that level is or will eventually be described by the laws 
of physics. Perspectivism; in contrast, is based on an epistemological 
belief that only relative "atomic" levels are cognitively accessible and 
therefore empirically verifiable, and that while some absolute 
irreducible level may exist, its irreducibility is not empirically 
verifiable (Wheeler 1980, p. 134). 
A weakness in Bertalanffy's presentation of perspectivism is 
indicative of the inadequacies in his writings that have dismayed GST 
advocates and critics alike. He contrasted perspectivism and science 
concerned with "wholeness" to reductionism and science concerned with 
"parts". It might seem reasonable to conclude then, as many apparently 
have, that GST and perspectivism are synonymous with or in some way 
particularly endeared to holism. This, however, is a misconception that 
Bertalanffy should have taken measures to prevent (assuming, of course, 
he did not share this view). Unfortunately, he did not explicitly 
mention the nature of the relationship between perspectivism and holism 
(or even "wholeness") as he did the contrast between perspectivism and 
reductionism. 
One is forced to second guess Bertalanffy's motivation in this 
regard. Was it simply an oversight? Perhaps his dedication to holism 
as a personal belief system was so strong -- as much of his writing 
suggests -- that the need for explicit discussion did not strike him. 
Or, though his writings do not suggest it, perhaps he considered it 
obvious that holism, as atomism or mechanicism, is an ontological 
concept -- a belief about the universe as it is and thus may be 
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allied with but not meaningfully compared to perspectivism which, as 
reductionism, is an epistemological concept, concerned with the universe 
as it can be known or, for a scientist, observed and described. It is 
useful to examine the relationship of each of the ontological concepts 
of interest here to both reductionism and perspectivism. This enables, 
through a more thorough appreciation of Bertalanffy's contrast of 
perspectivism and reductionism, a better understanding of GST. 
Reductionism and Science Based on an Ontology 
Reductionism is a conceptual methodology derived from atomism. It 
is the conceptual foundation of reductionistic experimental approaches. 
In its modern form it is a mechanistic epistemology which implicitly 
assumes (i.e., is founded on the ontological belief that) the universe 
is mechanistic and imposes on any phenomena which it is used to study, 
the character of a mechanistic universe -- a universe in which every 
whole is ultimately no more than a mechanistic assembly of some 
ultimately irreducible physical (or, for more practical or broader-
minded mechanicists perhaps, chemical) parts. Now it is here that the 
limitations of modern mechanistic reductionism -- that is, the 
reductionism that Bertalanffy concerned himself with -- and its 
relationship to holism become apparent. 
Observations and interpretations based on mechanistic reductionism 
enable definition of wholes in terms of their physical (or chemical) 
parts only. If the purpose of science is to objectively and accurately 
describe the universe and phenomena occurring within it, then 
reductionism is an inadequate conceptual methodology because it may not 
be accurate and cannot be objective. Not accurate because it will 
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provide an accurate description of a universe only in so far as that 
universe is, in fact. reducible, i.e., atomistic. Not objective because 
even if a universe were -- perish the thought -- not atomistic, it could 
only appear to be either atomistic or senseless to anyone 
observationally dependent on reductionism. Reductionistic science 
simply has no "scientific" access to evidence that the universe, or any 
phenomena occurring in it, might be anything other than atomistic --
say, for example, holistic. 
Perspectivism and Science Based on an Epistemology 
Now if the relationships of perspectivism to atomism and holism 
were simply the reverse of those of reductionism, then, with respect to 
the needs of science, perspectivism would suffer from the same 
fundamental inadequacy that debilitates reductionism, although perhaps 
opposite in observational effect. This is not the case, though. 
Whereas the adequacy of reductionism is dependent on the ontological 
validity of atomism, perspectivism is ontologically ambivalent. 
Perspectivism is more skeptical, "a more modest view", than 
reductionism in that it is based on the (epistemological) belief that 
discoursive thinking can never exhaust the infinite manifoldness of 
material reality (Nicholas of Cusa, cited by Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 245-
248). Perspectivism is holistic because it emphasizes the functional 
relation between parts and wholes, but it is not dependent on holism 
because it does not hold that the universe is the only true whole. 
Perspectivism is atomistic because it requires that wholes are composed 
of simpler parts, but it is not dependent on the validity of atomism 
because it does not require that the universe be composed of simple, 
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irreducible particles. Neither does it rule out the possibility that 
either atomism or holism or both might in fact be correct. Instead it 
is an acceptance of complex functional wholes as humanly 
incomprehensible when described in terms of the universe as the single 
ultimate whole or as an immense number of ultimately irreducible 
"atomic" particles. Perspectivism is set then, not on an ontological, 
but on an epistemological foundation. 
Now the ambition of science dependent on methods grounded on an 
epistemology must be humbler than that of science dependent on methods 
grounded on an ontology_ Science observationally dependent on an 
epistemologically based conceptual methodology, say perspectivism, can 
not purport to accurately and objectively describe the universe as it 
is, but the universe and phenomena occurring within it only to the 
extent that these are accessible to human cognition and amenable to 
linguistic description. Perspectivistic science is more practical and 
objective in a broader sense than reductionistic science can be. If it 
should be that ontological reality is not fully cognitively accessible 
or linguistically describable, then perspectivistic science can accept a 
full description of reality as outside the domain of science without 
excluding the possibility that parts of reality are cognitively 
accessible -- hence without disabling science as a materially effective 
intellectual art-- and without presuming the nature of reality as a 
whole. Perspectivistic science presumes only that human knowledge is 
necessarily restricted to that of phenomena which are cognitively 
acces.sible for humans, and scientific knowledge is necessarily 
restricted to those portions of human knowledge which are describable in 
scientifically acceptable language. 
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RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY IN G.S.T. 
This reveals another weakness in Bertalanffy's writing and a point 
essential to an appreciation of GST. Bertalanffy's contrast of 
perspectivism and reductionism implies that GST must be an epistemology 
upon which perspectivism is based. Bertalanffy, though, referred to GST 
as a "general science of wholeness", a "model of certain general aspects 
of reality", a "theory", "discipline", "methodological maxim", 
"perspective", and "paradigm". Although there are meaningful 
relationships among all these descriptive terms, they are not synonymous 
with each other or with "epistemology", and the term GST, never 
specifically defined, is consequently stricken with overt ambiguity. 
Such ambiguity has been more clearly perceived by GST-opponents like 
Naughton (1979) than by "systems" devotees. whose practical efforts have 
been severely hampered by their apparently naive indifference to it and 
its importance. 
Laszlo (1975) has suggested that the GST ambiguity of concern here 
did not exist for Bertalanffy, whose native language was German. The 
system/theory/science vocabulary in German, Laszlo suggests, has 
"broader meaning" than the closest English vocabulary. One may infer 
then that the GST terminological ambiguity never arose for Bertalanffy 
and might be internally resolved for those who speak German natively. or 
at least fluently. This, unfortunately, is of little help to those of 
us who are less than fluent in German. Worse still, it implies that 
scientists who might wish to benefit from GST should first become fluent 
in German -- a disheartening prospect. However, even if one were fluent 
in German, the "broader meaning" of the relevant vocabulary would 
require the reader either to have prior knowledge of the intent of each 
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of Berta1anffy's usages, or to select the intended meaning or 
combination of meanings by trial and error each time a "broadly" defined 
term was encountered. Fortunately Berta1anffy was either quite 
proficient in the English language, or as a non-native speaker, 
unusually willing to consult a dictionary during his writing efforts. 
The present effort continues on the assumption his intended meanings are 
accessible to Berta1anffy's English language readers who are 
sufficiently cautious, patient, and equipped with a historically 
appropriate dictionary. 
Laszlo (1975), like Bertalanffy (1968), described GST through a 
negation, stating that GST should not be construed as a "(scientific) 
'theory of general systems'". This leaves English-speaking scientists 
with perhaps only one other sensible, alternative English word order for 
GST, that might more accurately carry Berta1anffy's Germanic intent into 
connotative English: GST is a general theory of systems. Now this 
alternative ordering implies, as Laszlo suggested, that GST is not a 
scientific theory as this is commonly understood by English-speaking 
scientists, but a systematically presented set of empirical, axiomatic, 
or philosophical concepts about "systems" in general. It should be 
noted that this interpretation of GST is obtainable directly, without 
changing word order, even in English, if one is willing to consider 
alternate, non-disciplinarian definitions of "science" and "theory" 
which are available in most dictionaries. This is an encouraging and 
interesting observation which suggests a probable correctness for the 
assumption that the English language is no less GST-capable than the 
German and also suggests the possibility that GST might be a theory more 
properly considered in some field other than "science". 
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Laszlo (1975) stated that GST is not a single theory in the 
scientific sense, but a new paradigm for the development of theories. 
Given that Bertalanffy (1968, 1975) made similar statements, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that GST is not a "general science" in the 
commonly accepted English connotation of these words, but, in fact. an 
epistemology, a set of axiomatic or philosophical concepts on the 
validity and limits of empirically obtainable knowledge. Although 
Bertalanffy (1975, p. 165-169) at one point wrote on "systems ontology" 
as though to suggest there might in fact be some ontological1y real 
"systems", that discussion resolved into a statement of the conditional 
nature of scientific knowledge and led to a discussion of "systems 
epistemology". He pointed out that physical observation is questionable 
and that interactions, the existence of which is essential to the 
concept of systems, are themselves human conceptual constructs. He 
wrote, " ... the distinction between real objects and systems as given in 
observation, and conceptual constructs and systems cannot be drawn in 
any common sense way." Hence, neither "systems" nor GST should be 
understood as ontological concepts, but as epistemological concepts, 
conceptual tools humans use to cognitively deal with ontological 
reality. 
The central GST ambiguity is eliminated if one holds that what 
Bertalanffy called GST was actually comprised of, at least, a realistic 
epistemology; a conceptual methodology based on that epistemology, i.e. 
perspectivism; and an abstract experimental procedure, the "systems", or 
more properly, perspectivistic approach -- so-called "systems 
approaches" should be considered to be in accord with GST only when they 
can be demonstrated to be perspectivistic approaches. It now becomes 
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necessary to define as unequivocally as practically possible, the GST 
epistemology, perspectivism, and the perspectivistic approach. 
THE G.S.T. EPISTEMOLOGY: WE ARE NOT OMNISCIENT 
The GST epistemology has already been described as the belief upon 
which perspectivism is based. That belief is, reiterating Bertalanffy's 
(1968, p. 248) citation of Nicholas of Cusa, discoursive thinking can 
never exhaust the infinite manifoldness of ultimate reality. Or in the 
words of the economist, von Hayek (1967, p. 90), "The crucial fact of 
our lives is that we are not omniscient ... n Or in the words of Szent-
Gyorgyi (1964), "The mind is not a bottomless pit ... " Based on my own 
cautious study of Bertalanffy's writings and the understanding, derived 
from that study, of his intentions and concerns as a scientist, I have 
defined the GST epistemology as the belief that, relative to explicit 
cognizance of the spatiotemporal complexity and variety of the material 
universe, human cognitive capacity is distinctly inadequate. 
Szent-Gyorgyi (1964) presented an enjoyable description of a 
symptom in science of the limitations of human cognitive capacity. He 
wrote in a recollection of time he spent at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies in Princeton, 
... 1 revealed that in any living system there are more than two 
electrons, .... the physicists ... With all their computers ... could not 
say what the third electron might do. The remarkable thing is that 
it knows exactly what to do. So that little electron knows 
something all the wise men of Princeton don't ... 
(Bertalanffy and other early systems writers often cited the three-body 
problem of physics as indicative of the weakness of reductionistic 
science.) The present author suggests that little electron knows 
something all the wise men can't. That something is how to be an 
148 
electron; knowing, without calculating, pondering, or experimenting, 
what an electron should do next. It is appropriate that such an 
epistemology should be presented by scientists since it allows an 
examination of the nature, validity, and limits of empirically 
verifiable, and consequently, of scientific, knowledge. 
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 
Empirical knowledge may be defined as that which exists in the 
"experiencer" or "knower" due to its relationship with the "experienced" 
or "known", and, under the GST epistemology, would seem subject to a 
conceptual form of the law of the minimum. If the "known" phenomenon is 
functionally "simpler" than the cognitive capability of the "knower", 
then the knowledge of that phenomena is limited by the simplicity of the 
"known". On the other hand, if the complexity or immensity of the 
"known" phenomenon exceeds the cognitive capability of the "knower". 
then the knowledge of that phenomenon is limited by the cognitive 
capability of the "knower". There is, also, a third possible case. If 
the complexity of the cognitive capability of the "knower" is 
functionally equivalent to the complexity of the known phenomenon then, 
given no other information, the "knowledge-limiting factor" can not be 
identified. 
Empirical knowledge, as defined here (above), implies the empirical 
existence of both the nknower" and the nknown" , i.e., the existence of a 
physical reality in which both "knower" and nknownn simultaneously 
exist. It does not, however, provide the means for determining which is 
the nknowern and which the nknown". For example, assume there is a live 
fish in water. Under the definition given above, since the water is 
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displaced and altered by the fish one may state that the water has 
knowledge of the fish, that the water is the "knower". On the other 
hand, since the fish displaces and manipulates and may be displaced and 
manipulated by the water, one may say the fish has knowledge of the 
water. How then may one distinguish "knower" from "known"? And what 
does all this have to do with perspectivism? 
Non-Purposive Empirical Knowledge 
Distinguishing the "knower" from the "known" requires more 
information than is available in the stated definition of empirical 
knowledge. Two general types of knowledge, which are GST-
epistemologically valid, can be distinguished on the basis of observable 
relationships between "knower" and "known". In the preceding fishy 
example, the water's knowledge of the fish exemplifies one of these 
types. One might call this type of empirical knowledge "passive", but 
for reasons which will become apparent, I will call it non-purposive 
knowledge. 
Innumerable empirical observations by humans indicate that the 
existence of water is not dependent on the spatiotemporally simultaneous 
existence of fish, i.e., on water experiencing fish.7 On the other 
hand, human empirical observations also lead us to believe that the 
existence of live fish is dependent on the simultaneous existence of 
water. 8 Or, restating, the existence of organisms recognizable as fish 
70r , in the case of Szent-Gyorgyi's (1964) third electron: 
whatever electrons really are, they do not need science or scientists in 
order to know how to behave as electrons. 
8The live scientist/electron case is not so empirically clear cut. 
Not because the relationship is necessarily different in principle, but 
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depends not only on those organisms knowing how to develop and maintain 
"fishy" shapes, colors. etc., but also on their knowing how to use water 
to accomplish that development and maintenance -. fish must necessarily 
"know" water exists, and how to manipulate it in order to move, eat, 
breathe, etc. 9 Hence, the second general type of knowledge, which I 
will call purposive. 
Purposive Empirical Knowledge 
Non-purposive empirical knowledge is that which exists in the 
"knower" as a consequence of its relationship with the "known" and 
which, though necessary for the existence of the "known", can not be 
empirically construed as having any purpose with respect to the 
existence of the "knower". Purposive knowledge is that which exists in 
the "knower" as a consequence of its relationship with the "known" and 
which has purpose in the sense that the material existence of the 
"knower" is dependent upon it. Thus, a purposive "knower" is 
necessarily (or "obligately") concerned with externalities while a non-
purposive "knower" is not. 
Therefore, to differentiate the "knower" from the "known". it is 
necessary to determine whether the knowledge of interest is purposive or 
non-purposive. Scientific knowledge must be construed as purposive 
knowledge since it develops in, and to the existential benefit of, the 
because the existence of electrons is not so readily or certainly, i.e. 
sensorily, demonstrable as the existence of the substance we call water. 
9Water is an opportunity, but not an obligation, for fish to exist. 
More formally, the existence of water is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for the existence of fish. Water can not be 
construed as the cause of fish and fish can not be construed as the 
cause of water. 
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"knower"; and empirical observation suggests -- hence definition 
requires -- that it cannot exist in and is of no existential benefit to 
non·purposive "knowers". Science then may be defined as a (methodical) 
pursuit of purposive knowledge and scientists~ consequently, must be 
concerned with the nature of purposive knowledge. 
Passively Acquired Purposive Empirical Knowledge 
Two GST-epistemologically valid types of purposive knowledge can be 
distinguished on the basis of the means of acquisition by an individual 
"knower". The first type, passively acquired, is that knowledge an 
individual purposive "knower" must have a priori in order to exist. 
Such knowledge is fundamentally essential and consistently reliable in 
the knower's existential universe, and not available to the individual 
through active knowledge acquisition. Continuing with the fish as an 
example, the individual fish must know how to exchange gases with water 
("breathe") in a manner appropriate for each stage of its development, 
from egg to adult. And it must possess such knowledge before, and 
implement it no later than, the moment it is needed because the delay 
associated with discerning the need for such knowledge, investigation, 
and development of appropriate knowledge of gas exchange and 
physiological options (i.e., with "thinking about it") .- not to mention 
implementation of the selected options -- would necessarily result in 
asphyxiation. Similarly, a fish must know when and what kind of 
appendages and body shape are appropriate to sustaining its existence in 
water; for failure to develop a streamlined body and fins at the 
appropriate time would result in starvation or falling victim to 
environmental hazards. That is, knowledge of what is functionally 
essential for existence in a fish's watery existential universe must be 
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prior knowledge in any fish. If this were not so, then each individual 
organism would need to independently rediscover how to build and 
coordinate a morphological, physiological, and behavioral complex 
appropriate for existence in whatever existential universe it might find 
itself. And if this were so, then fish eggs might give rise to lizards 
or worms or humans or maybe even plants, according to where the 
individual developed. Empirical observation constrains us from such 
logical but outrageous inferences though, because, as an example, fish 
eggs either develop into fish or cease to exist die. 
It should be clear at this point that, for living organisms, an 
individual's genetic and cytoplasmic inheritance may be construed as its 
passively acquired purposive empirical knowledge. The complexity and 
depth of passively acquirable knowledge is incomprehensible (or, perhaps 
more accurately, "indescribable") and its effectiveness wondrous, even 
in a bacterium, let alone in a fish or a human. The passively acquired 
knowledge possessed by an individual is nevertheless limited, and its 
expression a material obligation -- a fertilized fish egg can only 
become a fish or die, and nothing more or other than that. There is a 
further limitation on passively acquired knowledge that is critical to 
an understanding of perspectivism. 
An individual must be able to sense and respond effectively to 
those events which are possible in its existential universe and which 
affect its material existence. The adequacy of passively acquirable 
knowledge in this regard is dependent on the condition that sensory and 
response capabilities which were existentially adequate for its 
progenitors will also be effective for the extant individual. Hence, as 
long as the chemical properties of water do not change, the passively 
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acquired knowledge of, say, gas exchange functionally adequate for a 
fish's progenitors will remain adequate. Likewise, as long as the 
physical properties of water do not change, passively acquired knowledge 
of a mechanically effective morphology could remain adequate. However, 
the existential universe of a fish includes far more than a collection 
of water molecules in the liquid state. There are other material 
events, not so consistent as the existence and properties of water, 
which must be effectively dealt with as well. 
Actively Acquired Purposive Empirical Knowledge 
Consider, for example, a fish's need to acquire food. If the fish 
is predatory it will at times in its life prey upon others and, 
probably, be subject to being preyed upon by others. If reliably 
abundant prey, when pursued, always attempted to evade the predatory 
attacks of the fish's ancestors by, say, turning abruptly to the left, 
then a reliably successful attack behavior could be part of the fish's 
passively acquired knowledge. Difficulties arise in practice, however. 
If the left-turning prey should begin to turn right, then the fish's 
pre-programmed attack pattern would be inadequate -- in fact, a complete 
failure, and the behaviorally inadequate predatory fish would starve. 
It is existentially essential therefore that the individual possess more 
than a functionally adequate passively acquired understanding of the 
historically consistent phenomena which occur in its existential 
universe. The individual must also possess a functionally adequate 
means of dealing with existentially relevant phenomena which were 
unknown to its ancestors or not sufficiently consistent in its ancestral 
history for functional knowledge of them to bave become part of its 
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passively acquired knowledge. Hence, the second type of purposive 
empirical knowledge: actively acquired. 
Actively and passively acquired knowledge differ in that while 
passively acquired knowledge defines internal capabilities (structure 
and function) in terms of external phenomena which are (presumed for 
historical/empirical reasons to be) temporospatially universal 
consistencies, actively acquired knowledge defines external phenomena 
which are temporospatially local consistencies in terms of internal 
capabilities (or "consistencies"). Passively acquired knowledge assures 
the functionality of the individual in terms of phenomena which are 
reliably consistent throughout the individual's existential universe 
that is, assures that the individual makes sense in terms of its 
existential universe. Passively acquired knowledge defines the limits 
of the individual's experiential capabilities and, consequently, the 
potential limits of its experiential universe. Actively acquired 
knowledge, in contrast, is concerned with the functionality of locally 
consistent phenomena in terms of the existential needs of the individual 
-- i.e., allows the individual to experientially "make sense" of 
(experienced) external phenomena with respect to its existential needs. 
Which knowledge an individual might actively acquire is limited to that 
of its existential universe, that is, that of the portion of the 
ontological universe in which the individual is equipped, by the 
knowledge passively acquired from its progenitors, to exist. Which 
knowledge it does actively acquire is limited to that of its own 
experiential universe, i.e., that portion of its existential universe 
with which it has experience. Considering the fish again, it has 
passively acquired knowledge that it must periodically replenish its 
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internal energy and nutrient supplies _. it knows when and how "to get 
hungry" -- that adequate food supplies (prey) exist in its universe, and 
how to use -- digest and metabolize -- food once ingested, but 
consistently reliable knowledge of such universally inconsistent 
phenomena as where and when prey occur, how to efficiently capture 
different prey, or when, while pursuing prey, "discretion is the better 
part of valor", can not be passively acquired. By way of clarification 
through definition, the experiential universe is that portion of the 
existential (epistemological) universe in which the individual exists, 
and to which its actively acquired knowledge is limited. The 
existential universe is that portion of the material (ontological) 
universe in which the individual is prepared by its passively acquired 
knowledge to exist and which it is prepared to "know". 
The Ability to Actively Acquire Knowledge 
Cannot Be Actively Acquired 
Because it is knowledge of external phenomena which are locally 
instead of universally consistent, the actively acquired knowledge which 
permitted (an individual's) progenitors to exist may not enable the 
(individual) progeny to deal adequately with "new" existentially 
relevant externals, or even new combinations of "old" externals. 
Further, empirical observation suggests that every individual is faced 
with the need to develop temporospatially appropriate actively acquired 
knowledge and that lack of the ability to meet that need will result in 
existential failure just as certainly as an inability to breathe, digest 
food, etc. Hence, the ability to actively acquire knowledge that is 
functionally relevant and reliable in the individual's existential 
universe is as fundamentally essential as, say, knowing how to breathe. 
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I suggest, for two reasons, that the fundamental knowledge of how 
to actively acquire knowledge can not itself be actively acquired. The 
first reason: Either one has the ability to "learn" or one does not. 
If one does, then one will learn. If one does not have the ability to 
learn, then one can not learn, hence, one can not learn to learn. The 
second reason: most purposive knowers constantly face challenges which, 
if these knowers are to maintain their existence, require material 
demonstration of the existential validity and effectiveness of their 
knowledge. Hence, it is unlikely they have the opportunity to concern 
themselves with how they acquired the knowledge that permits them to 
exist. Therefore, the ability to actively acquire knowledge is not 
functionally available to the individual as actively acquired knowledge, 
and therefore must be passively acquired 
of the beast". 
that is, nit is the nature 
PERSPECTIVISM AS A CONCEPTUAL METHODOLOGY 
This, then, is a fundamental concept underlying perspectivism: Any 
extant individual purposive knower must inherently be able to reason and 
learn adequately to maintain itself in a specific existential universe, 
the limits of which are defined by the knowledge passively acquired from 
its progenitors; for it can not maintain its existence with less than 
adequate knowledge and there can be no empirical verification -- and 
therefore should be no assumption -- that it possesses more than 
adequate knowledge. This last point is subtle but crucial, for it lies 
at the heart of the fundamental concern of this discussion, and bears 
directly on any consideration of science, scientific methods, or the 
limits of scientific knowledge. Scientists have failed to recognize 
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that over-zealous application of an anti-anthropomorphic doctrine 
implies an anthropocentric attitude which is, because of its subtlety, 
an even greater threat to our inherently weak human objectivity than the 
more easily diagnosed anthropomorphism (Berger and Berry, 1988). 
Perspectivism is an unorthodox conceptual methodology with a "more 
modest view" than the more conventional reductionism or less workable 
holism. Perspectivism holds, for example, that a fish can and must 
think, but as a fish and only as a fish; just as a human can and must 
think, but as, and only as, a human (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 245-248). 
Those who take a more conventional (reductionistic) view would likely 
agree with the doubly biased -- anthropocentric and quantity-minded 
(atomistic) -- statement that while the ability of fish to actively 
acquire knowledge would not be existentially adequate for humans, human 
active knowledge acquisition capabilities would be more than adequate 
for fish. To those taking a perspectivistic view, the capabilities of 
fish are simply not appropriate to human existential needs, as human 
capabilities are not to the existential needs of fish. 
Not A Futilitarian Relativism 
It is important to emphasize at this point, Bertalanffy's (1968, p. 
239-240) appropriate concern that perspectivism should not be construed 
as another form of futilitarian relativism. For, although it is 
relativistic, it does not hold that knowledge has a "purely conventional 
and utilitarian character", and should not give rise to an "emotional 
background of ... ultimate futility". A piece from Bertalanffy's 
writing on this point succinctly summarizes the concepts presented in 
the last few paragraphs. 
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As far as direct experience is concerned, the categories of 
perception as determined by the biophysiological organization 
of the species concerned cannot be completely 'wrong,' 
fortuitous, and arbitrary. Rather they must, in a certain way 
and to a certain extent, correspond to 'reality' ... Any 
organism, man included, ... has to react to stimuli coming 
from outside, according to its innate psychophysical 
equipment. There is a latitude in what is picked up as a 
stimulus, ... However, its perception must allow the animal to 
find its way in the world. This would be impossible if the 
categories of experience, such as time, space, substance, 
causality, were entirely deceptive. The categories of 
experience have arisen in biological evolution, and have 
continually to justify themselves in the struggle for 
existence. If they would not, in some way, correspond to 
reality, appropriate reaction would be impossible, and such 
organism would quickly be eliminated by selection. 
The Priority of Qualitative Knowledge 
As a conceptual methodology, perspectivism gives priority to 
qualitative, rather than quantitative, aspects of the ability to 
actively acquire knowledge, and in so doing, diminishes the 
anthropocentricity -- increases the objectivity -- of human observation 
and description. For example, to the perspectivist, the fish brain may, 
in some quantitatively measurable ways, be different from the human 
brain, but the relevance of organ size or numbers of neurons and 
synapses to the quantitative aspects of existentially necessary 
knowledge can not be reliably inferred. Gould and Marler (1987) discuss 
research results which support this position. An example, experiments 
where seed-caching chickadees with their "tiny" brains could "remember 
the locations of hundreds of hidden seeds, whereas human beings begin to 
forget after hiding about a dozen." Perspectivism suggests that the 
more general recognition that this is, say, a fish brain while that is a 
human brain takes epistemological precedence over the quantitative 
recognition that this brain has a mass of less than 1 gram while that 
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has a mass of over 1000 grams. Perspectivism prohibits presumption of 
an association of quantity with quality. Generalizations such as "If a 
little is good, a lot is better", "bigger is better", or "small is 
beautiful" are not epistemologically valid -- let alone empirically 
supported -- because they confuse the qualitatively and quantitatively 
describable aspects of the observable phenomena. While it would be 
perspectivistically meaningful to state that fish brain "An is 
materially larger than fish brain "Bn, it would be redundant to state 
that fish brain "An is smaller than human brain "e" because such a size 
difference is implicit in the qualities "fish" and "human". Further, 
even if some strange excess of growth should occur in a fish so that its 
brain mass approximated that of humans, there is no reason to believe 
that its brain would be -- at best, assuming no deformative growth --
anything other than a quantitatively unusual ("large"), qualitatively 
consistent ("fish") phenomenon (brain). 
This should not be understood to mean that perspectivists regard 
quantitative data as (ontologically) "second-rate" information. 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 238) is again explicit, 
Much harm has been done in science by playing one aspect against 
the other and so, in the elementaristic approach, to neglect and 
deny obvious and most important consequences; or, in the holistic 
approach, to deny the fundamental importance and necessity of 
analysis. 
Perspectivists, for epistemological reasons, must consider quantitative 
determinations as secondary since such the ability to make quantitative 
determinations presupposes a qualitative awareness of the existential 
(functional) relevance of the subject phenomenon, i.e., the cognitive 
accessibility of the phenomenon. One of the principles of perspectivism 
-- a simple principle of which any effective scientist is implicitly 
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aware -- may be simply stated as, "One must know where one is looking 
before one can know what to look for, and what to look for, before one 
can hope to determine how much of it there is." 
A word of caution: It is easy to misconstrue "existential 
functionality", as used here, as synonymous with "relevance" as used in 
the current popular sense. This would imply that pure academic research 
should not be pursued. This is clearly a misapprehension of the 
concepts involved because "existential functionality" is apparent as a 
universal human-relative quality synonymous with "cognitive 
accessibility" not by the majority, but by any human, because cognitive 
accessibility for any human mind necessarily implies potential 
existential, but not necessarily socio-economic, relevance for each 
human being. Bertalanffy also speaks to this. 
The Problem: Existing Without Being Omniscient 
Over the full range of qualitatively different purposive knowers, 
there is no empirical evidence that there exists, or has ever existed, 
any purposive knower with complete actively acquired knowledge of its 
experiential universe -- much less its existential, or, even more 
ambitiously, its ontological universe. There is a functional limit on 
the quantity of knowledge any spatiotemporally finite individual can 
possess. No individual can know the current status of all, or even most 
of, the separate material factors and relationships which have the 
potential to affect that individual's material existence. And 
apparently all empirically observable purposive knowers are faced with 
this quantitatively insurmountable problem. Still, they do exist and 
their existence necessarily implies that all extant purposive knowers 
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not to mention their ancestors and descendants -- somehow overcome this 
problem. That is, at least one solution to this problem of surviving in 
a universe of infinite manifoldness through the use of only limited 
knowledge and cognitive capabilities must exist, and every extant 
purposive knower must be presumed competent in the functional 
application of such a solution. 
The Solution: A Single, Reliable, Fully General Approach 
This conclusion has three possible consequences. First, there may 
be an immense number of solutions -- giving rise to the need to consider 
the possibility that each purposive knower might discover its own. 
Second, there may be a unique general solution -- giving rise to the 
need to consider the possibility that all purposive knowers exist as a 
consequence of functional competency in the application of that 
solution. Third, the first and second consequences may both be true. 
It is the third, most complicated of the three consequences which seems 
most compatible with the empirical information that is available within 
human cognitive constraints. However, the third consequence is 
resolvable, because the three consequences are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. The existence of a unique general solution (second 
consequence) would not preclude, and in fact would require, the 
development of an immense number of special solutions (first 
consequence) through application of the general solution to an immense 
number of special cases (third consequence). Hence, we arrive at the 
conclusion that although there must be an immense number of special 
solutions, there might be a general solution and, if there is, that all 
purposive knowers could be expected to be functionally competent in it. 
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There is another reason to consider that there might be a general 
solution to the problem of existing while equipped with only limited 
knowledge and cognitive capacity. To argue that there might not be a 
general solution is equivalent to arguing against the estimates that it 
would take more time than the present material universe has been in 
existence for randomly sequencing amino acids to become organized into 
self-reproducing structures (Madore and Freeman, 1987). In fact, there 
are reasons to believe that the development of such knowledge by random 
observation and apprehension is probably even less likely than the 
development of self-reproducing structures from randomly sequencing 
amino acids. One such reason is that once knowledge that is not 
passively acquired becomes necessary, it must be acquired in short order 
or it will not be effective; i.e., the purposive knower in question will 
cease to exist. Another reason is that there is an immense number and 
variety of potentially existentially relevant phenomena in an 
individual's experiential universe, and specific phenomena relevant 
today may not be tomorrow. Still another is that, if there were no 
general solution available, then the individual knower would have to 
"start from scratch" each time a new phenomenon is encountered. So, the 
ubiquity of the ability to actively acquire existentially adequate 
("effective") knowledge despite limited cognitive capacity; and, the 
unlikelihood that each individual purposive knower has the ability or 
sufficient opportunity to discover its own general solution to the 
problems which arise as a consequence of the obligate limitations on its 
cognitive capacity; lead to the conclusion that the general solution is 
inherent in -- i.e., part of the passively acquired knowledge of -- each 
existentially adequate purposive knower. 
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Consideration of the principal tenet of GST epistemology and some 
aspects of its associated conceptual methodology, perspectivism, 
suggests then, that there is a general solution to the problem of 
surviving in "the infinite manifoldness of material reality" with only 
finite cognitive capabilities. Further, it suggests that all 
existentially effective purposive knowers inherit competency in 
application of that general solution to a peculiar range of 
existentially relevant phenomena; that range being defined by their 
"biophysiological organization"t which is itself the result of passive 
application of that general solution by their progenitors. It is the 
opinion of the present author that the idealized objective of GST is to 
discern the character of this general solution and present itt to the 
extent possible, in a form compatible with transmission as actively 
acquired knowledge and thus bring this general solution as far as 
possible into the realm of explicit, conscious application. The 
remainder of this presentation is directed toward that objective. 
The Language: Mathematics or Logic 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 37) held that in its elaborate form GST 
"would be a logico-mathematical discipline, in itself purely formal but 
applicable to the various empirical sciences." Checkland (1981, p. 93) 
stated that Berta1anffy and the other founders of the Society for 
General Systems Research shared "Bertalanffy's unchanging view ... that 
there would arise as a result of work in different fields a high-level 
meta-theory of systems, mathematically expressed", but that "The general 
theory envisaged ... has certainly not emerged". Bertalanffy (1968) 
wrote in the 1945 article in which he introduced GST that GST "in its 
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developed form, would replace what is known as 'theory of categories' by 
an exact system of logico-mathematical laws. General notions as yet 
unexpressed in the vernacular would acquire the unambiguous and exact 
expression possible only in mathematical language." Three important 
points may be extracted from these statements. First, it is reasonable 
to infer that throughout his lifelong interest in GST Bertalanffy held 
the view that no mathematically expressed meta-theory of systems that 
might satisfy the objectives of GST had yet "emerged". Second, not only 
is it clarified that in its essential form GST would be a logico-
mathematical discipline, but that it would replace (or supersede) 
"theory of categories". Third, emphasis is given to the importance of a 
language capable of unambiguous and exact expression, in Bertalanffy's 
view a "mathematical language". It is my opinion that Bertalanffy was 
correct in suggesting that in its developed form it would replace 
"theory of categories", but in error regarding the lack of a formal 
logic capable of replacing "theory of categories" and compatible with 
GST or the natural sciences. I suggest that this error was the 
consequence of a conflict within Bertalanffy between a traditional 
scientist's loyalty to mathematics, and an intuitive sense that the 
requirements of GST could not be met by mathematics. An observable 
symptom of this conflict is the preservation of ambivalence about 
languages other than mathematics and ambiguity in use of the words 
"mathematics" and "mathematical". 
"Mathematical" is defined as that of or pertaining to mathematics, 
"the science of numbers and their operations, interrelations, 
combinations, generalizations, and abstractions ... " (Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary, 1981) or the science "treating of the exact 
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relations between quantities or magnitudes and operations ... " (Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary, 1946). One also finds a second simpler, less 
restrictive, definition: "rigorously exact: precise". There is, then, 
an inherent ambiguity in the word "mathematical", and consequently in 
the word "mathematics" as well. GST writers generally have not given 
any indication of which meaning they intended for these words. The 
following considers the meaning of these words as used in the GST 
literature, whether GST writers, including Bertalanffy, have used 
"mathematics" to mean "the science of quantities ... ", and whether this 
meaning is the appropriate one for use in efforts to describe GST. 
The Bertalanffian view: mathematics 
In the GST literature in general it is contextually difficult to 
consider that "mathematical" might have been intended to mean anything 
other than that which is related to "the science of numbers" and 
"mathematical language" anything other than the "rigorously exact" 
language of that science. Bertalanffy held the exactness of the 
language of mathematics in high regard. but, also held throughout his 
lifetime that GST must accept the use of languages more ambiguous than 
that of mathematics. For example, in his 1945 introduction of GST 
(Bertalanffy, 1968) one finds reference to 
" ... phenomena where the general principles can be described in 
ordinary language though they can not be formulated in mathematical 
terms." 
In 1967 (ibid.), 
This does not mean that models formulated in ordinary language are 
to be despised or refused ... A verbal model is better than no model 
at all, or a model which, because it can be formulated 
mathematically, is forcibly imposed upon and falsifies reality ... 
Models in ordinary language therefore have their place in systems 
theory. 
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And again in 1972, the year of his death, 
'Verbal' descriptions and models are not expendable. Problems must 
intuitively be 'seen' and recognized before they can be formalized 
mathematically. Otherwise, mathematical formalism may rather 
impede exploration of very 'real' problems." (p.163). 
But he never seemed to seriously consider that there might exist any 
"mathematical", i.e., any rigorously exact and unambiguous, language 
compatible with GST -- or, for that matter with science generally -- if 
not the language of the science of numbers. His belief in the primacy 
and power of mathematics was most apparent in 1972 when he wrote, 
" ... even though the problems of "systems" were ancient and known 
for many centuries, they remained 'philosophical' and did not 
become a 'science.' This was so because mathematical techniques 
were lacking ... ", 
and in the same paper, 
"The goal obviously is to develop general system theory in 
mathematical terms (a 'logicomathematical field,' as this author 
wrote in the early statement ... ) because mathematics is the exact 
language permitting deduction and confirmation (or refusal) of 
theory." 
So, although Berta1anffy continued to hold throughout his life that 
there is a place in GST for other languages, the only reliable language 
for GST (and science) was, in his view, the language of the science of 
numbers. 
Bertalanffy never (as far as I have been able to determine) 
expressed any misgivings about the power of "the language" of 
mathematics and its role in GST. However, he never offered any more 
justification for this "faith" than a simple default to the traditional 
regard for mathematics as "the exact language permitting rigorous 
deduction ... " from quantitative observation. Such unsupported 
invocations of convenient traditional views to support efforts to 
establish the validity and acceptability of GST may have been the basis 
167 
of GST opponent Naughton's (1979) claim that GST "seems to be benefiting 
from the prevailing climate of intellectual permissiveness." (Or, 
perhaps, after some forty years of exposure to impressive innovations in 
mathematical and numerical techniques and of "surviving" within 
traditional science, the quantity-minded ghost of atomism had returned 
to haunt Bertalanffy, or, at least, to reassure him of the legitimacy of 
mathematics as "the language" of mature scientific work which is 
ultimately no different, for, as I will attempt to demonstrate, once the 
domain of its language is defined so is the domain of a discipline.) 
Regardless, the GST literature neither justifies the acceptance of 
mathematics as "the" GST language, nor does it consider, except for 
resignations to practical necessity like those in Bertalanffy's 
statements quoted above, whether some other language might be more 
appropriate for GST, and, hence, for description of an effective 
procedure for active acquisition of reliable knowledge. 
The Inadequacies of Mathematics 
Can the acceptance of mathematics as the appropriate language for 
GST, as a language capable of supporting active acquisition of 
existentially relevant knowledge, be justified? Bertalanffy (1955, in 
1968, p. 24) indicated the points which he apparently considered to 
justify the acceptance of mathematics in this role: "unambiguity, 
possibility of strict deduction, and verifiability by observed data n , 
Consideration of the nature of mathematics and the intent of GST reveals 
an unresolvable contradiction between Bertalanffy's aspirations for GST 
and his presentation of GST as potentially fully expressible in the 
language of the science of numbers. Bertalanffy and many of his 
168 
successors considered GST a new, powerful, and truly general "paradigm". 
Now if GST is such, then only a truly general language could be used to 
adequately describe it or reliably render its purported power into a 
methodology. Mathematics is neither a truly general nor a very powerful 
language. Some of the weaknesses of mathematics (particularly with 
respect to the descriptive needs of science, and certainly, then, GST) 
have been pointed out in prose by such individuals as the economist, 
Hayek (1967), and the mathematician, von Neumann (1966; Ber1inski, 
1976); in models such as that of Solomonoff (Chaitin, 1975); and even 
mathematically demonstrated in works like those of the mathematical 
logician, Goedel (Chaitin, 1975; Nagel and Newman, 1956; Wang, 1986). 
Consider, as an initial demonstration of the inadequacy of 
mathematics as a truly general language, the entity called a sphere. An 
effective definition of a sphere can be provided in ordinary English: 
that three-dimensional geometrical surface which consists of all points 
equidistant from a specified point. In mathematical language the sphere 
is defined by the equation: 
(x-a)2 + (y-b)2 + (z-c)2 - r2. 
But mathematical language will not do to describe material objects --
the subjects of science and concern of any individual concerned with 
maintaining its existence in a material universe. What, for example, is 
the equation that defines a "red sphere"? There is none, because 
neither objects nor colors -- indeed no material objects or sensual 
perceptions of them -- are mathematical concepts, and consequently can 
not be described, ambiguously or otherwise, in the language of 
mathematics. Because of the importance of establishing the limitations 
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of the language of mathematics, and because the preceding demonstration 
(of the futility of expecting the language of the science of numbers to 
serve as the language of a truly general GST) is not altogether 
satisfying, it is worthwhile to consider the shortcoming of mathematics 
in more detail. 
The complaint is, then, that mathematics can only unambiguously and 
explicitly describe the conceptually sound constructions which can be 
formed from the colorless, odorless, tasteless, massless, mutually 
penetrable, and generally indistinguishable entities -- specifically 
"points" and "numbers" which are the building blocks of the universes 
of mathematics. There is a traditional counter-complaint that this is 
little more than a strict formalist argument which could be extended to 
interfere with the use of mathematics in any area of intellectual 
endeavor. To make this counter-complaint is to miss the point. It is 
not the purpose of this discussion to suggest that mathematics is not an 
extremely useful conceptual tool. The purpose is to consider what the 
fundamental limitations of mathematics might be, what types of problems 
might lie outside the domain of mathematics, and what artifacts might 
arise from application of mathematics to such mathematically 
inaccessible problems. 
Mathematics is idealistic 
Mathematics is incapable of describing GST, or of adequately 
expressing a protocol for a perspectivistic procedure, because it is an 
idealistic. atomistic, and, at least as regarded by most scientists, 
including Bertalanffy, an absolute language. Mathematics is idealistic, 
consequently its domain is restricted to universes that contain 
"objects" and "relations" which exist only as ideas, and which are not 
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constrained by the "natural order" that affects "real" objects in the 
material universe -- those existentially relevant objects with which 
purposive knowers must successfully deal if they are to maintain their 
material existence. 
Mathematics is atomistic 
The atomism of mathematics follows from its idealistic foundation, 
because every mathematics (at least insofar as I am aware) is based on 
at least one "undefined" term. To be more specific, every mathematics 
is based, directly or indirectly, on the existence of an irreducible 
abstract idealized entity which is referred to as a "number" (to contest 
this statement would be inconsistent with acceptance of the definition 
of mathematics as the science of numbers). It is a necessary 
consequence of being undefined that the fundamental "number" entity is 
functionally irreducible. Hence, mathematical universes are composed of 
ideal mathematical "atoms" called numbers, and consequently such 
universes are inherently atomistic. 
Mathematics is absolutistic 
The absolutism of mathematics follows from its idealism and 
atomism. Only those things which are deductively provable are 
permiSSible in the mathematical universe and, consequently, every 
mathematically extent "thing" can be fully and absolutely described in 
terms of the fundamental "number" entities of which everything in that 
universe is constituted. That is, any and every entity that can "exist" 
in a mathematical universe can be reduced to quantitatively specifiable 
relationships among idealistically absolute irreducible entities. 
Hence, mathematics is an absolute language. Proofs of mathematical 
theorems are, in fact, demonstrations of the reducibility of such 
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theorems to tautologous truths about the mathematical universe, such as 
an identity, 1 - 1, for example. 
The perspectivistic view: Mathematics and the nature of ideal universes 
Mathematics is absolute. however, only in a relative way. Consider 
in this regard an implication of the irreducibility (atomicity, if you 
will) of the "number" entity. The abstract mathematically fundamental 
entity which we may unambiguously denote with the symbol 0.00001 is 
neither part of, nor smaller than, nor larger than, that to which we may 
unambiguously attach the symbol 1 or 0, or for that matter 10 000. 
However, the symbolic deSignations 0, 0.00001, and 1 are unambiguous 
only if the entity designated by each mathematical symbol is always 
distinguishable from all other such entities. Yet these entities are 
undefined, massless, colorless, tasteless, odorless, formless, and fully 
interchangeable; that is, they are by definition indistinguishable. 
How, then, does the mathematician determine which is which? 
Meaning depends ~ form 
Finding a satisfactory answer to this question is no simple matter, 
because if the mathematical universe is the collection of all formless 
mathematically fundamental entities, then the universe is itself a 
formless entity. It is, therefore, impossible not only to distinguish 
one irreducible number entity from another, but also, to distinguish an 
irreducible number entity from the ideal universe which contains it. 
Consequently, postulating the existence of infinitely many such distinct 
formless entities, and the existence of an idealistic universe comprised 
of all such irreducible entities, is the same as postulating one 
idealistic, All-Formlessness -- and we encounter the difficulty 
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presented by adopting a holistic ontology. The entire language 
derivable from such an idealistic, atomistically absolute mathematical 
universe is contained in the one truth, "Formlessness is." Beyond this 
there are no other truths derivable from an idealistic absolute 
atomistic mathematical universe ultimately composed only of for~ess 
"number" atoms. Obviously, such universes are of little interest to 
scientists, or, more generally, to purposive knowers concerned with 
actively acquirable existentially relevant knowledge; in fact, they are 
not even of interest to mathematicians. The language of mathematics 
becomes meaningful, then, only when the mathematical universe which it 
describes is not formless. 
Internally defined form: the real world -- One can speak of only 
one type of for~ess universe, i.e., formless. One can, on the other 
hand, speak of two types of structured universes: those the form of 
which is internally defined, and those with externally defined form. 
Internally defined form arises as a consequence of the form(s) of the 
fundamental entities of a universe. I will venture to state that all 
material universes in which purposive knowers might exist may be 
considered to be of this type. That is, for all cognitively limited 
individuals, all realistic universes are of this type. In such 
universes each and every entity, fundamental or otherwise, is uniquely 
distinguishable in so far as its form is unique. Such universes present 
at least two practical difficulties for mathematics, however. Either 
such universes must contain no identical entities or mathematics must be 
ambiguous with respect to such entities. This is a relatively minor 
practical problem, though, compared to the second. To unambiguously 
designate non-identical entities in such a universe would require a 
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statement of how each entity is different from all other entities in the 
(same) universe, that is, to be unambiguous every description would 
require a complete catalog of all of the characteristics of each and 
every non-identical entity in the (same) universe. Hence, for such a 
universe t every designation of non-identical entities would be 
completely unambiguous, but, at the expense of being infinitely long, 
presenting the ultimate difficulty in adopting an atomistic ontology. I 
would not presume to state that infinitely long statements are never 
interesting, but they are of little help to the cognitively limited 
purposive knower in need of reliable, existentially relevant knowledge; 
to scientists looking for "natural laws"; to mathematicians looking for 
"provable" theorems. 
Externally defined form: describable worlds -- The form of a 
universe may also be externally defined. Externally defined form arises 
as a consequence of form outside the universe. All idealistic universes 
are of this type. Such universes are of particular interest to 
mathematics. Indeed, they are the only universes of interest to 
mathematics, because the form of the fundamental entities which comprise 
the universe need not be known and, consequently, can be left undefined. 
In fact, the fundamental entities of such universes must be formless 
because if the fundamental entities had form, then such universes would 
also have form and universal structure could not be externally imposed. 
For universes with externally defined form, entities can be 
unambiguously distinguished and designated on the basis of where they 
reside in the relevant universal structure, provided two requirements 
are met. The first requirement is a means of unambiguously designating 
relative position in the universal structure. All that is necessary to 
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enable such unambiguous designation is the existence of a universal 
reference point. In mathematics this is provided by the concept of "the 
origin" or "zero". The second requirement is that one and only one 
entity occupy each relative position in the universal structure. Again 
a single condition makes such unique associations possible: 
impenetrability of fundamental entities. In mathematics, this condition 
makes it possible to state definitively that 
0.999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 ... ~ 1. 
These two conditions together give rise to such mathematical 
curiosities as the numerical indeterminacy of such sensibly determinate 
relations as that of the circumference of a circle to its diameter t that 
iS t "pi"; and the problems that arise when numerical methods are applied 
to analytical mathematical models of material systems, i.e. chaos theory 
(Jensen, 1987) and attempts to explain episodes of chaotic behavior in 
such numerical models. The number of 9's in the left argument of the 
preceding inequality represents the number of binary digits used by 
digital computers in double-precision processing of numerical 
information and is of interest with respect to "chaos theory". It may 
be that 60 digits of precision is not sufficient to prevent numerical 
models (generally based on classical analytical mathematical models) of 
even the simplest natural "systems" from generating chaotic results. 
Ultimately, both the power and inadequacy of mathematics may reside in 
its dependence on the ontological validity of (the materially 
unaddressab1e concept) infinity. With even the most powerful computers, 
numerical methods are subject to a considerable loss of power relative 
to classical, analytical mathematics because numerical methods must 
ultimately relinquish the opportunity to functionally invoke infinity, 
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which ultimately is the mathematician's device for dealing with that 
which is materially apparent but quantitatively unverifiable. 
Further, imposition of these designation-enabling conditions does 
not alleviate all the problems inherent in the exploration of ideal 
universes. For example, there are problems with respect to the 
distinction between that which is (ontology) and that which can be known 
(epistemology) or, perhaps more correctly, that which can be designated. 
The form of an ideal universe is only defined relative to form outside 
the universe. In order to make formless entities distinguishable within 
externally defined structure -- that is, to enable unambiguous 
designation -- it is necessary to impose certain conditions, such as 
"zero" and impenetrability. As soon as such conditions are imposed the 
universe behaves as though its fundamental entities, indeed every entity 
in it, had form. And that behavior reflects the aspects of the external 
form that were implicit in the imposed designation-enabling conditions. 
Hence, ideal universes can be formed and conditionalized to reproduce 
the behavior of any, but never all, forms present in the external 
defining form. Never all, because, if this were possible, then the 
extrinsic-form-defined ideal universe would no longer be distinguishable 
from the extrinsic form relative to which it was defined, implying 
complete and absolute knowledge of the defining form on the part of the 
selector of the designation-enabling conditions. This implication 
violates the initial empirically based premise that the selector of the 
form-defining conditions has only limited cognitive capabilities. 
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The limits of mathematics and 
conflicts in the Bertalanffian presentation of GST 
In light of these considerations it seems reasonable to state that 
mathematics is not a truly general (absolute) or unambiguous language. 
Its generality and freedom from ambiguity are relative to the extrinsic 
form of the ideal universe from which mathematics was derived. 
Consequently, mathematics only speaks unambiguously about entities, 
fundamental or complex, within its ideal universe, and those entities in 
the extrinsic form of its universe to the extent that the forms of the 
extrinsic entities are implicit in the designation-enabling conditions 
(imposed on the ideal universe of mathematics). So, I suggest that 
mathematics is inherently atomistic and reductionistic; and t contrary to 
a tradition of modern science and Bertalanffy's view, I suggest that 
even in its ultimate form, mathematics will be neither absolute nor 
fully unambiguous. Hence, mathematics is not an appropriate language 
for the expression of GST. I propose, further, that no finite, 
externally unreferenced language can speak unambiguously about anything. 
And, as a corollary, that no finite language that can speak about 
everything can speak unambiguously about anything. 
Now these conclusions bring the limits of GST under Bertalanffy, 
not to mention the limits of traditional science, into view. Earlier in 
this discussion I raised three questions about GST. The first question 
regarding the purpose of GST as perceived by Bertalanffy has already 
been answered: GST "is a general science of 'wholeness'" and its 
subject is the formulation of principles that are valid for wholes 
(systems) not understandable by investigation of their isolated parts. 
The conclusions just reached regarding the effective domain of languages 
allow consideration of the two remaining questions. Why did 
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Bertalanffy's efforts to present GST appear redundant and ineffective? 
And, where was the inadequacy or inappropriateness of his means? 
Unreasonable expectations 
Berta1anffy's efforts appeared redundant and ineffective because 
apparently he did not himself appreciate the necessity of establishing 
an adequate philosophical foundation for GST. He bore a latent 
anthropocentric intellectual loyalty to an absolutist, atomistic, 
ontologically based science while trying to stimulate within that 
science development of a "new" epistemological foundation that was 
incompatible with his ontological loyalty. Consequently he continually 
jumped the fence between idealism and realism, which allowed him to hold 
unreasonable and contradicting expectations of GST. For example, if 
anything from an atom to a whale to a galaxy to the material universe 
can be a system, and if GST is "a theory ... of universal principles" 
applicable to "generalized systems or their respective subclasses, 
irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component 
elements, and the relations or 'forces' between them" (1968, p. 32), 
then his expectation that GST would ultimately be explicitly expressible 
in the "exact language" of mathematics is unreasonable. The inadequacy 
of his means, then, may be seen to lie in his dedication, expressed and 
implied, to the science of numbers and quantities as the ideal science. 
Ontological issues avoided 
He avoided discussion of the ontological issues begged by his 
discussions of GST and the confusions and contradictions those 
discussions contained. In his discussion of "system ontology", for 
example, he suggested that "real systems" exist independently of the 
observer who may perceive or infer them from observation, but that 
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"interactions of the component elements" in a system "are never directly 
seen or perceived; they are conceptual constructs." When, then, are 
conceptual constructs not to be considered as inferred from observation? 
And, if inferred from observation, then when are they just "conceptual 
constructs" and not to be understood to exist independent of the 
observer? 
Ideality and reality confused 
His willingness to jump from ideal to real properties reveals a 
more profound difficulty within Bertalanffy's GST. Unsolved this 
problem leaves GST without a philosophical foundation, disables 
perspectivism as a reliable conceptual tool for science, and, 
consequently, invalidates the perspectivistic approach as a theoretical 
description of the general solution to the problem faced by cognitively 
limited knowers in an immensely variable universe. Bertalanffy proposed 
that to explain the behavior of a whole it is necessary to know the 
quantities, qualities, and interactions of the component parts of the 
whole. Now, if the interactions among the component parts are 
conceptual constructs, then how does one know if one is investigating an 
"ideal" whole which is only a conceptual construct (probably not even of 
the investigator's own conceptual construction) or a "real" whole? How 
does one avoid the humanistic risks which so rightfully concern the 
opponents of GST and the "systems movement"? Bertalanffy answered by 
appealing to the "humanistic concern" of GST as he understood it. He 
apparently wished to suggest that science under GST would have more 
effective recourse to "humanistic concern" than traditional science when 
he stated that (Berta1anffy, 1972, p. 167), 
If reality is a hierarchy of organized wholes, the image of man 
will be different from what it is in a world of physical particles 
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governed by chance events as the ultimate and only "true" reality. 
Rather, the world of symbols, values, ... is something very 'real'. 
Though his first sentence here is clearly a reasonable statement, it is 
tautological, and provides no evidence that science under GST would have 
more effective recourse to "humanistic concern" than traditional 
science, and ignores the philosophically difficult issue of whether any 
science should ever have recourse to "humanistic concerns" at all. The 
second sentence presents the ideal/real ambiguity again. Are symbols 
and values "real" or are they "conceptual constructs"? 
An implicit principle contradicted 
Finally, Bertalanffy violated the conclusions implicit in the 
perspectivism he himself proposed. He apparently gave quantitatively 
describable observations higher epistemological priority than 
qualitatively describable observations. This is a necessary consequence 
of his faith in atomistic mathematics as an absolute, universal 
language. Consider in this regard his expectation that GST would lead 
to quantification of 
Concepts like those of organization, wholeness, directiveness, 
teleology, and differentiation ... General system theory iS t in 
principle, capable of giving exact definitions to such concepts 
and, in suitable cases, of putting them to quantitative analysis. 
Such a belief implies a fundamental belief in the validity of atomism, 
hence, belief in the universal validity of quantitative descriptions; 
and, despite his sincere desire to the contrary, prohibits science based 
on GST as presented by Bertalanffy from being anything other than 
traditional science in more emotionally appealing vestments. In fact, 
the case can be made that the limits of science under GST as presented 
by Bertalanffy are either narrower than those of traditional science or 
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are broadened at the risk of reduced reliability of conclusions, 
something traditional science is already capable of. 
Ambiguities unresolved 
GST under Bertalanffy ultimately succumbs to the same weakness that 
plagues science under atomism: dependence on an ideal, atomistic, 
absolutist language incapable of unambiguous description of material 
reality. Bertalanffy's presentation of GST failed because it bore too 
many ambiguities. I treated some of the more benign ambiguities earlier 
in this presentation, but I have found no treatment for the real/ideal 
ambiguity apparent in Bertalanffy's faith in the language of mathematics 
as the one truly exact and unambiguous language. There is an 
interesting and important lesson here. Bertalanffy's undoubting faith 
in mathematics as the only language capable of exact and unambiguous 
expression carried two implications which imposed a bias on his 
"perspective". First, since he saw mathematics as the one truly exact 
and unambiguous language, it would have appeared futile to him to search 
for other more powerful or less ambiguous languages. Second, since if 
he saw any language other than mathematics as inherently ambiguous, then 
he needed not be too concerned about avoiding or clarifying ambiguities 
in his use of such languages, particularly verbal languages. Also, 
since he saw mathematical truths as universal, and since only 
quantitative observations can be fully rendered into mathematical 
language, he must have regarded universal material truths as obtainable 
through quantitative observation. 
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Language and Science 
The limits 
That the limits of science are the limits of the language of 
science, and that the limits of traditional science are reflected in the 
constraints on Bertalanffy's views of GST, is suggested by the 
following, from articles on science and the scientific method by 
Bridgman and Holton (1987): 
A prerequisite to nearly every science is a suitable method of 
description of its subject matter. The language of such 
description must be capable of reproducing or recalling the 
subject matter with precision and uniqueness. If the 
description is of an object, there should be only one 
corresponding object, which it should be possible to reproduce 
or reconstruct from the description; or, given an object, it 
must be possible to check whether it does or does not satisfy 
the corresponding description ... Fundamentally, measurement 
amounts to description by the use of numbers ... The numbers 
obtained ... may be subjected to mathematical analysis, and 
mathematical regularities revealing the operation of various 
laws of nature often can be discovered and made the basis of 
theoretical understanding. It is regarded as an ideal of 
science that it be capable of mathematical analysis, and the 
more highly developed the science, the more susceptible it is 
of such analysis ... 
Bertalanffy's contributions 
Because Bertalanffy did not relinquish his traditional scientist's 
faith in mathematics, he could not do more than present intuitive 
impressions of the essential tenets of GST. Nevertheless his efforts 
did present them and that is Bertalanffy's contribution. His 
discussions provided insights on four principle points. (1) It is 
unreasonable to consider the limit of (human, scientific) knowledge to 
be defined by the "infinite manifoldness of ultimate reality", and as a 
consequence, that the pursuit of knowledge should not be based on a 
presumption of the nature of ultimate reality. (2) Realistic propriety 
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requires the limit of knowledge and the method of pursuit of knowledge 
be viewed as defined by the capabilities of the pursuer of knowledge. 
(3) Only a realistic, qualitative, relativistic, infinitely reference-
transferrable and extensible method, which he envisioned as 
"perspectivism", would provide finite "knowers" with a means to obtain 
existentially reliable knowledge. (4) Empirically distinguishable 
"wholes" and "parts" can serve as an epistemologically sound basis for a 
realistic perspectivism (Bertalanffy preferred the word "system" to 
"whole", but he defined the term "system" too restrictively.) 
Bertalanffy, then, provided insights into the "why" and "what" of CST, 
but it is necessary to look beyond his efforts for the "how". 
Bertalanffy's error 
Bertalanffy was not totally without insight into the nature of the 
"how" of GST. As mentioned earlier he was of the opinion that CST would 
replace logical "theory of categories", but did not seem to believe that 
a formal logic capable of replacing or superseding "theory of 
categories" had yet been developed. Bertalanffy's error in this regard 
suggests the possibility that he may have overlooked logic in general as 
a discipline where at least the rudiments of a formal CST might be 
found. The lack of mention of specific logical theories (other than by 
indirect reference, like that to "theory of categories") in his writings 
support this idea. Further, the possibility that a single discipline 
might already have a formal structure for GST would have conflicted with 
Bertalanffy's expectation that formal GST would arise from work in 
different fields. 
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There is also. however, the possibility that Bertalanffy's error 
was the consequence of his holding what is -- if the present author's 
experience with other scientists is correct -- a common view among 
traditional scientists regarding the functional relationship between 
science and logic. Logic, the study of forms of reasoning without 
regard for content, is generally regarded by scientists as "all form and 
no substance" (recall Berlinski's complaint about GST), something on 
which they can not reasonably afford to spend time. Many logicians hold 
a complimentary view that was well summarized by Lejewski (1986), 
"Traditionally, logicians have distinguished between deductive logic, 
whose principles are used in drawing new propositions out of premises in 
which they lie latent, and inductive logic, which ventures conclusions 
from particular facts that appear to serve as evidence for them. But 
this division is obsolete, because the problems earlier subsumed under 
induction are now apportioned to the methodology of the natural 
sciences." According to the logicians, then, inductive logic is the 
tool and domain of natural scientists. But among interested scientists 
and philosophers of science the conclusion has been drawn that there is 
no such thing as inductive logic (Medawar, 1969; Ackermann, 1976; also, 
recall Naughton's statement regarding GST). From this view the success 
of science is seen as depending almost solely on the effective use of an 
essentially deductive procedure known as "the scientific method", of 
which there are a variety of (incomplete) descriptions such as the 
hypothetico-deductive method. The invocation of the hypothetico-
deductive or other such "scientific" methods is rather unsatisfying, 
however, for these methods in effect avoid the question of how one might 
formulate effective hypotheses -- note that in science hypotheses may be 
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"effective" without being "correct", while for an existentially 
challenged purposive knower correctness and effectiveness often are not 
different -- about previously unknown phenomena with which science or 
scientists have no prior experience, or, and perhaps presenting even 
more difficulty, about previously known but misunderstood phenomena. 
Any science that would depend on idealistic deductive logic for 
innovation i~ ultimately no different from science that would depend on 
mathematics as a universally valid language. Science based solely on 
deductive logic, as, for example, hypothetico-deductive science, 
ultimately must fall into a routine of deductively testing relatively 
unexciting variations on dogmatic themes, and awaiting serendipitous 
events, those rare "lucky" selections of experimental conditions which 
lead to unexpected but interpretable observations and satisfying new 
explanations of observable natural phenomena. Consequently, under 
deductivistic approaches, science falls back onto Bertalanffy's belief 
that no formal logic compatible with the inductive needs of science or 
descriptive of effective active acquisition of empirical knowledge (GST) 
has emerged. More explicitly, that there is no such thing as a reliable 
inductive logic. That is, most logiCians are no longer concerned with 
induction, and most scientists function disinterested in logic or 
denying that any logic could adequately describe effective inductive 
process. 
Further, it seems not to be generally appreciated that the 
disinterest of scientists in inductive logic is likely due to their 
acceptance of the fundamental tenet of atomisitic-reductionistic science 
that there are absolute material "truths" which can be found out 
"scientifically". To be logically consistent, anyone who functions, 
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knowingly or unknowingly, under an absolute materialistic, atomistic, 
and mechanistic ontology must reject the possibility of an inductive 
logic. This is so because, if the material universe were demonstrably 
mechanistic (consistent in an Aristotelian deductive logical sense) and 
ultimately composed of simple, indivisible, indestructible "atoms" 
(atomism); and if physical matter were the only true reality and 
everything in the material universe could be explained in terms of 
physical laws (materialism); then it would necessarily follow that (1) 
as soon as one universally valid law were known, all valid laws would be 
mechanically deducible, but (2) as long as no universally valid 
(absolute) law were known, nothing reliable would be known, and 
consequently (3) induction, by definition concerned with drawing 
effective conclusions from reliable but incomplete (relative) knowledge, 
can not be undertaken unless something is reliably known, but under the 
ontology in question as soon as something is reliably known; everything 
is deducible and induction is pointless. That is, scientists who 
function, knowingly or unknowingly, under an absolute, materialistic, 
atomistic ontology implicitly presume either that they are endowed with 
or will eventually develop infinite cognitive capacity (presumably as a 
consequence of the intellectual exercises necessary to their 
investigative activities), or achieve divine insight (presumably the 
result of having successfully investigated every materially permissible 
phenomenon), either of which would eliminate any need for inductive 
reasoning. 
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The Logic of Wholes and Parts 
The obscurity of Lesniewski's work 
Despite logicians' acceptance of the "obsolescence" of inductive 
logic (this attitude seems to be changing as a consequence of interest 
in "artificial intelligence", see Waldrop, 1987) and the deference of 
scientists to deductive methodologies. it still seems a little difficult 
to understand why no one, Bertalanffy or any other, interested in the 
GST debate (at least according to the literature I have seen) seems to 
have picked up on Lesniewski's mereology, a formalized "general theory 
of the relationship between part and whole" (Bird, 1986). Perhaps it is 
simply a question of the obscurity of Lesniewski's work. Lesniewski 
originally presented his logic in 1916 in Polish, a language not widely 
spoken in the world academic community. He then worked intensively for 
years formalizing his logic and its own mathematical language, but 
refrained from publication because his work was not in as perfect a form 
as he considered desirable. In 1927 he began presentation of a series 
of papers that illustrated the main lines of his theories of logic and 
mathematics even then, he apparently only undertook publication 
because the works of his colleagues, which were dependent on his 
results, were awaiting publication. Those publications brought 
worldwide recognition to the Warsaw school, but before it reached its 
height, Lesniewski died suddenly, just prior to World War II, most of 
his findings still unpublished. All his manuscripts were destroyed 
during that conflict. After the War, many of the results of his work 
were made known through the work of his students, but nevertheless seem 
to remain an obscurity even among logicians, let alone scientists. 
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Relevance to GST and science 
The misfortune for GST, and for science, that is represented by the 
loss of Lesniewski's manuscripts and the obscurity of what remains of 
his work is apparent in Luschei's (1962) The Logical Systems of 
Lesniewski (which I will quote extensively in the following pages as an, 
perhaps the, authoritative English language reference on Lesniewski's 
logic), even though that author makes no mention of GST. Lesniewski 
acquired from his teacher, Twardowski, an "insistence on rigor and 
c1arity ... based on precise definition and analysis". He was concerned 
with the paradoxes which have afflicted deductive logics since the time 
of Aristotle, and felt that such were the result of ambiguities in the 
formal language or metalanguage implied by those logics. Hence, he did 
not trust formal logical languages during his early years, and 
empathized, apparently throughout his life, with the attitude of most 
natural scientists toward formal deductive logics. This empathy was 
apparent, for example, in his emphasis nthat equivocal use of 
terms ... makes it unclear whether theses are in or about the system in 
question, and remarked that such ambiguities discourage those who do not 
derive the same delight" from the manipulation of formal patterns nas 
'devotees of meaningless mathematics' ... but want to know what they are 
doing and why, and what the formations and transformations meann 
(Luschei, 1962). nLesniewski was openly critical of pure formalism that 
would consider logic and mathematics as nothing more than a game of 
symbols ... he maintained that a theory ultimately must be judged for its 
accord with realityn (Bird, 1986). And, according to Lejewski (1967), 
"the conceptual apparatus of Lesniewski's theories was intended by its 
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originator to be used in philosophical or scientific practice at any 
level of lower generality." 
Foundations: The use and limits of language 
The value of Lesniewski's work in the present consideration of the 
active acquisition of purposive empirical knowledge arises from his 
appreciation of several points. He appreciated linguistic expressions 
as generalizable communicable conceptual descriptions of cognitively 
accessible phenomena. Anticipating the work of Goedel and others as 
well as its implications, he appreciated that the validity of 
linguistically expressible conceptual descriptions is relative and 
limited<to the level of the "object" language, but can only be 
meaningfully discussed at the metalanguage level. Like Aristotle and 
Russell, Lesniewski recognized that in "natural" languages, including 
prior formal logical languages, relative consistency was achieved 
through the use of "systematic ambiguities resting on systematic 
analogies". Such usage increases the "power" of language by permitting 
expressions of the same form to carry different meanings, the intended 
meaning clarified by the context in which the expression occurs. And 
the consequent that 
To ensure consistent determinacy of meaning in an adequate logical 
reconstruction [one which will provide a formal language the 
expressive power of which approaches that of natural language], it 
is essential to treat systematically ambiguous logical ... schemes as 
representing unbounded hierarchies of different but systematically 
analogous and true theses ranged in tiers above the basic theses of 
lowest level (Luschei, 1962, p. 86). 
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Problem: Inconsistencies in theoretical foundations 
Like Bertalanffy who was troubled by inadequate development of 
general theoretical foundations in the natural sciences, Lesniewski was 
troubled by inadequacies in the predominate theories of his field, 
philosophy of mathematics and symbolic logic, or as it was more widely 
known in his day, mathematical logic. Lesniewski, however, unlike 
Bertalanffy and probably most modern scientists, was more directly 
appreciative of the profound, fundamental import of languages to the 
natural sciences. In fact, he held views which differed from those 
generally accepted by the logicians and mathematicians of his day, views 
which many scientists now share. For example, he rejected the view that 
logic or mathematics is "nothing more than a game of symbols" the 
Significance of which seems to arise out of mathematicians' or 
logicians' chance encounters with materially interpretable symbolic 
expressions. He held that realism, intuition, and common sense are of 
primary importance to logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences, and 
would almost certainly have rejected the currently prevalent belief that 
scientists should be distrusting, perhaps even "neglectful, if not 
contemptuous, of man's naive and basic intuitions of the way things 
are". 
Diagnosis: All linguistically expressible truth is relative 
It is interesting in this regard, that the theories and successes 
of modern physics. Einstein's Theory of Relativity in particular, are 
invoked by modern scientists as implying a general validity for an 
idealistic, anti-common-sense view of reality. Such invocation is due 
in large part to misinterpretation and over-extension of Einstein's 
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results (Pais. 1988; Popper, 1980). Further. a presumption of the 
universality of the mathematical language is implicit in the Theory of 
Relativity. Overly enthusiastic reception of the theories and successes 
of modern physics, the inherent dependence of science on language, and 
an unquestioning "faith" in the universality of mathematics may prevent 
most scientists, as they probably prevented Bertalanffy with respect to 
his own GST ideas, from appreciating the more general implications of 
Einstein's work: (1) that experimental verifiability (reproducibility) 
requires scientific "truths" to be linguistically communicable, and 
hence that scientific "truths" are contextual and language dependent; 
(2) that the "truthfulness" of statements in any language is relative; 
and (3) that only a portion of reality can ever be accurately described 
through the use of any semantically closed symbolic language. The 
relativity of any linguistically expressible "truth" did not escape 
Lesniewski whose "study of semantic antinomies convinced [him] that in 
any 'universal' language" closed so that it contains its own rules for 
interpretation of symbolic expressions "the laws of classical logic 
cannot consistently hold" (Luschei, 1962, p. 34). 
Cure: Exploit the relations between whole and part 
Lesniewski took a direct approach to dealing with the problems 
which arise out of the relativity of linguistically expressible 
"truths", the result being his theories which "for him ... consisted of 
interesting though extremely general propositions true of reality as we 
know it from experience." Interpreting this into the terminology of the 
present discussion Lesniewski developed what, in the aggregate, could 
represent a theoretical description of the process of active acquisition 
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of purposive knowledge. A detailed presentation of Lesniewski's work is 
beyond the scope or needs of this exploration of GST. It is sufficient 
here to state that he developed, from his intuitive insight into the use 
and limits of formal and informal language, and the relationships among 
whole and part, a logic which he formalized 
... completely, combinatorial1y on a finite basis, and in 
extensional terms. It is ... distinguished by its 
'constructively nominalist' and 'contextualist' character; its 
basic grammar of semantic categories; its rigor, generality, 
and power of expression; its demonstrable relative 
consistency; its universal validity; and its logical purity, 
economy, and elegance. It consists of three axiomatic 
deductive systems in hierarchic order: protothetic, ontology, 
and mereology ... Protothetic and ontology together form a 
unified system of logic comparable in scope and power to 
Principia Mathematica as a foundation for classical 
mathematics and for any other axiomatic theory, such as 
mereology, in a deductive hierarchy ... Mereology is an 
extremely general extralogica1 theory based on the two logical 
systems. Together with them, it provides a mathematical [in 
the sense of formal, "rigorously exact: precise"] basis for 
spatiotemporal theories of topology, for geometries such as 
Tarski's axiomatic geometry of solids ... and for scientific 
description of reality ... (Luschei, 1962, p. 28) 
Lesniewski's accomplishments 
Lesniewski was a philosopher, professor of the philosophy of 
mathematics at the University of Warsaw. His success in the field of 
logic arose out of fascination with the contradictions and paradoxes 
that afflict mathematics and symbolic logics. He developed the 
fundamental principles of his logic over a period of 11 years beginning 
in 1911. During that period he worked inductively and intuitively. By 
1913 he had logically refuted "the conception of 'general objects'" 
(Luschei, 1962, p. 27). His linguistic insights and study of various 
logical traditions enabled him to diagnose the cause of specific 
paradoxes as failure to distinguish between collective (relative to the 
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"whole") and distributive (relative to the "parts" which make up the 
"whole") interpretations of linguistic expressions about "classes". 
Having diagnosed the affliction of classical logics, and equipped with 
his material insightfulness and logical expertise, he began in 1914 
development of mereology, his theory of the relations between wholes and 
parts, the logic embodying the interpretation of collective class 
expressions. He recognized that mereology implied certain "logically 
prior theories". He apprehended those theories and by 1922 had 
developed them as: ontology, his "general theory of what there is"y 
based on the one undefined term "is" and embodying the distributive 
interpretation of class expressions; and, protothetic, "the most 
comprehensive theory yet developed of the relations between 
propositions", based on the functor of equivalence as the only undefined 
term; completed his grammar of semantic categories (theory of logical 
categories) about the same time; and, by 1931, had developed his 
comprehensive and rigorous directives for definition, substitution, and 
extensibility. 
His philosophy: a definitive foundation for his logical theories 
Lesniewski's logics may be considered a rigorous extension of his 
philosophy the character of which is indicated by his insistence that 
feeling for reality ... ought to be preserved even in the most 
abstract studies. Logic ... is concerned with the real world just as 
truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general 
features .... The sense of reality is vital in logic, and whoever 
juggles with it ... is doing a disservice to thought." (Lesniewski 
quoted in Luschei, 1962, p. 51). 
This statement indicates the depth of Lesniewski's realistic beliefs, in 
his belief in the sensible logical (but not necessarily mechanistic) 
consistency of the material universe. It also clarifies that the 
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concern of logic under Lesniewski is the same as the concern of GST 
under Bertalanffy. Lesniewski apparently regarded material reality as 
the "primary standard" of logical consistency. And, at least partially 
as a consequence of his realistic orientation, he decided that if 
linguistic expressions are to accurately represent aspects of reality, 
then logic should refer "strictly to expressions as concrete spatio-
temporal objects, not to forms of expression in abstraction from their 
instances in context" (Luschei, 1962, p. 4). 
Lesniewski was not only an affirmed realist, but also an avowed 
intuitionist, believing the natural logical consistency of the material 
universe to be more directly accessible through disciplined, realistic 
intuition than through systematic exploration of idealized descriptions: 
... one has only to stop using words for a moment to recognize that 
reality does not arrive neatly tailored and dressed in words or 
verbal categories (p. l4) ... Lesniewski regarded the consistency or 
inconsistency of [other logical] systems 'quite irrelevant' to the 
'reality-directed intellectual torment' of intuitive compulsion to 
believe presuppositions "true" and inferences "correct" that taken 
together lead to contradiction, [such contradictions] thus 
representing antimonies which can be resolved only by intuitively 
undermining their sources. For 'Mathematics [meaning symbolic 
logic as well as the science of numbers] without intuition cannot 
effectively remedy the maladies of intuition. (Luschei, 1962, 
p.78)(see also von Neumann, 1966). 
Lesniewski's work and writings indicate he accepted intuition as 
cognitively primal. Apparently his studies of various logical 
traditions and his own linguistic insights enabled him to recognize that 
direct, immediate cognition of the metalinguistically describable whole 
is materially and logically prerequisite to materially adequate 
linguistic, hence scientific, description of the distributive qualities 
of the parts of a whole. Luschei (1962, p. 34-35) relates in this 
regard that 
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Lesniewski was the first (at least in modern times, to 
Tarski's knowledge) to attain, express clearly. and appreciate the 
consequence of certain fundamental insights, anticipating Russell, 
Ramsey, and Goedel. Recognizing that semantic concepts are relative 
to the "object" language or theory discussed, which may not 
coincide with though it may be part of the "metalanguage" in which 
it is discussed, Lesniewski stressed the distinction between these 
correlatives ... He concluded that in a language not constructively 
stratified and relativized but supposed to be universal, ideally 
completed, and semantically closed to incorporate all its own 
semantics, the laws of classical logic cannot consistently hold. 
Reasonable expectations 
Restating, Lesniewski accepted that if a symbolic logic or a 
language is to be truly general, then it can not be concerned with 
ultimate reality, which is the domain of direct cognition, perception, 
intuition. As a consequence of his insights into the limits of logic 
and language, and hence, science -- insights others later formally 
demonstrated to be valid -- Lesniewski accepted that all that can be 
expected of even a truly general language is expression of reliable, 
logically consistent, and testable descriptions of certain aspects of 
reality (because formulation of valid expressions about entities extant 
at the "object" language level requires cognitive apprehension at the 
metalanguage level of the collective whole which is comprised of those 
objects) (Luschei, 1962, p. 105). Under these premises he developed a 
logic which comprises a universally valid, ontologically ambivalent set 
of directives which enables the construction of qualitative, 
relativistic, infinitely extensible languages in which "individual 
aspects of reality can be described without 'referring to abstract 
entities' at all" (ibid., p. 80). The value of such a grammar to science 
is obvious; but, and more importantly here, it provides (in my view) the 
best (and apparently only) theoretical description ever developed of the 
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general solution to the problem faced by all cognitively limited 
purposive knowers. I will cite specific points derived by Lesniewski 
(or others using his logics) in the following presentation of the 
general principles of the perspectivistic approach. 
The General Principles of the Perspectivistic Approach 
The first general principle: Materially reliable generalizations 
must be discovered. The wording of the first principle is intentionally 
ambiguous, allowing two interpretations. 
The first interpretation: In order to exist, cognitively limited 
purposive knowers must reduce the amount of specific knowledge they are 
materially required to handle. This may be accomplished by classifying 
individual entities on the basis of equivalence with respect to material 
criteria which are existentially relevant, therefore cognitively 
accessible, to the classifying knower. Recall that equivalence and "is" 
were the only undefined terms necessary for Lesniewski to develop a 
relativistically consistent, infinitely extensible "general theory of 
what there is" (Lejewski, 1967). Reliably effective perspectivistic 
generalization (or, valid Lesniewskian generalization) involves 
qualitative classification of entities according to their existential 
relevance to the classifying knower; not according to their relevance to 
some ideal, hence materially unreliable, entity. For, although 
"equating logically different objects" is "one of the most powerful and 
efficient methods in mathematics" (read the science of numbers), relying 
on materially or logically unjustified generalizations would likely 
prove fatal for most purposive knowers. It follows then that: all 
materially reliable generalizations (including those which comprise the 
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passively acquired knowledge) must be inducible from specific 
experiential knowledge. Properly developed perspectivistic 
generalizations have full epistemological, hence relativistic material, 
validity; but only partial ontological validity. 
The second interpretation: The first principle stipulates the 
primacy of direct cognition. Direct cognition is otherwise variously 
described by such terms as perception, intuition, insight, inductive 
reasoning. Direct cognitive access always precedes and provides the 
reference necessary to effective description, and, consequently, to the 
communicability and applicability of traditional scientific methodology 
in the search for new knowledge. Previously unrecognized materially 
reliable generalizations are not encountered (at least not with 
existentially adequate speed) through directed searches of, or 
intentionally "designed" and "constructed" from parts selected out of 
the warehouse of, previously acquired specific knowledge. Each 
previously unknown materially reliable generality must initially be 
grasped as a whole consistent with, and part of, or inclusive of the 
whole that is the totality of knowledge previously acquired by the 
classifying knower. Initially only one such entity will have been 
encountered. Hence, the cognitively "new" whole is unique and therefore 
only qualitatively describable, since multiplicity, which is a necessary 
condition for quantitative description, is by definition not a quality 
of any unique thing. Once a clear perception of the collective material 
whole represented by the generalization has been achieved, that is, once 
an adequate description of this "whole" is available; its parts become 
unambiguously distinguishable and describable, even though, as 
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Lesniewski pointed out, they may not be discrete and consequently, 
again, only qualitatively describable. (Recall the previous discussion 
of distinguishability of entities in ideal universes with externally 
defined structure.) Such qualitative generalizations represent 
primitive entities and may be considered to have the desirable 
qualities, in the Lesniewskian sense, of logical simplicity and purity; 
and were well described in one of the poetic essays of Pope (1711), 
Those rules of old discover'd, not devis'd 
Are Nature still, but Nature Methodized; 
Nature, like Monarchy, is but restrain'd 
By the same laws which first herself ordain'd. lO 
The second general principle: Specific experiential knowledge is 
obtained only through specific experiences with material entities that 
are sensorally accessible as individuals; that is, which are functional 
material "wholes" with respect to the existential needs, or experiential 
"range" of the knower. Consider again my hypothetical fish, this time 
encountering, say, a worm. The fish perceives a whole worm, not a 
collection of worm parts. The fish smells to the full extent of its 
olfactory capabilities the complex of chemicals released by the whole 
worm, not just those of the worm's intestinal contents, or blood, or 
epithelial cells, or .... It sees the physical form and movements of a 
IOThe reader might also consider Luschei's (1962, p. 103) comment 
that without meaningful generalizations, "human knowledge would be 
incommunicable and non-cumulative, amounting at each moment, for each 
isolated individual, to little more than the momentary content of his 
conscious awareness, since even individual knowledge becomes generalized 
in being communicated. And generalizations may be at least as important 
as their individual instances. It may for example be as important to 
know that there is danger (or none) in the field one is about to explore 
as to know individual names, kinds, numbers, locations, and dispositions 
of bulls, mines, or what-not. The mere existence of nuclear bombs has 
proved as disturbing as their unknown total .... 
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whole worm, not of an assembly of worm tissues, organs, cells, 
cytoplasm, genetic material, .... Just as a human apprehends an 
automobile as an automobile, not as an assembly of sub-assemblies of 
sub-sub-assemblies of ... car parts which are assemblies of sub-assemblies 
of ... various chemical assemblies which are assemblies of .... For as 
Lesniewski discerned from usage in natural language. the individual 
entities which are parts of a cognitive whole are not necessarily 
discrete. That is, the same valid generalization may be inducible from 
specific experiential knowledge of materially different individual 
entities. 
Speaking in more general terms, which entities are sensorally 
accessible to an individual knower is determined by its sensory 
capabilities. The individual's sensory capabilities are determined by 
its passively acquired knowledge and limit the knower's sensory access 
to only those entities which display material qualities ancestrally 
established as characteristic of existentially relevant entities; that 
is, entities that did (do) something that was (is) materially relevant 
to the survival of this individual whole. 
An individual knower's sensory limits may be temporarily extended -
- when an astronomer uses a telescope, for example -- but this does not 
alter the sensory capabilities by which this individual (as a collective 
whole) might be distinguished from other (distributive) members of its 
collective class (say, its taxonomic biological species). Similarly an 
individual's cognitive effectiveness might be temporarily enhanced, but 
not its fundamental cognitive capabilities. Regardless, the most 
general statement that can be empirically justified is that all 
materially extant knowers exist equipped with quantitatively limited 
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cognitive capabilities. One interpretation of the empirical evidence --
indeed, in my opinion, the only interpretation based on reasoning that 
is not viciously circular is that they accomplish this by 
compensating quantitative inadequacies through exploitation of the 
extensibility of qualitative cognition. 
Built, as Lesniewski's logics, upon a foundation of verifiable 
material equivalence and recognizability of patterns among the parts of 
cognitively accessible wholes; qualitative cognition enables 
classification of incomprehensibly large numbers of entities into a 
comprehensible number of related, existentially relevant wholes. The 
recognized infinitely extensible validity and descriptive power of 
Lesniewski's logics provide formal symbolic ("mathematical") 
justification for the proposed biological importance of qualitative 
cognition based on pattern recognition and material equivalence, the 
most fundamental and general pattern being that of whole and part. 
Existentially effective qualitative cognition is ultimately the ability 
to decide whether, with respect to the knower, a collection of 
cognitively accessible entities is an existentially meaningful 
collective class (metawhole) or simply a distributive collection of 
discrete entities with no collective material function existentially 
relevant to the knower even though some or all of the individual 
entities may have existentially relevant material functions. 
The second general principle further implies the requirement that 
no entity is part of a collective whole (a "system" with emergent 
properties, a Bertalanffian "system") unless the entity has at least one 
cognitively accessible, sensorally verifiable, material function with 
respect to, that is, material effect upon, at least one other entity 
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which is part of the collective whole. This in turn, implies that 
Bertalanffian relationships, those "conceptual constructs ... never seen 
or perceived ... ", among the parts of a whole are not materially 
reliable, and dependence upon such ideal connectors is too risky to 
provide an adequate basis for active acquisition of purposive knowledge. 
This material function requirement addresses the limits of 
quantitative and qualitative cognitive accessibility, and would cause 
considerable difficulty were it not that the perspectivistic approach is 
based on recognition of those limits and stipulates that meaningful, 
linguistically describable observations can only be made from the 
metalevel of the subject under observation. If the entities which are 
parts of a whole function distributively, and those distributive 
functions are to be observed; that is, if the individual parts of the 
whole are functionally discrete; then direct, materially reliable, even 
quantitative, observation can be carried out from the level of the 
whole, one level above the level at which the parts are functional 
collective wholes in their own right. On the other hand, when the 
entities which are parts of a whole function collectively_ the function 
of the individual part entities simply can not be directly, meaningfully 
observed; because each distributive entity's collective function is 
uniquely contextually defined and not observable outside the collective 
whole in which it is part. The member entities in a collective whole 
are functionally non-discrete, hence not quantitatively describable. 
Cognitive accessibility and sensory verifiability of the material 
function of an entity in a collective whole can only be established 
qualitatively by observing that lack or malfunction of the entity alters 
the collective function of the whole. That is, that an entity is a 
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(functional) part of a collective whole can only be established by 
observation from the metalevel of the whole, two levels above the level 
at which the parts are collective wholes in their own right. 
Observation at this (2 X higher) level can materially establish only the 
qualitative knowledge that an entity is (or is not) a functional part of 
the collective whole. 
It may be observed at this point that wholes comprised of 
distributively functional, hence, discrete parts are the most satisfying 
for traditional scientists -- materially reliable generalizations 
representing such wholes can be expressed in the language of the science 
of numbers, i.e., in quantitative terms. However, such wholes are of 
limited existential relevance to the knower with limited cognitive 
capacity; if for no other reason, then because the number of entities in 
each such whole can, for no immediately apparent reason, quickly expand 
to exceed the quantitative cognitive limits of the knower, becoming 
cognitively inaccessible, and leaving the knower no means by which to 
decide when and how to respond to such wholes, or even if such wholes 
are the ones which should be responded to. 
Collective wholes are more existentially important to purposive 
knowers of limited cognitive capacity. As already discussed, the 
greater importance of such materially functional collections of non-
discrete parts arises from the fact that they can provide the knower 
with an existentially adequate means of cognitively simplifying the 
material universe in which it exists, enabling it to select effective 
responses to a quantitatively incomprehensible variety of environmental 
hazards. Also, as has already been mentioned, collective wholes and 
collective functions can only be qualitatively described -- they either 
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materially occur or they do not. It is of interest to add here that 
even a knower with a relatively very limited cognitive capacity can 
build, retain, and use complex cognitively accessible hierarchies of 
collective wholes rapidly. This is so because, while there is no 
assurance of functional connection among quantitatively describable 
assemblies of quantitatively describable distributive wholes, in 
perspectivistically developed hierarchies of relativistically materially 
reliable collective wholes, no whole is functionally unrelated to any 
and every other whole within a hierarchy. Such hierarchies require 
analog representation; they can not be validly represented by 
quantitative or digital symbolic representation. Hence, those 
generalizations which are included in passively acquired knowledge are 
present in a wholistic analog expression, the passively acquired 
knowledge. The individual's initial store of existentially useful 
knowledge, and the individual's existential effectiveness, may be 
increased by the acquisition of relativistically valid, materially 
reliable generalizations. The "emotion" associated with direct 
cognition of (sudden insight into) a valid generalization may be the 
result of the brain encountering an organization of representations, a 
pattern, that is compatible with the whole that is the collective 
totality of the knower's acquired knowledge, active and passive. This 
view of valid generalizations as analog representations that are 
wholistical1y acquirable only through direct cognitive access; well 
described in Gertrude Stein's statement about modern art 
It looks strange and it looks strange and it looks very strange and 
then suddenly it doesn't look strange at all and you can't 
understand what made it look strange in the first place. (quoted 
by Luscher in Medawar & Shelley, 1980) 
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was shared by von Neumann (1966), but is contrary to the expressed view 
of Bertalanffy (1968), and the cyberneticist Ashby (1966). 
Finally, the second general principle serves not only to describe 
effective cognitive process for knowers with limited cognitive capacity, 
but also serves a clear theoretical purpose. It prevents deductions 
based on epistemologically sound, hence relativistically materially 
reliable, generalizations from degrading into excessive or divergen~ 
idealistic logical regresses which, although formally correct in the 
sense of non-Lesniewskian logics, lead to the inference of specific 
entities without adequate or appropriate epistemological justification 
and no ontological (material) reliability. Further, as already 
mentioned, the first and second principles in conjunction imply that if 
any valid, materially reliable generalization can be expressed, then 
cognitive access to the next higher level has already been achieved. 
This implication leads to the third general principle. 
The third general principle: If there is more than one cognitively 
accessible class of individual material entities in the knower's 
experiential universe, then there are at least two reliable 
generalizations. And, if there are at least two materially reliable 
generalizations (about specific entities in the knower's universe), then 
there is at least one materially reliable generalization about the 
generalizations, that is, there is at least one valid generalization of 
a "higher level". But, if all materially reliable generalizations must 
be inducible from specific experiential knowledge; and if specific 
experiential knowledge is obtained only through specific experiences 
with entities which are cognitively accessible as individual "wholes"; 
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then a higher level generalization implies that there are specific 
entities from which the higher level generalization may be induced. 
That is, each materially reliable generalization at any level implies 
one cognitively accessible material whole. The third principle is the 
perspectivistic equivalent of Lesniewski's refutation of ideal general 
objects, and implies, as does his refutation, that no materially 
reliable generalization ("logical general object") represents ~ than 
~ individual object (Luschei, 1962, p. 27). Further, in conjunction 
with Lesniewski's refutation, it implies that the limit of expressible 
(quantitatively describable for traditionalist science), hence 
scientific, knowledge is (at least) one semantical category, one logical 
type, one cognitive level, one existentially relevant arrangement of 
material "wholes", below the level of current qualitative cognition. 
This epistemological implication of "Goedel's proof" (of the 
incompleteness of closed logic systems) was understood and exploited by 
Lesniewski fully a decade before Goedel presented his proof. 
The fourth general principle: "There is ~ such thing !! nothing". 
This principle arises directly from the realistic, material foundation 
of actively acquired purposive knowledge. The perspectivistic procedure 
is presented as a theoretical description of the general, materially 
effective, cognitive process which permits existentially effective 
active acquisition of purposive knowledge. The cognitive process 
described is proposed to be passively acquired by all existentially 
effective, cognitively limited, purposive knowers. That is, it is 
proposed to have arisen necessarily as the effective means by which 
cognitively limited purposive knowers deal with an inexpressibly complex 
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and variable material universe (environment). The described cognitive 
process evolved out of existential need to deal with "concrete", "real" 
entities. If the evolutionary, material origin of cognition is 
accepted, then it follows that such "things" as "nothing", "zero", or 
"the null set" which are not material things at all, do not represent 
cognitively accessible entities. From a Lesniewskian logical, or 
perspectivistic viewpoint, the usefulness of the traditional idealistic 
concepts represented by these terms is related to the usefulness of the 
realistic concept represented by the term "randomness". Traditionally 
these concepts are discussed and used as though they refer to some ideal 
"thing" which would be convenient to have around even though it has not 
even an ideal "concreteness" and is not in any sense cognitively or 
materially accessible. For the perspectivist these terms refer to those 
cognitively apprehensible material things which are not cognitively 
accessible as related to the class of entities under discussion (being 
generalized about); or as Smith (1980, p. 41 in Medawar & Shelley) put 
it, those things among which 
there is no pattern, ... , or, if there is, it would be better to 
ignore it. 
It also follows from the fourth principle that, if purposive 
knowers are cognitively equipped to deal with entities which exist under 
the constraints of material reality, then logical (linguistic) entities 
ought to be conceived as though they were specific material entities, 
subject to the same constraints as material objects. That is, in order 
to be as cognitively accessible as possible, they should have the 
characteristics which enable cognitive access to material entities; 
namely, cognitively accessible individuality and inducibility from 
specific knowledge. Hence, Lesniewski's strict reference "to individual 
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[logical or linguistic] expressions as concrete spatiotemporal objects" 
(Luschei, 1962, p. 4). 
The fifth general principle: All existentially effective 
generalizations, ~ about collective classes with potentially 
infinitely numerous member entities, ~ be validly inducible from! 
finite number of experiences with entities cognitive!y accessible !! 
collectively related individuals. If this were not the case, then, in 
order to discover effective generalizations, it would be necessary not 
only to have but to use an infinite amount of information; and no knower 
with limited cognitive capacity could meet such a requirement. Luschei 
(1962) provides a Lesniewskian view on this point, 
To establish a generalization "about members of a class" it is not 
always necessary to ncomprehend all individual members n and confirm 
all substitution severally .... Nor is this even possible when 
individual members or instances cannot all be enlisted or checked 
in a register, as when their number is indefinite or unknown, 
generalization being useful just when they cannot all be summoned, 
mustered, and called to attention for intuitive inspection, so that 
only inference or conjecture can provide more or less reliable 
information about them all, or about arbitrary members not present 
for roll call .... Lesniewski's terminological explanations and 
directives refer strictly to individual expressions of finite 
length in spatiotemporal context, not to forms of expression in 
abstraction from their occurrences, much less to "corresponding 
extralinguistic entities or to expressions infinite in number or 
lengthn. He {LesniewskiJ ... asserted that he would not consider a 
ncollection consisting of an infinite number of words" an 
expression at all. 1l 
llRecall the previous discussion of unambiguous, but infinitely 
long descriptions required for ideal universes with internally defined 
form. Lesniewski's work re-examined the ancient idea that language and 
reasoning are inextricably intertwined. Lesniewski, though, bad a 
deeper appreciation than most, recognizing that natural languages co-
evolve with knowledge and that their accumulation of expressive power 
shadows the accumulation of knowledge. As previous knowledge is 
superseded or expanded, it is meanings not expressions that become 
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The Cognitive Primacy of Wholes 
These five general principles of the perspectivistic approach --
interpretations of empirical observations of the behavior of cognitively 
limited knowers provide a complete foundation for the development of 
a perspectivistic procedure. However, practical application of the 
general principles underlying the perspectivistic approach can not be 
traditionally undertaken~ for it is ultimately a call to develop and 
exploit the natural intuitive, inductive capabilities implied by the 
existential success of purposive knowers. Unlike the traditional 
reductionistic approach, the perspectivistic approach does not pursue 
knowledge of entities (which possess properties of existential interest) 
by serially dissecting entities into subentities, subentities into 
subsubentities, ... and then attempting to reconstruct a "new and improved 
version" of the original entity. The perspectivistic approach is not a 
Bertalanffian approach; it does not pursue knowledge of specific 
quantifiable interrelationships among the various parts in wholes of 
existential concern; it is not naively unconcerned that the number of 
outdated, and consequently the meaning of the same expression can differ 
in time or space. Which meaning of an expression is intended is 
established by the context of that expression. 
Lesniewski exploited the dependence of meaning on context, ... the 
meaning of an expression in canonic language L [any language 
constructed according to Lesniewski's grammar], as in unformalized 
languages, depends not on its form alone but also on its use in 
propositional context. But whereas in unformalized languages 
context usually reduces ambiguity inherent in homonymy [uses of the 
same expressional form with different intended meanings], or 
different but analogous,uses of expressions of such forms as 'is', 
'exists', 'unique', or 'the', in canonic language L rigorous 
general conventions assure that context altogether eliminate 
indeterminacy of Significance ... (Luschei, 1962) 
Establishing meaning contextually has the interesting effect of limiting 
the number of forms necessary for clear expression of even highly 
complex ideas. 
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interrelationships in a whole probably exceeds, in most cases by far, 
the number of isolable parts in the whole, that is, if there are any 
validly isolable parts in the whole. The perspectivistic approach 
focuses, instead, on recognition of the primacy of the whole as the 
simplest means of reliably identifying the entities that possess all the 
functions of existential concern at any given time or place. 
A SEARCH FOR SIMPLICITY 
It is important to recall the proposed existential function of the 
perspectivistic approach, and, hence, of any valid perspectivistic 
procedure, before considering a protocol for any perspectivistic 
examination of natural phenomena. The perspectivistic approach is 
proposed to be the cognitive approach selected during the evolution of 
purposive knowers because it enables cognitively limited knowers to 
select, from among an incomprehensible range of actions that could be 
taken in response to each of an incomprehensible number of existentially 
threatening situations, one of a few appropriate courses of action. The 
perspectivistic approach is a search for existentially relevant and 
effective, materially reliable, simplicity. Excerpts from Rapaport's 
"Search for Simplicity" (1972) summarize well the purpose, power, and 
weaknesses of the perspectivistic approach, (and reveal the previously 
mentioned ignorance of Lesniewski's work characteristic of supporters of 
GST): 
A strong case can be made for the search for simplicity as an 
activity rooted in a survival mechanism. A simple, predictable 
environment is easier to adapt to than a complex, capricious 
one .... Science is clearly a systematized search for simplicity, 
a method of making the world predictable [understandable] .... 
Understanding the world and controlling it are logically 
separable .... Understanding the motions of the planets does not 
confer the power to control them. Nevertheless, there is an 
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undeniable connection between understanding and control. 
Understanding the nature of the world can confer power over a 
portion of it .... curiosity has probably antedated rapacity 
(the obsession with power) in the development of human psyche, 
since familiarity confers the survival-enhancing ability to 
predict, independently of the ability to control .... In short, 
all understanding stems from perceived analogies --
recognition that something is like something else .... ln 
contrast to the mathematical concept, which defines a system 
as a set of relations among variables that are defined or 
postulated, the organismic concept [Bertalanffy's concept 
equivalent to Lesniewski's earlier concept of the collective 
whole] depends on an act of intuitive recognition .... this 
ability does not depend on any conscious selection of 
variables and of relations among them: it is simply given to 
us, as it is to other animals .... The question now is, how far 
can this recognition be stretched? What else besides 
organisms can we get to recognize as "systems"? .. And what is 
a "theoretically fruitful" analogy anyway? .. The quest for 
simplicity stems from a conviction that underlying apparent 
wide dissimilarities are profound similarities, which, when 
one perceives them, make order out of chaos, hence simplicity 
out of complexity ... In pursuing investigations of this sort, 
it is well to keep in mind that most of them will lead to 
disappointments. We do not really have any serious "system 
laws" on which to build a grandiose theoretical edifice 
comparable to the edifice of mathematical physics. 
Lesniewskian Linguistic Analysis 
Rapaport (1972), as all the GST proponents I have read, appears not 
to have known of Lesniewski's logics which might be the serious laws on 
which a theoretical edifice could be constructed. One of the beauties 
of Lesniewski's logics in this regard is that there is no need to 
exhaustively redevelop a language developed during previous efforts to 
scientifically describe reality -- a prospect as disheartening as having 
to become fluent in German in order to understand Bertalanffy's GST 
vocabulary -- in order to have the ability to induce valid conclusions 
with respect to the relationship of material whole and parts of current 
existential concern. For, if a scientific language is materially 
reliable, i.e., consistent; then it can be presumed to be valid in a 
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Lesniewskian sense. Consequently, the individual need not concern 
itself with, for example, the validity of prior material observations 
because all materially related observations jointly may be presumed 
valid up to some Lesniewskian linguistic level, and that level can be 
identified by determining the highest level up to and including which 
descriptions of related material observations lead to consistent 
conclusions. This highest level of consistent description is one level 
below the current level of cognitive access, the level relative to which 
all currently consistent descriptions are defined. 
A Perspectivistic Procedure 
If the complete function of current existential concern is not 
consistently inferrable as a quality of one or more classes of 
functional collective wholes consistently describable on the presently 
describable level, then induction of the functional metawhole of 
existential concern is called for. At this point an inductive search 
for meaningful patterns among the inconsistently describable 
observations must be undertaken. Success in this undertaking is, as 
Rapaport (1972) pointed out, dependent "on an act of intuitive 
recognition", and not "on any conscious selection of variables and of 
relations among them". The capability of carrying out such inductions 
is primitive, "simply given to us, as it is to other animals", or, in 
the opinion of the present author, to all life forms. To be efficient 
in such inductive efforts, the mind should not be fettered with 
expectations based on previously acquired quantitative knowledge, but 
guided by the "sense" of meaningfully qualitatively describable wholes. 
In other words, under a Lesniewskian linguistic analysis approach; or on 
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the one-level-higher, purely cognitive scale of the perspectivistic 
approach; it is invalid and debilitating, to attempt to define! priori, 
based on experience with quantitatively describable entities, the whole 
or type of whole responsible for the function of current concern, 
because valid identification of the (at this point) only qualitatively 
describable metawhole will be replaced by the self-realizing prophecy of 
a previously designated whole that is quantitatively describable and 
therefore not of an adequately high linguistic!1ogical level or material 
function. 
Because of the primitive nature of the perspectivistic approach, a 
procedure is short, and specified by the form of the preceding 
discussion of a Lesniewskian linguistic analysis approach. 
1. A function of material concern to the knower becomes apparent. 
2. Efforts based on previously acquired knowledge fail to control the 
function or to identify appropriate responses to its occurrence; 
i.e., consideration of previously known functional wholes lead to 
contradictory conclusions regarding the identity of the functional 
whole of concern. 
3. All entities which are validly describable at the currently highest 
logical/cognitive level are qualitatively identified --
quantitative descriptions are to be avoided, in order to avoid 
adulterating the knower's "cognitive innocence". 
4. Those entities which can be experimentally demonstrated, or, on the 
basis of materially reliable previously acquired knowledge, 
concluded to have no effect on the function of concern are 
eliminated from consideration as parts of the whole of concern. 
5. The candidate part entities are collectively submitted for 
intuitive consideration. Since inductive reasoning is not a 
conscious activity there can be no procedure for this step. 
Indeed, if the work conditions are correct, i.e., not excessively 
fixated on quantitative data collection, or overly demanding on the 
functional capacity of the mind, then this activity is probably 
occurring continuously. This is important since all the entities 
necessary to the induction of the whole of interest may not be 
known at the time of preparation of the list of highest-
qualitatively-describable-level, candidate part entities. 
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6. The whole of interest, once induced, is not itself subject to 
quantitative analytical experimental verification. But its parts, 
which were previously entities of the highest-qualitatively-
describable-level or other entities which were not consistently 
quantitatively describable will, if the induction was correct, now 
be consistently quantitatively describable. If they are not, if 
the function of concern is still not controllable, or if 
appropriate responses to the function can not be consistently 
selected. then the induction was invalid and should be abandoned 
(though this is not easily mentally accomplished) and the procedure 
re-initiated. 
In the body of this dissertation I present the results of the 
application of the perspectivistic approach to examine the current 
predicament of agriculture as the consequence of a failure to diagnose 
traditional practices as materially unreliable (mutually contradictory) 
with consideration to the collective whole within which agronomic crop 
production is a major and essential function. Chapter 3 suggests that 
the logicalj1inguistic/cognitive level of the induced whole(s) currently 
used as the relativistic reference(s) for the description of the 
behavior of plant/soil systems is not adequately high, and attempts to 
present the inductive identification of an appropriate level. Chapter 4 
presents a model of soil structural development compatible with the 
plant-control model (whole), induction of which was begun in Chapter 3. 
In conjunction, the plant-control hypothesis and soil structural 
development model form a higher (metawhole) level model of control and 
self-regulation in plant/soil systems. Under this higher level model, 
previously inconsistent quantitative descriptions of parts of the 
plant/soil system become consistent without loss of the practical 
usefulness of those descriptions. Chapter 5 presents demonstrations of 
the effectiveness of the high level model in enabling consistent 
quantitative descriptions where only inconsistent descriptions had been 
available before, and in predicting and interpreting the consistencies 
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among observations made independently by different observers in 
different locations. 
A CLOSING REMARK 
There are several other relevant matters which I have not 
discussed, but this text DUst end somewhere, so I offer these closing 
thoughts. My time (all too long) in graduate school has inclined me to 
believe there is one very important thing that is strikingly difficult 
to find in science and academics today: sincere intellectual humility -
- a virtue which seems almost impossible to develop or maintain by 
intent. And another is all too easily encountered: the elevation, in 
practice, of easily stated and apprehended logical or mathematical 
principles to the status of universal or natural law. As mentioned 
earlier in this appendix, Einstein'S theory of relativity has been a 
victim of such unwarranted intellectual and social sanctification. 
Another victim is the principle of logic known as Ockham's razor and 
often interpreted as requiring that, among competitive explanations, 
simple explanations be accepted over more complex. A powerful and 
important tool in the realm of closed logic systems, its reliability 
with respect to accurate description of the material universe, the 
natural sciences, or any effort to deal with non-ideal universes is 
dubious. So I offer in closing this quotation from Rapaport (1972) 
(part of which appeared earlier in this appendix) as it reflects my own 
view about the role of science, humility, and simplicity in this my 
present effort and those of scientists, and human beings in general: 
A strong case can be made for the search for simplicity as an 
activity rooted in a survival mechanism. A simple, predictable 
environment is easier to adapt to than a complex, capricious 
one .... Science is clearly a systematized search for simplicity, a 
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method of making the world predictable [understandable] .... The 
search for simplicity, however, is seductive. It is easy to delude 
oneself into thinking one has discovered a great universal law, and 
delusions of grandeur of this sort are -- alas! too frequently --
apparent in the work of scientifically or mathematically 
semiliterate cranks ... the line between creative and destructive. or 
self-defeating, effort is thin .... So it is with the search for 
simplicity. The catharsis of insight is exhilarating, but the 
distinction between a genuine insight and a self-induced illusion 
is not clear. There is, however, one test to which one can put 
one's insights if one has the courage .... !f it [one's insight] only 
opens the mind to further, more tantalizing questions, if it makes 
one more humble than proud, it may be genuine. Insights derived 
from speculations instigated by perceived analogies function 
somewhat like education: they reveal to the intelligent and 
conceal from the stupid the extent of their own 
ignorance .... Therefore , seek simplicity and distrust it. 
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